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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation analyzes the life and writing of inventor and scientist Alan Turing in 
order to define and theorize chiasmic relations between bodies and texts. Chiasmic 
rhetoric, as I develop throughout the dissertation, is the dynamic processes between 
materials and discourses that interact to construct powerful rhetorical effect, shape 
bodies, and also compose new knowledges. Throughout the dissertation, I develop 
chiasmic rhetoric as intersecting bodies and discourse, dynamic and productive, and 
potentially destabilizing. 
 Turing is an unusual figure for research on bodily rhetoric and embodied 
knowledge. He is often associated with disembodied knowledge and as his inventions are 
said to move intelligence towards greater abstraction and away from human bodies. 
However, this dissertation exposes the many ways that bodies are active in shaping and 
producing knowledge even within Turing’s scientific and technical writing. I identify 
how, in every text that Turing produces, chiasmic interactions between bodies and texts 
actively compose Turing’s scientific knowledge and technical innovations towards digital 
computation and artificial intelligence. His knowledge, thus, is not composed out of 
abstract logic, or neutral technological advances. Rather, his knowledge and invention are 
composed and in through discourses and embodied experiences. Given that bodies and 
discourses are also composed within social and political power dynamics, then the 
political, social, and personal embodied experiences that compose Turing’s life and his 
embodiment also compose his texts, rhetoric, inventions, and science. 
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 In Chapter 1, I introduce Alan Turing and the significance of my research for the 
fields of rhetoric of science and technology, body studies, and also for our understanding 
of Alan Turing’s technical writing. In Chapter Two, I first show that antithesis has been 
the primary figure representing the dichotomy between bodies and knowledge. However, 
I also draw from feminist science studies and a style analysis of Turing’s essay “Nature 
of Spirit” to demonstrate that a strong antithesis between bodies and mind can never be 
maintained: bodies can never be totally excluded and bodily presence is rhetorically 
significant. In Chapter Three, I define how bodies are always already connected with 
discourse: the two can never be separated. In Turing’s article “On Computable Numbers 
with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem,” the intersection between bodies and 
texts is significant in the way that Turing draws from his embodied experience 
performing calculation in order to invent the Turing Machine, which became an 
important theoretical foundation for digital computation.  
 In Chapter Four, I argue that the chiasmic relation between bodies and texts is 
dynamic and productive. The dynamic chiasmus in Turing’s article “Intelligent 
Machinery” reveals the ways that Turing’s embodiment as a homosexual man in England 
in the 20th century informs his early proposals for how to develop artificial intelligence. 
In particular, the very same disciplining—through intervention and a focus on the body— 
that compose Turing’s embodied experiences as a subject of sexuality and 
governmentality also composes Turing’s proposal for constructing intelligence in 
machines. In Chapter 5, I posit that Turing rhetorically constructs a disruptive notion of 
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machine intelligence that is embodied, feminine, and performative or imitative. This 
finding is of particular importance in the field of science and technology, which is 
predominantly known for excluding women as well as qualities associated with 
femininity. Turing disrupts traditional expectations in technical writing by feminizing the 
machine. His article “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” disrupts traditional 
definitions of intelligence by making femininity, fallibility, and embodiment central 
components that qualify a machine as an intelligent being. In Chapter 6, I conclude by 
demonstrating the importance of chiasmic relations between bodies and texts for 
technical writing broadly, including the teaching of technical writing. Then I end by 
proposing a pedagogy of care and disorientation that are attuned to the complex 
embodiment of students interacting with texts in our composition classrooms.  
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CHIASMUS 1:  
CHIASMIC RHETORIC 
 
“Write yourself. Your body must be heard.”  Cixous 
“Language has all the suppleness of human flesh, and something of its warmth.” Quinn  
 
 
 
In this dissertation, I analyze the interactions among the life and the writings of 
Alan Turing, who has been celebrated as a father of computer science, honored as a 
British war hero for his work as a cryptologist in WWII, and is one of the many victims 
of British laws criminalizing homosexuality. This research focuses on the intersections 
and interactions between the body of the scientist and the writing of science. In order to 
investigate these intersections and interactions, I demonstrate that the rhetorical figure 
chiasmus—which is significant in rhetorical theory, literary theory, and gender theory—
is a productive heuristic for analyzing the relations between bodies of flesh and bodies of 
texts. Chiasmus is a rhetorical figure that connects two phrases so that the phrases are 
balanced and at the same time the phrases can be dissimilar or even antithetical. For 
example, Isaac Newton illustrates his law of motion: “if you press a stone with your 
finger, the finger is also pressed by the stone.” For theorists of gender and bodies, 
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chiasmus also figures relations between bodies and discourses that are dynamic and co-
constructing. As I develop and explore increasingly complex notions of chiasmus; so too, 
the relations between bodies and discourse become increasingly complex.  
Chiasmic rhetoric, as I develop it from both rhetorical theory and feminist theory, 
is composed of dynamic processes between materials and discourses that interact to 
construct powerful rhetorical effect, shape bodies, and also compose new knowledges. I 
define chiasmic rhetoric as the rhetorical effects of the relations between bodies and 
discourse. And these chiasmic rhetorical effects aid in constituting knowledge.  
Throughout the dissertation, I develop chiasmic rhetoric as 1) intersecting (bodies and 
discourse) 2) dynamic, which is to say productive, 3) potentially destabilizing. I'll 
develop each of these movements of chiasmic rhetoric in chapters 3, 4, and 5. This 
dissertation develops a theory of chiasmic rhetoric by drawing upon definitions of bodies 
in relation to discourse posited by gender theorists, especially Judith Butler, Elizabeth 
Grosz, and Karen Barad. These feminist theorists present definitions of bodies that 
intersect with discourse in order to compose bodies as well as compose knowledge. In 
this definition, discourse and bodies are intersecting and interacting, yet also diverging 
from or exceeding each other. Each singular body is the product of the unique 
interactions and relations between unique material bodies and shared but complex 
linguistic construction. Through the interactions between language and bodies, chiasmic 
rhetoric produces powerful, materially embedded rhetorical appeals. In order to develop a 
notion of chiasmic rhetoric, I posit that rhetoric, especially rhetoric of science, can benefit 
from more complex theories of bodies, especially theories grounded in feminist and 
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gender theory, that make visible the significance of embodiment for knowledge 
production.   
In this way, too, chiasmic rhetoric will move to show how the gap between bodies 
and knowledge, first opened by Plato, can be moved ever closer towards closure. 
Through this dissertation, I demonstrate that the chiasmic rhetoric of Alan Turing’s 
particular embodied experiences contributes toward the process of his inventive and 
insightful scientific and technical work. At the same time, his education, research, and 
disciplinary training also function as technologies of the body that co-construct Turing’s 
embodied experiences.  
Regarding our knowledge of bodies in rhetoric, this dissertation contributes to the 
fields of rhetoric and composition, especially in technical and scientific writing and 
rhetoric, by analyzing how a body’s particularity and uniqueness shape the composition 
and the content of text and technical knowledge. This project demonstrates how Alan 
Turing’s bodily particularity and uniqueness shape the composition and content of his 
texts that contribute towards the development of digital computation. By interpreting the 
chiasmic relations between bodies and rhetoric, we can see not just what we know, but 
also how we know through rhetorical forms.  
I am glad to be placing the rhetorical forms at the center of this project. Often, 
when scholars of rhetoric turn towards bodies, ontology, or epistemology, they also move 
away from the nuts and bolts of rhetoric and language—like structure, rhetorical forms, 
and style. The performative critique of Luce Irigaray demonstrates that male philosophers 
have not only composed arguments that exclude women, but that these men have also 
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performed masculine embodiment in the form, style, and syntax of their compositions. I 
show that by turning towards bodies in rhetoric we can also turn towards the material or 
formal aspects of rhetoric and language. Both the form of bodies and the form of 
language actively contribute to the meaning and knowledge we construct.  
In addition, this project contributes toward current scholarship on the rhetoric of 
science and technology. For over 20 years, rhetoric of science scholars have 
demonstrated the ways that scientific discourse as well as scientific facts are embedded in 
and produced through rhetoric (Bazerman, Myers, Campbell, Fahnestock). Gross makes a 
stronger claim that rhetoric is constitutive of scientific knowledge (Rhetoric of Science; 
cf. Starring the Text). Marcello Pera also makes this argument but extends the role of 
rhetoric into the very methods and logic of scientific reasoning and discovery. Although 
Gross recently argued for a more moderate version of this claim (Starring the Text), the 
field and also science studies more broadly have continually shown how our scientific 
knowledges are inseparable from the words, figures, forms, and strategies of composing 
science in discourse (Taylor). This dissertation focuses on the deep, meaningful relations 
between Turing’s embodiment and the construction and composition of his scientific and 
technical knowledge. This contribution demonstrates that all knowledge is constructed by 
particular bodies in particular contexts, and that the political, social, economic, gendered, 
raced, and sexualized particularities of those bodies also form the knowledge. My 
inclusion of bodies into the rhetoric of science is significant because these bodies co-
construct powerful rhetoric and new knowledge, and with the exception of feminist 
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science studies, studies of the rhetoric of science and technology have not considered 
embodiment as a active or productive aspect of scientific and technical discourses.   
I am not, however, attempting to contribute to current debates and discourses on 
Turing’s biography or his technical innovations. Volumes of work have already been 
published that detail Turing’s biography; of those Andrew Hodges’ biography is 
doubtless the most detailed, complex, and scholarly. In addition, volumes of work have 
already been published on Turing’s theoretical contributions to mathematics, computer 
science, and artificial intelligence. B. Jack Copeland and his frequent co-author Diane 
Proudfoot are the leading experts on Turing’s writing and inventions. Certainly the 
conversation that Turing initiated on artificial intelligence has also generated volumes of 
theoretical scholarship. I draw on all of this scholarship, but my primary contribution 
towards an understanding of Turing is informed by rhetorical theory as well as theories of 
bodies and gender. My research is the first to analyze Turing’s embodied experience and 
his rhetorical practices. Instead, I am contributing to scholarship on Turing by 
demonstrating how his rhetoric and his embodied experiences constitute his technical 
invention and scientific knowledge production.  
This dissertation challenges the common understanding of Turing as a figure who 
erases bodies with digital technology and artificial intelligence. Granted, some claims 
that Turing disembodies knowledge are, on the surface, justified: Turing moved 
computation out of the hands of men and women and into a computer, and he challenged 
the humanist claim that we are the sole owners of intelligence when imagined machines 
could be trained to demonstrate intelligence.  In this way, he is seen as complicit in a 
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broader shift toward digital technology, which is also seen as a shift away from human 
bodies. In order to complicate this narrative about disembodiment and digital technology, 
I analyze Turing’s writings and embodied experience as they move towards and then 
beyond the invention of digital computation. My analysis demonstrates that Turing was 
far from a disembodying, abstracting inventor. The opposite is true: Turing’s texts are 
lively with bodies and always connected with his embodied experience. Specifically, this 
research demonstrates the ways that his thinking and his writing are fully integrated and 
co-constructed with his particular embodied experiences. More broadly, these arguments 
contribute towards technical communication and digital technologies. This dissertation 
asserts that all modes of communication and even all modes of invention are always 
already embodied and material. Finally, while other scholars of science and technology 
have demonstrated the ways that technology has been discursively coded as masculine 
and an extension of masculine strength and drive to control (see Easlea; Cockburn; 
Seidler; Grint and Gill), this research highlights a unique and disruptive moment in the 
history of computing in which both engineer and technology were coded in feminine 
ways. Erin Manning and Brian Massumi point towards the embodied context of 
knowledge when they write, “concepts must be experienced. They are lived.” In the 
figure chiasmus, bodies and discourses intersect and interact with rhetorical effect and 
knowledge production even in the most abstract discourses of mathematics and digital 
computation.  
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Constructing Alan Turing 
Constructing his Role in Computer Science 
Alan Turing, born in 1912 and deceased in 1953, is a disputed ‘father’ of digital 
computation. Beyond his various involvements with the community of inventors working 
towards digital computation, strong defenders of Turing’s legacy stress that Turing 
contributed the vision or insightfulness that paved the way for other inventors (Copeland 
“Turing after the UTM”). In particular, Turing’s 1936 article “On Computable Numbers 
with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem” is often cited, including by Von 
Neumann, as a theoretical foundation for digital computation. Hodges, one of Turing’s 
most committed advocates, praises Turing “as one of the very few who had the vision, it 
fell to Alan Turing to force the British government into the modern world” (219). Agar 
suggests that, although Turing did not directly work on the Colossus (the computer built a 
the British Government Code and Decipher School to decrypt German messages during 
WWII), Turing influenced its construction because the computer “was a symbol-
processing device that immediately recalled the imaginary machine [Turing] had 
conjured up in his 19371 paper” (111-112). Leavitt also gives Turing credit for his 
conceptual contribution towards computation. Leavitt seems to dismiss von Neumann’s 
contributions by writing that the US Electronic Numerical Integrator And Computer 
(ENIAC), fully functional by 1947, was “von Neumann’s apparent wholesale 
appropriation of [Turing’s] ideas” (201). Likewise, Dyson also grants Turing the role of 
the conceptual father of digital computation, while portraying von Neumann as the a 
                                                
1 The date of “On Computable Numbers” is often cited incorrectly. Its original 
publication date is in November 1936.  
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brilliant and more business savvy opportunist. Biographers reconstruct Turing as a 
genius, but because he preferred to work with numbers and machines rather than people, 
he remained over looked by historians. In addition, these accounts often point to his 
personal queerness as a sign of social awkwardness that made him reticent to appear in 
public. While these claims about why Turing may have failed to gain recognition may 
generally be valid, he did gain public attention as first a war hero and then as an inventor. 
He frequently appeared on radio shows and public debates, although his performance was 
often critiqued as awkward or so technical he was incomprehensible. In these accounts of 
Turing’s legacy, biographers also reconstruct a stereotype of the solo genius whose 
commitment to knowledge is praised while individuals like von Neumann are often 
characterized as power hungry or even narcissistic. Nevertheless, Turing’s name has 
never been on a major computer patent and for many years his contributions towards 
computers were left unrecognized.  
The debate over Turing’s contribution towards the digital computer continues: 
Just this year, Thomas Haigh published, “Turing Did Not Invent the Computer” in 
Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery. In order to support this 
denial of Turing’s contributions, Haigh separates computer science from computing 
technology. Grounding his argument in a bifurcation of theory and practice, Haigh claims 
that while Turing did publish some of the most significant foundational texts in computer 
science, he did not directly invent any computer2. Haigh’s distinction between theoretical 
                                                
2 This claim is debatable. Turing worked on Computers for the British Code and 
Decipher School, the National Physics Lab, and the University of Manchester. However, 
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and technical advances is anachronistic. Although commonplace in contemporary 
computer science, in the 1940’s and 1950’s, especially in the midst of WWII, theorists 
like Turing designed, built, and operated computing technologies. Haig critiques 
Copeland for conflating theory with practice. This paradigm difference between the 
theoretical advancements and the technical advances are commonplace in contemporary 
computer science. However, Turing certainly didn’t know the difference. In the 1940’s 
and 1950’s, especially in the midst of WWII, the theorists like Turing designed, built, and 
operated computing technologies. 
 
Constructing his Sexual Identity 
In addition to being the object of debate in the history of computing, Turing is also well 
known as a tragic victim of anti-gay laws in England, under which Turing was sentenced 
and punished with chemical castration. This punishment was levied against Turing after 
he was arrested under “gross indecency” laws in 1952. Unwilling to admit that 
homosexuality was a crime, he did not deny the accusation nor did he defend himself. He 
was sentenced to one year of estrogen treatment, which was essentially a form of 
chemical castration. Just one year after the sentence of estrogen injections was complete, 
he apparently committed suicide from ingesting cyanide. Although many details of 
Turing’s life are debated, none is so adamantly or as inconclusively debated over whether 
he committed suicide or if he accidently poisoned himself. In 2009, Prime Minister 
                                                                                                                                            
his name was never on a patent nor was he ever the lead designer of the final version of 
any of these particular computers.  
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Gordon Brown issued an apology to Alan Turing. And on Christmas Day 2013, while I 
was writing this dissertation, Alan Turing was officially pardoned.  
Although this is a well-documented fact, Turing biographers and scholars 
commonly refrain from making mention of his sexuality except in reference to his trial 
and then later his death. For instance, although Copeland was one of the most prominent 
advocates soliciting the British government for Turing’s pardon, in his scholarship on 
Turing’s theories and intentions, Copeland never mentions Turing sexuality and seldom 
mentions his personal life. Whitby, Haig, Dyson and many others who do discuss 
Turing’s personal life, still do not discuss his sexuality unless it is in reference to Turing 
trial and his death. Here are two notable exceptions. Hodges’ biography is by far the most 
complex and unapologetic account of Turing’s sexuality. Leavitt also states that his 
primary goal in writing Turing’s biography is to repair the previous problematic accounts 
of Turing’s life, sexuality, and thinking.  In this dissertation, I discuss Turing’s 
embodiment in chiasmic relation to his writing and technical invention. And this 
embodiment does include some discussion of his sexuality. However, I must insist that, 
as we move to include Turing’s body more fully, that we do not reduce his embodiment 
exclusively to his sexuality. This is important because Turing’s embodiment is complex 
and includes many diverse experiences. Nevertheless, heteronomativity and the 
construction of sexuality do not only regulate sexual practices but also practices that form 
subjectivity more generally. Hence—in the chiasmus between Turing’s embodiment and 
his discourse—his sexuality as well as his gender do play a prominent role.  
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Tracing Bodies in Philosophy and Rhetoric 
The connections I draw between bodies and rhetoric in Turing’s text are not new; a 
connection between bodies and rhetoric can be seen throughout the history of Western 
philosophy. Since Plato, bodies and rhetoric have shared similar fates in relation to Truth. 
For instance, in the Phaedrus, Plato ranks souls according to their proximity to truth and 
knowledge. Obviously, the philosopher was at the very top of the list. The sophists—
those who made a profession out of teaching the art of oratory and persuasion—were 
ranked nearly at the bottom, just slightly better than the tyrant. Those who work with 
their bodies primarily, laborers and craftsmen, were ranked just slightly higher in the 
proximity to truth. In Plato’s ranking, we find that those who build their craft primarily 
with their words or bodies are both alienated from true wisdom. This is because, for 
Plato, both bodies and language are just temporary, worldly representations. The body is 
a burden and obstacle for the soul of the person. Likewise, a word is a mere mimicry or 
representation of a true form. This treatment of bodies and rhetoric became one of Plato’s 
most widely adopted legacies.   
In The Advancement of Learning, Bacon re-reads the people of his day back into 
Plato’s cave where they are chained and blinded by pretty words, bodily pleasures, and 
superstition. Bacon develops a method of inductive logic that attempts to free the 
thinking man from the trappings of language and his subjective bodily perspective (while 
acknowledging their existence as necessary “Idols” in human life). Rene Descartes also 
holds that language and bodies distract from knowledge. His method of deduction begins 
by doubting bodily senses, including sight. Like dialectic for Plato and induction for 
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Bacon, deduction offers for Descartes a way to move beyond the burden of bodies and 
words towards pure logic and cognition.  
Notably, rhetoric is often explained metaphorically as a woman who uses her 
body to distract and pacify men from doing serious intellectual work. For instance, John 
Locke wrote, “eloquence, like the fairer sex, has too prevailing beauties in it to suffer 
itself ever to be spoken against. And it is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving, 
wherein men find pleasure to be deceived” (book III).  The assumption here is that their 
bodies primarily define women. In this metaphor, rhetoric, like a woman’s body, is only 
useful for simple, superficial pleasure. So rhetoric and women's bodies pose the same 
threat—they both focus on bodies, pleasure, and sensation. Bodies and rhetoric were 
opposed to serious knowledge that was understood as transcendent or superior to 
experiences of pleasure through bodies and words.  
 
Bodies in Relation to Reason 
The work of feminist philosophers helps to explain why and how bodies were excluded 
from philosophy and Truth. Notably, Genevieve Lloyd argues that the very definitions of 
reason are dependent on excluding bodies, material, and also women. This exclusion of 
bodies from the definition of reason, however, does not mean that bodies play no part in 
the development of theories of reason, logic, and knowledge. No, the opposite is case. 
She explains that the very definition of reason is dependent on first developing restrictive 
definitions of bodies.  
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For Plato, reason either transcends bodies or the two are defined as opposites or in 
conflict (Lloyd 207). In the Phaedrus, for instance, bodies are compared to an ignoble 
horse that fights against the controlling reason and knowledge of the charioteer, which 
represents the rational, wise soul. Bodies are temporary, volatile, and natural. Reason, on 
the other hand, transcends and controls everything that is associated with bodies. Lloyd 
demonstrates that if bodies are defined as temporary, volatile, and natural, then reason is 
defined as eternal, stable, and cultivated or heavenly. This is not the only way that 
philosophers have separated bodies from reason.  
Lloyd also explains that the Enlightenment with its development of scientific 
methods used a different logic to separate bodies from reason. For instance in the writing 
of Francis Bacon, knowledge is the power to control and master nature, which contains 
no reason or intelligence. The physical world and knowledge are not necessarily battling 
against each other as we see in Plato. Nevertheless, the physical world and knowledge are 
defined as opposites: the physical is devoid of reason, and reason is the power to control 
the physical (Lloyd 10-17). Although different philosophers have conceived of varying 
relations between bodies and reason, Lloyd argues that what these different notions have 
in common is that after first defining bodies, reason stands in for all that is definitionally 
opposed to bodies. This definitional opposition allows philosophers to conceive of reason 
and logic as transcendent from bodies. 
Although bodies are excluded from the definition of reason, philosophers 
nevertheless devote extensive attention to discussing and defining bodies. These same 
men—Plato, Descartes, Francis Bacon—who exclude bodies from reason and 
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philosophy, also theorize bodies, especially how to manage, regulate, control, and 
discipline bodies. For instance, Descartes, the famed father of modern philosophy, 
excludes bodies in his Meditations by creating a rigid distinction between mind and body. 
Lloyd explains that this sharp distinction between body and mind is crucial for the 
development of his scientific method, which utilizes the pure intellect of the mind and 
excludes the sensations of bodies (45). However, Descartes also wrote extensively on 
bodies. In his treatise Passions of the Soul, he defines bodies as “everything that can be 
observed in us that is opposed to our reason” (365.5). According to this text, our bodies 
are machines that regulate our sensations and passions so that our logical, rational minds 
are left pure from our animal-like passions (354.10-355.10). 
 
Feminist Critique of Reason/Body Antithesis 
This mind/body dualism has been consistently critiqued for centuries. Significantly, 
feminists identify ways that women have also been separated from knowledge in this 
binary. For this project, it is important to note two main lines of critique.  
First, the split between mind and body is challenged because it is not logically or 
ontologically viable. Moira Gatens interprets the theories of Benedict Spinoza to remind 
us that his thinking, even back in the 17th century, collapsed the binary between mind 
and body and between reason and emotion. Gatens explains that Spinoza’s ethics 
associate rationality and intellect with kinds of lived, bodily activities. Thinking is a kind 
of action or mode of being that the mind performs (Gatens 61). Understood this way, 
reason cannot be separate from bodies because reason requires a body to act and think. 
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Because humans can only know or think through and in our bodies, we can also improve 
our knowledge and rationality by better understanding our bodies, rather than 
transcending our bodies as Descartes would suggest. In addition, Lloyd demonstrates that 
reason and logic have never been disembodied. Rather, reason and logic have been 
consistently defined in opposition to anything feminine. The so-called universal subject 
and objective logic are neither universal nor objective, but instead conform to masculine 
characteristics and value masculine subjects (Lloyd iii-x).  
Second, Cartesian dualism is critiqued because, despite Descartes’ intention to 
include women and men equally in this ‘universal’ reasoning, his commitment to split 
body and mind actually reifies male dominance and female exclusion or subordination. 
Bodies are first defined as separate from reason. Then, femininity is also defined as 
opposed to reason because femininity is associated with bodily pleasure, birth, emotion, 
and other corporeally-bound experiences. As Lloyd argues, because reason is defined in 
opposition to the feminine, then to achieve rational thought we must first transcend or 
exclude anything defined as feminine. Her argument demonstrates how the very 
definition of reason preserves power relations that give men dominance and superiority as 
more rational beings (103). 
After identifying the problems with our definitions of bodies, gender theorists, 
especially Judith Butler, Elizabeth Grosz and Karen Barad, have worked to address this 
problem by redefining bodies as meaningful, volatile, relational, and even agential. While 
I engage in a detailed discussion of these definitions of bodies progressively in each 
chapter of this dissertation, for now, these philosophers are significant because they all 
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move towards new definitions of bodies. I connect these feminist definitions of bodies 
with rhetorical theory in order develop a notion of chiasmic rhetoric as a process of 
interacting and co-constructing bodies and discourse. With this notion of chiasmic 
rhetoric, I analyze Turing’s texts in order to demonstrate how the intersections between 
his embodiment and his compositions compose Turing’s concepts and his writing 
towards the invention of digital computation. 
 
Bodies in Relation to Rhetoric 
The passive bodies that feminist scholars have identified are also be found in some 
rhetorical theory. However, instead of truth or knowledge transcending or controlling 
bodies as we see in philosophy, rhetoric and language transcend and control bodies. For 
instance, we see this when Michelle Ballif (Seduction, Sophistry, and the Woman with the 
Rhetorical Figure 25) and Diane Davis (Breaking Up 40) both define bodies as passive 
and even non-existent before the constructing power of language and rhetoric. Gail 
Corning and Randi Patterson define bodies as sites of inscription and construction at 
intersection of “persuasion, discourse, and power” (9). These definitions define bodies as 
passive objects that are constructed through active language. This gives rhetoric a 
transcendent, productive role over bodies. By first defining bodies as objects and 
language as active powerful processes, rhetoricians are then able to theorize rhetoric 
without accounting for the bodies that live and breathe in each rhetorical situation.  
Since at least the 1990s, the emerging field of body rhetorics argues that bodies 
have been marginalized from contemporary scholarship. These scholars cite a perceived 
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absence of bodies as the exigency for more detailed research that focuses on bodies. (e.g. 
Corbeill, Nature Embodied: Gesture in Ancient Rome; Crowley “Body Studies in 
Rhetoric and Composition”; McKerrow, “Corporeality and Cultural Rhetoric: A site for 
Rhetoric's Future,” Jack Selzer and Sharon Crowley, eds. Rhetorical Bodies, Barbara A. 
Biesecker, John Louis Lucaites, Rhetoric, Materiality, and Politics). For example, in their 
edited collection Rhetorical Bodies, Sharon Crowley and Jack Selzer argue that the 
linguistic turn focused so narrowly on language that bodies were either excluded entirely 
or were included as inert, passive matter constructed by all-powerful language.  
In response to this perceived absence, rhetoricians have moved to include bodies 
more fully and actively into our theories of discourse and persuasion. Debra Hawhee 
argues that we must include bodies in rhetoric in order to address the vast diversity of 
rhetoric we encounter in our day-to-day lives (“Bodies, Rhetoric, and Everyday Life”). In 
her analysis of Burke’s life and writing, she describes language and bodies in a tight, 
interacting relationship, in which bodies and language both have some influence or power 
over the other (Moving Bodies).  This relationship between bodies and language can also 
be seen in Burke’s theory of consubstantiality from A Rhetoric of Motives. Burke 
introduces this term that joins two distinct, even opposed parties by focusing on shared 
interests or commonalities (20-21). Consubstantiality is a way of “acting together” (21) 
between bodies and discourse. For Burke, bodies and language are never identical; 
however, they are always intersecting and interacting. 
In the related field of Composition studies, Kristie Fleckenstein (Embodied 
Literacies), Sondra Perl (Felt Sense) and Peter Elbow (Vernacular Eloquence) all argue, 
  18 
in different ways, that composition has failed to utilize a writer's body to improve 
writing. They all offer different solutions for bringing bodies into composition more 
fully. For instance, Peter Elbow argues that, if we speak aloud while writing, then our ear 
and ingrained sense for language will aid in compositing clear, simple, eloquent writing.  
While I acknowledge that the common claim in body rhetorics—that bodies have 
been excluded—is valid regarding much of rhetorical theory, reading generously into the 
history of rhetoric reveals a rich tradition of discourse on bodies. Since at least as far 
back as the ancient Greeks, bodies have played important roles in rhetoric. The sophists 
held the belief that the universe is a connected interacting whole, wherein everything is 
material, including language (Kerferd 72). With this understanding of the universe, 
sophists theorized rhetoric as a material or bodily method of creating change. Gorgias 
demonstrates this theory of language when he wrote that words worked like strong body 
seducing Helen of Troy (“Encomium of Helen”). In part, this can be read as a metaphor. 
However, Gorgias also believed that words have the power act on bodies by recreating 
sensory experience (Enos 132-3)—which his Encomium does by physically 
demonstrating it! Long after the sophists, even Aristotle accounted for the different kinds 
of bodies—young, strong, or old—of potential audiences, although somewhat 
rationalistically (On Rhetoric 165-9). A key figure in Roman rhetoric, Cicero understood 
oratory as working on intuition in much the same way that music works on bodies to 
make us move (Katz). 
Within modern rhetorical theory, bodies play active roles in some of the most 
significant texts. The 18th century saw renewed interest in elocution and chironomia, 
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which were two forms of pedagogy that taught orators to train their bodies’ gestures, 
postures, pronunciation, and vocal performance in order to maximize persuasive impact. 
(Austin, Chironomia; Bulwer, Chirologia). The work of Kenneth Burke contains 
extended discussions of bodies acting rhetorically (Permanence and Change; see 
Hawhee, Moving Bodies). James Berlin’s social-epistemic rhetoric shifts the focus of 
rhetorical theory towards the historical and material contexts of text and shifts the focus 
of pedagogy towards understanding our experiences as texts to be read. The focus on 
historical context refocuses on specific bodies within specific material contexts. In 
addition, focusing on experiences as texts refocuses on our bodily experiences (e.g., 
emotions, reactions, movements, and senses of security or insecurity) and how rhetoric 
shapes our actions, beliefs and identities. In race rhetoric, Keith Gilyard’s scholarship 
studies how race functions in dominant discourse to prescribe limited or even 
dehumanizing identities to black bodies while white bodies define the norm (Race, 
Rhetoric and Composition). Feminist rhetorics also have called attention to gender and 
the role of women in rhetoric’s history (e.g., Jarrett, Rereading the Sophists; Glen, 
Rhetoric Retold). Feminist scholars have also theorized rhetorics race, laughter, and 
silence and listening rhetoric, which all include some consideration of bodies (e.g. hooks 
Talking Back; Davis, Breaking Up [at] Totality: A Rhetoric of Laughter; Glen, 
Unspoken). George Lakoff and Mark Johnson also account for how our bodies participate 
in rhetoric by drawing from recent findings in cognitive science (Philosophy of the 
Flesh). They explain that our brains use metaphor to understand abstract concepts by 
relating them to concrete, bodily experiences. 
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 I move through these texts quickly to emphasize that there is no deficiency of 
discourse on bodies in recent rhetorical theory. If Burke compared scholarly discourse to 
entering a parlor with a heated conversation already in progress (Philosophy of Literary 
Form, 110-111), the parlor in which rhetoricians discuss bodies is quite a crowded party. 
Not only do we have a body in rhetorics, we have a lot of different bodies doing different 
things. In the above review of literature, I have emphasized the inseparability of 
discourse and bodies by focusing on the many intersections between the two in the 
history of rhetoric. The intersections between discourse and bodies demonstrated in this 
quick literature review are significant for this dissertation because they set the stage for 
the chiasmic relation between bodies and discourse. Rhetoric and bodies seem to be 
inseparable.  
 
The Mutual Threat of Bodies and Rhetoric 
This intersecting treatment of bodies and rhetoric is not coincidental: both represent 
challenges to universal truth, reason, and logic. If an observed truth is to achieve the 
status of universality, then that truth must be true for all bodies, at all times, in any 
language, and potentially in any rhetorical arrangement. Rhetoric and bodies both 
challenge claims to universal truth because both call attention to the particular physical 
and discursive context in which truths are constructed, composed, and communicated. 
Therein lies the threat that philosophers since Plato have warned against: both bodies and 
rhetoric remind us that knowledge is from some body and understood through some 
rhetorical strategies and within established discursive codes.  
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Instead of universal truths and transcendent knowledge, bodies and rhetoric 
compose knowledge and even truths that are limited the specificity of unique situations, 
stylistic choices, singular bodies, and our particular life experiences. All of these 
particularities shape how we communicate. In addition, the particularities of our bodily 
and rhetorical forms, in this case Turing’s bodily particularity and rhetorical particularity, 
construct how we interpret, understand, and value knowledge and meanings. Our bodies 
shape what we know about the world, our ethics, and political values. In addition, 
language and rhetorical choices shape how we understand the world. Language and 
bodies are both forms that interact to construct the lenses through which we understand 
our lives, our world, and our values. 
 
Chiasmus and Embodiment 
The chiasmic relation between bodies and discourse, which we will investigate in and 
through Turing’s writing, is by no means new or unique. Maurice Merleau-Ponty set a 
precedent for thinking of bodies as chiasmic figures. In “The Intertwining—the Chiasm,” 
Merleau-Ponty introduces the term chiasm to explain the crisscrossing, intertwining 
interactions among vision and touch—and by extension objectivity and subjectivity. 
Merleau-Ponty begins with the experience of touch and touching in which the subjective 
experience of touching is also the objective touch of the other. Chiasmic experience and 
material reality reverse and intertwine to connect subjectivity and objectivity. Merleau-
Ponty then extends this intersection so that vision relates to the connection between 
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external, social, and cultural experience while touch relates to internal, personal, and 
individual experiences.  
By arguing that flesh and world intertwine though sight and touch, Merleau-Ponty 
concludes that subjective knowledge is always intertwining with objective knowledge. 
Merleau-Ponty describes these intertwining experiences in wave-like, intertwining terms: 
“Through this crisscrossing within it of the touching and the tangible, its [the hand] own 
movements incorporate themselves into the universe they interrogate, are recorded on the 
same map as it; the systems are applied upon one another, as the two halves of an orange” 
(133). The subjective experience of any human is always connected and, as Merleau-
Ponty writes, “recorded on the same map” as objective reality. This conclusion refuses to 
deny objectivity. Merleau-Ponty is not a solipsist nor is he an empiricist. Instead, 
intertwining flesh and the world assumes that any knowledge is at the same time both 
objective and subjective.  
Working with Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasm, Judith Butler further develops 
the definition of bodies as chiasmic figures. In particular, the rhetorical figure chiasmus 
becomes the model for understanding the relation between bodies and language. Butler 
defines chiasm as “the rhetorical figure…that two different relations are asserted which 
are not altogether commutative” in which “there is a formal symmetry in the figure of the 
chiasm, there is no semantic equivalence between the two phrases symmetrically so 
paired” (“Sexual Difference as a Question of Ethics” 75). Butler sees this figure as 
powerful. The meaning between the two sides of chiasmus, like the relation between 
language and bodies, always exceeds each other. Although there is formal balance, they 
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both produce surplus. In Bodies That Matter, she describes the relation between bodies 
and language as “chiasmic in their interdependency, but never fully collapsed into one 
another” (69).  
Although she never explicitly uses the word chiasmus, Elizabeth Grosz’s theories 
also imply chiasmic relations. In particular, Grosz describes the interactions of material 
and culture as a Mobius strip. This shape of the Mobius strip is initially a chiasmus in so 
far as it is made of two parts that intersect in the center (36). However, this figure adds a 
further layer of complexity to the chiasmus. First, the two intersecting lines are not two 
separate lines. Rather, they are folded over to connect at both ends. This is a single 
connected strip that is twisted into an X. This means that the two lines not only intersect, 
they also curve around and back into the other side. Second, this twisted strip, in order to 
create the X, must also have a twist on each side at which point the inside become outside 
and outside becomes inside. We find similarly complex, intersecting relations defining 
the rhetorical figure of chiasmus.  
 
Chiasmus and Form 
Chiasmus, although defined in a variety of ways, always creates an intersecting formal 
balance between two different clauses, phrases, sentences, or larger sections of text. The 
figure is composed of two intersecting, always connected, but never collapsible parts. For 
instance, we have Francis Bacon’s chiasmus “If a man will begin with certainties, he 
shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin with doubts he shall end in 
certainties” (in Quinn 94). The figure is made of two lines that intersect. The meanings of 
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these two phrases intersect, but they also diverge so that the meanings are opposed. The 
intersecting parts of the chiasmus simultaneously suggest difference and inseparability. 
Likewise, bodies are composed of different yet inseparable parts—both body and 
language—as I will analyze in the case of Turing. Bodies and Language neither 
collapsible into a larger whole nor are the distinct parts totally separable or totally distinct 
from the interacting parts. The relation between the two is so close that we cannot 
understand bodies without language, and we cannot construct meaning without our skin 
to sense, our hands to write, and our mouths to speak. The relation between these two 
parts is also equal; language does not supersede or override bodies, nor do bodies 
determine or control language.  
Chiasmus has been defined inconsistently at times as a trope, other times as a 
schema, and at times as both. The differences between tropes and schemas are significant 
because they parallel the antithetical relation set up between knowledge and bodies. 
Schema means the shape or the form of language. This is the structure, sound, and the 
space that words take up on pages. Edward P.J. Corbett, for example, defines scheme as a 
“deviation from the ordinary pattern or arrangement of words” (425-6). Trope is defined 
as “a deviation from the ordinary and principal signification of a word” (426). Tropes are 
figures of concepts and content. Because tropes figure concepts or content, they are often 
given more attention and value as important ways that humans communicate. Fahnestock 
writes that it is especially the trope of metaphor that has received extensive scholarly 
attentions (4-6). Schemas, however, have had an uphill battle. As Fahnestock explains, 
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schemas are often defined as ornamental, non-essential, even excessive or distracting (17; 
cf. Lyotard).  
This distinction between schemas and tropes parallels the distinctions between 
knowledge and rhetoric, mind and body, and message and media (see McLuhan),. In each 
of these distinctions, philosophy and science have traditionally privileged the abstract 
first term as separate, and perhaps more pure or true, than the material or structural. Just 
as mind has been privileged over bodies, and ideas or knowledge cherished without 
regard to the media, so to tropes have been privileged as epistemic—or keys to 
understanding and knowledge—while schemas have been seen as unessential, structural, 
and instrumental for communicating, understanding, or constructing knowledge. When 
Francis Bacon, in The Advancement of Learning, rails against rhetoric as a frivolous and 
decorative practice, he is writing against rhetoric as an ornament of words. Even Henry 
Peacham’s 1577 treatise on rhetorical forms, which is ostensibly a celebration of 
rhetorical forms, still compares them to the flora and fauna that decorate the garden of 
eloquence (in Espy).  
This diminished or unessential role for the schema, however, is by no means 
uncontested. The later shift to privilege ideas as independent of formal structures, 
according to Fahnestock, is another negative consequence of the “fatal dissociation” 
between content and form (58). Jeanne Fahnestock argues that schemas form the epitome 
of scientific argument. She also argues that Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian make no 
distinction between tropes and schemas, because, in some ways, these fathers of rhetoric 
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understood form in a tight, complex relationship with content. Form and content are 
inseparable; moreover, they both inform and dynamically co-construct each other.  
Chiasmus forms the primary figure of my rhetorical thinking in this dissertation. 
In addition, I have composed the dissertation as an initial iteration of a performance of 
chiasmic movements that create multiple points of intersection between bodies and 
rhetoric. I have done this primarily by intersecting and connecting biographical details 
from Turing’s life, feminist theories of bodies, technical history of digital computation, as 
well as detailed study of the rhetorical figure chiasmus. By cutting together these 
different discourses, this dissertation creates intersections and interactions between 
Turing’s body, theories of bodies, technology, and rhetoric. In composing the form of this 
dissertation, I was also committed to writing in a narrative, performative style. This is not 
exclusively a stylistic choice. Just as rhetorical figures construct knowledge, so too, my 
use of narrative shapes the knowledge of this text by adding energy, movement, and the 
particularity of Turing’s story. Narratives and stories, as theorized by Adrianna Cavarero, 
anchor theory in specific human body (Relating Narratives). This style is central to 
Cavarero’s philosophy, as she argues that bodies have long been erased from philosophy 
and political theory (For More Than One Voice). To counter-act this centuries-long trend, 
Cavarero uses narrative and storytelling as her philosophical method. The result is that 
her texts live and breathe with lively bodies on every page that give depth and complexity 
to her ontological and political thought. Likewise, I use Turing’s narrative to drive the 
argument and the form of this dissertation. 
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Chapter Overview 
Each chapter gradually develops a notion of chiasmic rhetoric by considering 
increasingly more complex movements of chiasmic figuring. As these chiasmic relations 
become more active, so too does my discussion offer complex analyses of Turing’s 
embodiment and how that embodiment relates to his developments of digital computation 
and artificial intelligence. In Chapter Two I begin by discussing antithesis, which is 
related to but simpler than chiasmus. I argue that antithesis is the primary figure that has 
been used to represent the relations between bodies and knowledge in philosophy and 
demonstrate how Alan Turing reforms long established antithetical relations between 
bodies and mind in his young writing in the 1932 essay/letter “Nature of Spirit.” To 
demonstrate that we need a more complex figure to understand the relations between 
bodies and knowledge, I enroll feminist critiques of mind-body dualism into a close 
reading of Turing’s style to find locations in the text where antithesis breaks down. 
Having established the added complexity of the relations between bodies and 
knowledge, I turn to chiasmus for the remainder of the dissertation. In Chapter Three I 
develop the most extended discussion of chiasmus. This chapter functions as the center 
point of the dissertation and creates a grounding for understanding chiasmus between 
bodies and discourses. In that chapter, chiasmus moves to connect or intersect two things. 
From this movement to connect, I will build the remainder of the dissertation into more 
and more dynamic and even unstable notions of chiasmus between bodies and discourse. 
In Chapter Three, I use the detailed scholarship on chiasmus from the historical, literary, 
rhetorical, and stylistic perspectives to argue that Alan Turing’s thinking and invention 
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are fully integrated and intersecting with embodiment, even in his most theoretical and 
most abstract 1936 article “On Computable Numbers with an Application to the 
Entscheidungsproblem” that proved that mathematics would always have some mysteries 
and unsolvable problems. To get to this conclusion, Turing had to first start with the 
embodied process of solving calculations. With this argument, I therefore further develop 
a notion of chiasmic rhetoric in Alan Turing’s writing in which bodies and discourse co-
constitute knowledge.   
In Chapters Four and Five I develop chiasmic rhetoric through increasingly 
complex notions of embodiment and relate these Turing’s own embodied experiences. In 
Chapter Four, I argue that chiasmus moves towards dynamic relations between the two 
intersecting parts of bodies and discourse. In this case, Turing’s body and his writing on 
artificial intelligence in “Intelligent Machinery” (1948) dynamically intersect in so far as 
the disciplining and regulating that Turing experienced on his own body were re-
inscribed onto the computer’s body. In Chapter Four, I also integrate theories of 
sexuality, especially by Foucault, in order to call attention to the many rigorous ways that 
the intellectual training that Turing benefited from constitute a form of bodily training 
that compose him as a subject with sexual subject outside of heteronormative standards.  
In Chapter Five I pay close attention not only to embodiment of Turing and of the 
computer, but also to bodily differences. Chiasmic rhetoric, here, moves towards 
becoming a destabilizing force. In particular, this chapter looks at the gendering 
discourses of Turing’s world and also in Turing’s text. I analyze Turing’s most famous 
text “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” to argue that Turing’s chiasmic rhetoric 
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destabilizes the relations between bodies and discourse. Here, I find that the relations are 
destabilizing because Turing not only embodies his machine in particular ways but also 
genders the machine and the machine’s technicians as feminine. This specific feminizing 
calls attention to the bodily differences that are re-inscribed when Turing begins with 
bodily experiences in order to produce knowledge of artificial intelligence.  
Finally, in Chapter Six, I conclude with a discussion of how the notions of 
chiasmic rhetoric that I have articulated in this dissertation generate critical and 
productive methods of teaching writing, especially the teaching of technical writing. 
Given that all writing is embodied writing, I argue that the writing of science and 
technology has more work to do to acknowledge and account for the particular embodied 
context of its production and also the embodied effects. It is with the movements of 
chiasmic rhetoric that I am able to demonstrate the progressively complex, integrated, 
dynamic, and even destabilizing relations between Turing’s embodiment and his 
technical writing. And chiasmic rhetoric has important implications for teachers of 
technical writing. In addition, it is through the movements of chiasmus that I demonstrate 
the many significant ways that Turing’s knowledge production and his inventiveness 
composed through his embodiment. This suggests that we must pay attention to the 
unique bodies composed between material and cultural construction in the classroom, and 
how we might do this. 
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CHIASMUS 2:  
PRODUCING ANTITHESIS THEN BREAKING ANTITHESIS 
 
 
 
“I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter  
but certainly not always by the same kind of body.” 
 ~Turing, “Nature of Spirit”  
 
“A perennial motif that underlies much of scientific creativity—names, the urge to 
fathom the secrets of nature…we will fathom the ultimate secrets of own mortality.” 
~Keller, From Secrets of life to Secrets of Death 
 
 
Before Alan Turing invented the digital computer and cracked the codes produced by the 
Nazi Enigma Machine, he was just a boy experimenting with friends, with relationships, 
with gnats in jars, and telescopes pointed to the skies. He was also a boy who received 
rigorous disciplining to conform to standards of British decorum. Through this 
disciplining and also through his study of biology, physics, and logic, Turing learned that 
a good body was disciplined, clean, and controlled. In this chapter, I will draw 
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connections between young Turing's experiences and his early thinking on the relations 
between mind and body. I will identify these connections between his life and ideas 
through a close analysis of his essay/personal letter, titled “Nature of Spirit.”  
 In “Nature of Spirit,” as I will demonstrate, Alan Turing defines bodies in 
opposition to spirit or free will. “Nature of Spirit” reproduces the well-entrenched 
religious, scientific and philosophical relation of antitheses between bodies and mind. 
Antithesis is a rhetorical figure that defines two things as opposed or mutually exclusive. 
Traditionally, Western philosophy and science have reified a relation of antithesis in 
which bodies are outside or opposed to knowledge, truth, and reason.  After defining 
antithesis, I will draw from feminist critiques of philosophy in order to trace the historical 
significances of antithesis between knowledge and embodiment. Feminist philosophers 
demonstrate that, while antithesis between body and knowledge may be rhetorically 
maintained, in fact, there are many levels of connection between knowledge and the 
particular historical, social, political, and embodied context, out of which knowledge 
emerges. This chapter is organized in the form of antithesis: it is composed of two parts 
that are opposed. I will first demonstrate how antithesis structures Turing’s essay, and 
then I will turn to demonstrate the ways that the article cannot not maintain mutually 
exclusive antithesis. In the second half of this chapter, I perform a close style analysis of 
Turing’s essay in order to locate places in the argument, structure, and style where 
antithesis breaks down: places where mutual exclusivity between mind and body are not 
maintained.  
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Turing’s Education 
Alan Turing and Christopher Morcom met at the prestigious Sherborne School when they 
were both teenagers. Alan didn’t fit in at the school, which seemed to be more concerned 
with teaching manliness, manners, and decorum than science and math. By ‘didn’t fit in,’ 
I don’t just mean he wasn’t one of the cool kids, which he certainly was not. He didn’t 
seem to fit in with any of the students. For 2 years, he had few or no friends. Although 
many of his professors agreed that Alan was unusually bright, even the adults teased 
Turing because of his appearance, which was often disorderly or even dirty, and his 
mannerisms, which were quiet and dreamy. He 
seemed unable to use a pen without getting ink 
all over his hands. On the sports field, he 
appeared to be day dreaming more than 
participating in a competitive event (Hodges 
11). His mother sketched the image to the left 
when Alan Turing was just 8 years old, which 
would surely have embarrassed almost any 
young boy (Leavitt 11).  
For an upper-class, young man at the 
beginning of the 20th century England, what 
seem to be peculiar habits to my 21st century sensibilities were more than embarrassing 
social faux pas. Alan’s peculiarity represented a major impediment to graduation from 
Sherborne and threatened his access to elite British society. Although everyone knew he 
Figure 1 “Watching the Daisies Grow” Drawing 
by Mrs. Turing, which she sent to the matron at 
Turing's elementary school in the spring of 1923. 
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was unusually bright, his parents continually received bad reports based on his bad 
handwriting, messiness, disordered dress, and general inability to conform to the social 
norms (Hodges 25).  
 Into this context, Christopher Morcom entered Alan Turing’s life. Turing was 16 
and Morcom was 17. These young men became friends. Morcom and Turing were also 
deeply intellectually engaged. Their letters back and forth discuss the details of their 
experiments and methods. They wrote about how to find particular asteroids and what 
constellations they had seen through their telescopes. Together they discussed chemistry, 
physics, math. At a place like Sherborne, where the sports were far more important than 
experiments and abstract mathematics, Turing was starved for companionship as well as 
intellectual simulation. Morcom’s friendship fed Turing personally and intellectually.  
This context is important in order to understand the importance of this friendship 
on Alan Turing. Morcom was not just a friend. He was Turing’s first close friend. In 
addition, he was the first to really engage with Turing in a way that allowed Turing to 
thrive as an intellectual young man with particular interests in science and math. This was 
an important turning point in Turing’s life. Morcom was more popular. With this 
companionship, Turing began to make more friends. He was enjoying his school 
experience and striving to succeed socially and academically, in large part, to impress 
Christopher (Hodges 42-43).  
 Several biographers describe Morcom as Turing’s “first love,” even Turing’s first 
lover. David Leavitt describes their relationship as one that “blossomed along the classic 
trajectory of nineteenth-century “romantic friendship,” marked by flurries of rhapsodic 
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emotion” (16). But “classic trajectory of nineteenth-century “romantic friendship”” is 
somewhat ambiguous. We know that Turing was open and even confident about his 
sexuality within his small group of close friends. Leavitt even calls Turing “naïve, 
absent-minded, and oblivious” for being so open about his sexuality (4). We know 
relatively little about Turing and Morcom’s relationship. We know from his letters that 
Alan was attracted to Christopher at first sight. Like many teenage loves, Alan felt that 
Christopher “made everyone else seem so ordinary” (in Hodges 35). The most extensive 
biographer on Turing, Andrew Hodges, writes that the romantic attraction was one-sided, 
but that their friendship was genuine and even affectionate (44).  
These studious, even nerdy, young men made plans to enroll in the same college, 
King’s College at Cambridge University. They made plans to continue their research. 
They wrote letters about comet sightings (Hodges 45). After two years of friendship, on 
February 6th 1930, Christopher was rushed to the hospital in London. Less than a week 
later Christopher died of tuberculosis. Turing was not told that Christopher was ailing 
until after he passed away.   
 
Alan Turing’s “Nature of Spirit” 
Two years later, Alan traveled to visit Christopher’s mother at her home, which is called 
the Clock House in Bromsgrove. This was not Alan’s first visit with Mrs. Morcom, who 
was an artistic, free-spirited woman. They became friends after Christopher died. Turing 
joined the Morcom family for vacations and for day-trips to Mrs. Morcom’s London flat. 
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During this particular visit in 1932—in the house where Christopher spent his childhood, 
experimented in the lab, gazed at the stars—Alan wrote a short essay “Nature of Spirit.”  
 
Figure 2: “Nature of Spirit” Letter Head from the Clock House 
 This 6-page, hand-written essay has been read as a seed pot out of which grew the 
theories that made possible the invention of modern computers and digital computation 
(Hodges 67; Copeland 30; Leavitt 102). In some ways, the essay seems to conform to the 
conventions of scholarly writing. He cites two opposed positions that many students of 
science at the time would have been familiar with, which are material determinism and 
emerging theories in quantum mechanics. In particular, he offers his summary on these 
two differing schools of thought on the relation between bodies and human freewill. 
Turing quickly summarizes his interest in these two fields and then clearly places his 
stake along with those who defend human free will and controlling mind over matter.  
 However, the essay breaks the conventions of scientific writing more than it 
conforms. In no way is this essay an example of scientific research or scientific writing. 
This is a note, the personal musings of a young man who has a deep interest in science. 
Turing does not attempt to conform to the structure of scientific writing. Gross identifies 
the dominant structure of articles in scientific journals: Introduction, Methods, Results, 
and Discussion (IMRaD). As will be discussed more in Chapter 3, even Turing’s 
  36 
published technical articles do not conform to this typical form. He is a young man 
interested in science. Most of his letters to friends and family included detailed 
descriptions of the books he read, experiments he performed, and theories he was 
developing. Even as a boy, he wrote to his mother about experiments with flies and drew 
sketches of less-than-successful invention. Like many of these letters, “Nature of Spirit” 
discusses his thoughts on scientific matters, but he is not attempting to formulate a viable 
argument. Nor does he attempt to conform to the expectations of a scientific audience, 
which of course was in no way his target audience. Rather, this is a sensitive, caring note 
of hope from a grieving boy to the grieving mother of Christopher Morcom. “Nature of 
Spirit” connects science and spirituality. Turing discusses his former belief in a heavenly 
afterlife and the possibility for a person’s spirit to live on beyond the death of a person’s 
body. And all of these spiritual, even mystical, claims are made in the context of 
scientific justification.  
 Although Turing posits claims about both materialism and spirituality, he offers 
no evidence or support for his claims. He engages with scientific theory but does not 
quote directly or even explain in any detail. Although he is positioning his claims 
between two different scientific theories, he writes his own position in the style of 
personal musing. For instance, he writes, “personally, I think” and “I cannot guess what 
happens.” These word choices suggest a low level of certainty, or rather, no certainty3. In 
this essay, Turing does not attempt to make empirical claims in this essay. He writes 
about spirits and alternative universes. Some words are placed in scare quotes, which 
                                                
3 In Latour and Woolgar’s classification of statements of fact in scientific writing, this 
would be statement type 1: speculations that convey the lowest certainty (79). 
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suggest that Turing himself didn’t quite accept his use of words like “spirit.” These scare 
quotes are ways for Turing to distance himself from the words “spirit” and “mechanical” 
(see Wysocki and Lynch 575). The physical essay reveals Turing’s messy handwriting, 
scratched out words, extra smudges and blobs of ink that dropped on the page has his 
hand moved from the inkwell to the page. In its form, claims, and even its physical 
appearance, this little essay is a personal, early musing of a young scientific mind 
thinking about a very personal topic.  
 If we consider the context in which Turing penned this essay, then the purpose of 
the essay appears to be less to establish his position on contemporary scientific theory 
and more to think through his dear hope that Christopher Morcom’s spirit may live on, 
even though this is never stated explicitly. This short essay was obviously not intended 
for publication or any professional audience. The one and only intended reader was 
Christopher Morcom’s mother. Turing wrote the essay while visiting her at the home 
where his friend grew up. Early in the day, Turing walked around the grounds that 
Christopher explored as a young man. Christopher’s mother wished Alan good night as 
they all retired for the night. Turing wrote the essay in Morcom’s room. He slept in 
Christopher’s bed. After all this, on stationary with “The Clock House” letterhead, Turing 
wrote “Nature of Spirit” hypothesizing that spirits may live on in alternative bodies. On 
the 3rd page, Turing pens the word “but when the body does the ‘mechanism’ of the body, 
holding the spirit is gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps 
immediately [sic]” (qtd in Hodges 64). 
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Figure 3: "Nature of Spirit" sample of Turing's handwriting. 
Although Christopher’s body may have died, his spirit may have lived on to inhabit other 
kinds of bodies. This hypothesis and hope that his friend’s spirit may still live on 
becomes an initial entry point for understanding the relations between bodies and spirits 
that Turing held at this time.  
 
Defining Bodies in “Nature of Spirit” 
The primary question of “Nature of Spirit” addresses the relationship between bodies and 
spirits. Turing specifically uses the word spirit, but I will also relate this spirit to notions 
of mind or consciousness. I make this association in part because Turing seems uncertain 
about this term: he uses quotes whenever he uses spirit. In addition, the theories that he is 
citing of are not theories of spirits in the religious sense. Rather, they are theories of the 
relation between material and human consciousness or free will.  
The significance of this essay is not in its scientific of theoretical soundness. 
Rather, the significance is in the fact that the essay lays the groundwork for 
understanding how Turing defines the relation between bodies and minds. Turing’s 
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answer is not because it is unique. Rather, his answer re-inscribes an age-old relation of 
antithesis between bodies and minds through scientific speculation.  
 Turing begins by dismissing a notion that “if everything was known about the 
Universe at any particular moment, then we can predict what it will be through all the 
future” (qtd. in Hodges 64). This position, which is a material determinist position, would 
allow no room for human will but would instead hold that matter predetermines all 
activity in the Universe. Hodges explains that this would have been a familiar concept for 
any student of science or math. For any problem, if sufficiently detailed information were 
provided, then the entire future of the physical system could be determined (Hodges 64). 
These material determinist theories would include astronomy, which Turing mentions 
specifically in “Nature of Spirit.”  In addition, many mathematicians espoused a kind of 
material determinism. In 1900, David Hilbert, the prominent mathematician, posed the 
Entscheidungsproblem, or the problem of decidability that asked if mathematics was a 
completely ‘decidable’ science. Until 1936, Hilbert and the majority of prominent 
mathematicians concluded that every mathematical question could be solved given 
comprehensive data and precise terms. This conclusion would be undermined in 1936 
with the publication of Turing’s first major contribution to mathematics “On Computable 
Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem,” which will be the focus of 
Chapter 3.   
Turing dismisses material determinism in favor of human will that is able to 
“determine the actions of the other atoms of the universe” (qtd in Hodges 64). Turing 
counters this material determinist argument by citing the theories of quantum mechanics, 
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which studies the physics of atoms and the smallest scale of matter. Turing was interested 
in new quantum mechanics because, at the very small scale of atoms and particles, “it 
seemed that certain phenomena were absolutely undetermined” (Hodges 65). Quantum 
mechanics has shown that random, unpredictable phenomena proliferate at the atomic 
level and cannot be explained through material observation (see Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
principle which he first published in 1927). Turing was working directly with Arthur S. 
Eddington’s in The Nature of the Physical World, which argues that the random 
phenomena observed in quantum mechanics are not random at all but rather the effects of 
human will or intuition. Hodges describes this book as an “olive branch that Eddington 
held out from the throne of science towards the claims of religion” (64). Eddington draws 
from Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principles, which draws on quantum mechanics to “check 
the findings” of philosophies, including Descartes’ notion of an independent mind with 
free will. John McTaggert’s Nature of Existence, published in 1921, extended the olive 
branch that Eddington held out from science to religion. According to McTaggert, the 
relationship between bodies and spirit is such that “matter is meaningless in the absence 
of spirit” (qtd in Hodges 64). McTaggert drew loosely from quantum mechanics to justify 
notions of reincarnation. According to McTaggert, a human mind (which Turing would 
call spirit) amplifies through matter beyond a single body (66). As a teenager, Turing 
believed in a Christian notion of heaven. He imagined that spirits could live without 
bodies. He rejects Christianity by the time he enters college. However, his beliefs in 
spirits do not stray far from Christian notions of souls and heaven.  
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While Turing expresses his conviction that spirit and bodies are connected, this 
connection is not a relation between two equal parts. In “Nature of Spirit,” Turing 
expresses his belief that “as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I 
consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ‘attract’ and hold on to a 
‘spirit’, whilst the body is alive and awake the two are firmly connected” (qtd. in Hodges 
64). While spirit and body are connected, spirit determines and gives meaning.  Matter is 
meaningless and lifeless. Matter dies and decays. Spirit is not bound to this same sad 
state. Instead,  “I think,” Turing contemplates, “that spirit is really eternally connected 
with matter but certainly not always by the same kind of body” (qtd in Hodges 64). When 
the body dies, spirits can live on in another kind of body. While spirit is particular, 
unique, and eternal, any kind of mortal body can passively hold onto spirit without 
changing the nature or character of the spirit. The work of McTaggert gave Turing more 
the scientific justification to imagine spirits inhabiting new bodies rather than residing in 
a heavenly place. It is unclear what kind of body Turing may have imagined 
Christopher’s spirit inhabiting. Hodges imagines that Turing may have hoped that “the 
Clock House still held the spirit of Christopher Morcom” (63). Hodges then asks “Could 
the atoms of Alan’s brain be excited by a non-material ‘spirit’, like the wireless set 
resonating to a signal from the unseen world?” (63). Years later, after many years of 
intellectual development, Turing will again suggest that some of the functions of human 
minds can be performed by new bodies. But this time the new bodies will be mechanical. 
In order to better understand the relation between bodies and minds that Turing posits I 
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will next review the significance of antithesis as a rhetorical figure and as a relation 
between bodies and minds in philosophy.  
 
Form and Rhetoric of Antithesis 
In “Nature of Spirit,” Turing presumes that the relation between bodies and matter is one 
of antithesis. Antithesis is a rhetorical figure that includes two parallel phrases, ideas, or 
things and defines the relationship between the two things as opposed, contrary, or 
essentially different. Turing’s use of antithesis within scientific writing is not unusual. In 
Rhetorical Figures in Science, Jeanne Fahnestock finds antithesis as a crucial figure in 
many foundational texts of scientific writing, including Francis Bacon's Advancement of 
Learning (59) and Darwin's The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals (65). This 
is also the figure that cements the difference between male and female as an antithetical, 
contrary relationship (Fahnestock 81-85). Richard Lanham, in Analyzing Prose, suggests 
that antithesis may be ingrained into our biology: “as a habit of mind, antithesis may well 
be intrinsic to how we think, part of the brain's now-familiar right and left 
hemispherically” (122). He finds antithesis in every aspect of life from the animal's body 
language (122) to the very “patterns of thinking” that also frame the structures of formal 
logic (125).  
In modern definitions of antithesis, many scholars continue to privilege antithesis 
as a more meaningful trope over any schema of form. When the form of antithesis is 
included, it is incidental or unessential for the effective use of antithesis. For instance, in 
A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms, Richard Lanham defines the figure as the act of 
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“conjoining contrasting ideas” (12) and mentions no formal qualities. Edward P.J. 
Corbett defines the figure in terms of either a figure of words and ideas or as a figure of 
ideas independent of form. His primary definition is that antithesis is “the juxtaposition of 
contrasting ideas, often in parallel structure”(464). Arthur Quinn defines antithesis as a 
figure that both affirms one thing and to deny/negate its opposite (67-8). He makes no 
mention of a specific formal structure, and of his examples do not follow into any 
particular form or structure.  
 In his more in-depth research on rhetorical figures Analyzing Prose, Lanham's 
discussion of antithesis brings the figure back to its formal schema. For Lanham, figures 
are like maps: they trace out in space the relations between things (119). These formal 
structures then become ingrained in our thinking as tacit knowledge: we understand the 
concept in part because we recognize the form. Antithesis gets its rhetorical force from its 
formal structure, which is recognized and understood by the reader. The form itself 
creates antithesis. However, Lanham’s is a flexible schema. Lanham defines antithesis as 
a form with parallel wording. According to Lanham, the ‘sense’ of antithesis must be 
created, but that sense can appear in a variety of forms. Throughout his discussion, 
Lanham analyzes a variety of figures, in a variety of grammatical structures that all work 
to create antithesis in both concept and form. Sometimes these are parallel; sometimes 
they are out of balance. Other times these are equal, or not equal. The importance is 
placed on figures that “both frame thinking and, by their formal ‘logic’ of sight and 
sound, urge certain thoughts upon us” (125).  
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 Although other scholars define antithesis as enacted in content alone, Fahnestock 
maintains a formally strict definition and demonstrates this in each of her examples. In 
addition, she defines a more specific structure for antithesis. In particular, the formal 
structure of the antithesis is “defined as a verbal structure that places contrasted or 
opposed terms in parallel or balanced cola or phrases” (46). Fahnestock draws this from 
Aristotle's Topics, which defines antithesis as both contrary ideas and also as a formal 
structure (51-52). She also explains that the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum as well the notion 
of antithesis in Quintilian and Cicero’s writings understand antithesis to be a figure that is 
both contrary or opposed ideas as well as a formal or stylistic device (55).  
 
Relations of Antithesis 
Antithesis, like many rhetorical figures, constructs specific relationships between two 
things. According to Fahnestock, antithesis can create new oppositions where there were 
none. It can use established oppositions in order to frame new arguments. In addition, 
antithesis can be used in more subtle ways to define or reconfigure the relationship 
between established opposites (58). This point is important because a number of different 
kinds of antithetical relationships are possible through this rhetorical figure. Antithesis 
can create a cut, essentially slicing two concepts of things into definitional opposites. 
This is a contrary relation (Corbett 129-131). This is like the cut between definitions of 
man and woman or masculine and feminine. The terms are defined through their mutual 
exclusion of the other. The relations between mind and body are most often contrary 
relations of mutual exclusivity where no middle ground is possible. But the opposition 
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does not have to be mutually exclusive. The antithesis could be that of scale (large or 
small, good or bad) or kind (cat or dog) (Corbett 59).    
The effect in all forms of antithesis, according to Lanham, is that the relations 
appear inevitable. The tacit logic of the figure works so that “the second half of the 
assertion seems to follow inevitably from the first because the shape of the phrasing says 
so” (Lanham, Analyzing Prose, 124), which creates the “path of least resistance” (136). 
In addition, the figure of antithesis creates either/or logic where no middle ground it 
possible. This, Lanham asserts, creates “mutually exclusive roles. It excludes, by its form, 
the temptation to stand in the middle” (123). In addition, this figure lends itself toward 
false dilemma or either/or fallacy. This is a common logical error in which only two 
options are considered while alternatives or middle ground are excluded.  
Antithesis can be understood in terms of topoi, or common places for starting 
arguments. Edward P. J. Corbett defines three topoi that also forms of antithesis: 
contraries, contradiction, and difference (129-31). These three classifications are part of 
his common topics for inventing arguments, which he draws heavily from Aristotle’s 
Topics. Contraries and contradictions are closely related terms. Both set up mutually 
exclusive relationships. However, contrary sets up a relation where one term is defined as 
“opposite or incompatible things of the same kind”  (hot vs. cold) (129), while 
contradiction sets up a relation where one term is defined as the negation of the other 
term (hot vs. not hot) (131). This difference is subtle but important for the purposes of 
argumentation. Contrary defines the relations between things as opposites where both 
terms are defined in opposition to the other. For instance, in the contrary between hot and 
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cold, their opposition defines both terms. However, with contradiction, the relations are 
defined by one term as the negative or absence of the other. For instance, in the 
contradiction between hot and not hot, the second term only has meaning in so far as its 
lack, or absence of heat.  
In the third class of antithesis, difference compares ideas or things through a more 
flexible and complex relation. In this comparison of difference, the things or ideas do not 
have to be of the same kind or species, for instance cats and dogs. These things are 
different, but they are not defined as opposed. In addition, relations of difference may 
share some qualities. For instance, cats and dogs are both mammals. An author could 
compare these different things without constructing an opposition. Rather, difference 
creates an antithesis where the two concepts overlap in some ways and diverge in others. 
This relation of difference is significant because antithesis does not have to construct a 
relation of mutual exclusivity. The topoi of difference allow the antithetical ideas or 
things to be defined through their dissimilarity while, at the same time, sharing some 
similarity or commonality. This is not the relation that Turing constructs in “Nature of 
Spirit.” However, as this chapter progresses I will demonstrate ways in which the strict 
mutual exclusivity of contrary cannot be maintained. Although I do not argue that Turing 
creates a relation of difference in this article, through a reading of his style and form, I 
will locate connections and mutual inclusivity between bodies and mind. Before I make 
that shift, I will next identify contrary antithesis as significant rhetorical form in Alan 
Turing’s essay “Nature of Spirit.” 
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Identifying Antithesis in “Nature of Spirit”  
Alan Turing builds his argument for spirit as transcendent of bodies on the topoi or 
common ground of contrary antithesis between bodies and minds. Antithesis works most 
obviously on the level of content in Turing’s “Nature of Spirit.” The two terms are 
mutually exclusive. Both are defined in opposition to the other: what is spirit is not body 
and what is body is not spirit. This antithesis can best be described as a contrary because 
the figure defines the relationship between bodies and spirit like two sides of the same 
coin: the definition of bodies becomes the opposite of spirits and the definition of spirits 
becomes the opposite of bodies. However, unlike contradiction, for Turing bodies are not 
defined as the negative or the absence of spirit. In fact, Turing writes: “but when the body 
dies the “mechanisms” of the body, holding the spirit is gone & the spirit finds a new 
body sooner or later perhaps immediately” (qtd in Hodges 64).  
I identify this relation as contrary because, for each quality that defines spirits, 
bodies are associated with the opposed quality. For instance, spirits are defined as unique 
and freed from lived experience while bodies are defined as general forms that are bound 
by material constraints. Bodies die. Bodies also need sleep. Death and sleep are not 
experiences of the spirit. In addition, Turing writes, “matter is meaningless in the absence 
of spirit” (qtd in Hodges 64). So bodies are meaningless, but spirits are meaning-giving. 
He writes that bodies “hold on to” spirits while alive. Another key term Turing uses is 
“mechanisms,” which he puts in scare quotes. This word choice suggests a notion of 
bodies as mechanical, programmed, automatic. Earlier in the essay Turing writes that 
bodies serve to “amplify” the working of spirits. Again, this word choice works 
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metaphorically. Here bodies are like speakers or amplifiers that help to project the sound 
(content/data) of a person or recording. Spirit is active and meaningful. The matter of 
bodies is instrumental and serves to aid but not contribute or change the content of the 
spirit. This suggests a definition of bodies that are passive content, form with no content. 
Spirits, on the other hand, are defined as active content of a person, identity that is 
indifferent to form. In all of these qualities, the qualities of spirit are contrary to the 
qualities of bodies. 
By drawing upon the antithesis between bodies and spirit, Turing is drawing from 
a common place of arguments. The antithetical relationship is not a new concept that 
Turing introduces or extends. Instead, this antithesis would have been an accepted notion. 
As Fahnestock explains, antithesis builds a new argument based on accepted notions of 
antithesis. Corbett classifies contrary and contradictions as common topics. These 
common topics are to be used to generate or discover new arguments. In order to develop 
a new argument, Turing started with the common topic of an antithetical relation between 
bodies and spirits that his audience would have readily accepted. But what then, if not a 
new relation, was Turing trying to argue? In this essay, Turing works from antithesis 
between bodies and spirits in order to posit a new argument that perhaps spirits can 
continue to live in a number of different kinds of bodies.  
 Antithesis can also be found in the macro organization of the essay.  The 
organization is in the form of antithesis in so far as the position posited in the opening is 
first refuted and then the contrary position is established in the final paragraph. In the first 
paragraph, Turing introduces a notion of biological determinism, which is exactly the 
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notion that he seeks to reject. He writes, “it used to be supposed in Science that if 
everything was known about the Universe at any particular moment then we can predict 
what it will be through all the future” (qtd in Hodges 64). The second paragraph moves to 
a notion where spirits are the key meaning-gives, but they are also eternally connected to 
bodies: “As McTaggart shews [sic] matter is meaningless in the absence of 
spirit…Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter but certainly 
not always the same kind of body” (qtd in Hodges 64). Then, in the final two short 
paragraphs, Turing considers how spirits may move from body to body as our material 
existence ages and dies. He questions, “why we have bodies at all; why we do not or 
cannot live free as spirits and communicate as such?” (qtd in Hodges 64). This structure 
creates antithesis between biological determinism, which he rejects, for the alternative of 
all-determining spirit with passive bodies. This antithetical structure pivots on the claim 
that bodies and spirits are eternally connected but not always to the same body. This 
antithesis form creates a sense that there are only two alternatives, as Richard Lanham 
explains, that are mutually exclusive: matter is either all determining or spirit is all 
determining. No middle ground is possible. In addition, the antithesis structure transitions 
so that the notion of biological determinism is negated through the move to affirm spirit. 
 Finally, how may we see antithesis on the formal level, the sight and sound of the 
sentence? Fahnestock defines as antithesis as a schema of parallel phrases connecting 
opposed idea. To begin, nowhere in Turing’s essay do we find a schema of antithesis as 
defined by Fahnestock. But this does not mean that we cannot find the sense of antithesis, 
as described by Lanham, in the formal structure Turing’s writing. First, many of the 
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sentences bodies and spirits alternate between the subject and the object. For instance, 
Turing writes, “the body by reason of being a living body can ‘attract’ and hold on to a 
‘spirit’… spirit finds a new body sooner or later…The body provides something for the 
spirit to look after and use” (qtd in Hodges 64). In each of these cases, bodies and spirits 
are separated into the subject and object. As Corbett explains, contrary antithesis creates 
a relation where, in this case, bodies and spirits are mutually exclusive (129-131). In the 
form of Turing’s essay, that separation can even be found on the level of the sentence by 
separating the terms into either the subject or the predicate. This separation creates a 
visible and structural divide between bodies and spirits. In addition, bodies and spirits are 
associated with different kinds of actions. Bodies “can ‘attract’ and hold.” “The body 
provides something for the spirit to look after and use.” These verbs—‘can attract and 
hold’ and ‘provides’—put bodies in an instrumental or useful role. Bodies provide 
resources. Bodies hold and attract. The actions that bodies perform are in the service of 
something else, and that something else, for Turing, is spirit. Meanwhile “spirit finds a 
new body.” Spirits communicate; they do things and they use bodies. In these cases, spirit 
has the will to find, use, and look after bodies. Sprits act on the basis of will. Bodies are 
passive resources that hold and amplify the will of spirits.   
 
Purpose of Body and Mind Antitheses 
This relation that I’ve described above is far from unique. This can be found in volumes 
and volumes of philosophical and scientific theory. As Hodges points out, “Alan could 
have found many of these ideas in his reading of Eddington while still at [Sherborne] 
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school” (64). Arthur Eddington wrote The Nature of the Physical World, which Turing 
had been reading since he first arrived at Sherborne. Eddington was a Quaker who sought 
scientific justification for his religious beliefs. His book explicitly explains the human 
body as a kind of machine. This machine of our bodies facilitates the working of human 
free will.  
This notion of bodies and spirits that both Eddington and Turing presume can be 
found throughout the history of philosophy and rhetoric. This contrary antithesis has been 
a common place for defining not only bodies, but also for defining what kinds of 
knowledge is valued in philosophy and science. This tradition assumes that bodies are 
passive and meaningless without mind or spirit. Likewise, Alan Turing writes of bodies 
that are meaningless, mechanistic, and passive; this is the result of long-standing 
discursive codes that defines bodies as opposed to knowledge. Out of this context, it is no 
wonder that Alan Turing could envision a way for his friend Christopher’s active, wise 
spirit to transcend and overcome the death of a passive bodily container. Turing clearly 
indicates that any body will suffice. He writes, “spirit’s really eternally connected with 
matter but not always by the same kind of body.”  And that when a particular body dies 
“spirit finds a new body sooner or later.” In other words, the particularity of a human’s 
body is irrelevant. Spirits need to live or reside in bodies, but spirit can move from body 
to body. Equipped with this antithetical relationship between bodies and minds, Turing 
will later invent a thinking machine. However, later we will find that bodies in Turing’s 
text play a more complex and even active role in their relation to thinking and mind.  
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Movements of Antithesis 
Lanham uses an active, physical metaphor to explain the rhetorical work of antithesis. 
Antithesis performs a rhetorical Judo: “by keeping the phrase but inverting its meaning 
we use our opponent's own power to overcome him” (122). Antithesis sets up contraries 
but only in order to throw one under the dominance of 
the other. In the practice of Judo, as with antithesis, the 
superior athlete may not be stronger. No… it is trickier 
than that. The dominating athlete uses the forms and 
techniques of Judo to turn strength of the opponent into 
the opponent’s own downfall. The image to the left is a 
pictogram of a Judo match. The two opponents meet 
in the middle. They touch. The body of one seems to meld indistinguishable into the body 
of the other. This figure looks deceptively like a caring or sharing embrace. However, at 
the heart of this connection we have antithesis and opposition. The two meet, touch, 
balance into each other only to try to master. Brut strength will not win this opposition. If 
one opponent were to throw in all of his strength, then he would lose his balance. Once 
balance is lost, the match is over. The superior opponent knows how to match strength 
while maintaining balance. By maintaining that balance, the superior opponent can turn 
the power of her opponent into the crucial move to dominate the lesser opponent.  
Fahnestock writes that antithesis is most complete when the figure is set in two 
parallel and balanced phrases (46). By setting up the figure in a balanced structure, 
antithesis gives a sense of evenness and completeness. Just as with the body and mind 
Figure 4: Olympic pictogram of Judo 
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antithesis, the two are set up as two poles out of which the world can be divided neatly 
and cleanly between the two. This appearance of balance, according to Lanham, also 
gives a sense of naturalness or inevitability (Analyzing Prose 125). Fahnestock may agree 
with this claim as she writes that antithesis is strongest when the readers already buy into 
the opposed relation (58). When readers come across this balanced yet oppositional 
figure, it appears to contain everything, both the negative and the affirmative. Both sides 
of the coin are visible by connecting the antithesis. The writer appears to be revealing all: 
the light and the dark, the heads and the tales, statement and counterstatement.  
However, by setting up a figure that claims to show both sides, the figure creates 
a logical fallacy of false opposition. The figure may tell the reader that it shows 
everything, both light and dark; however, all shades of grey and all color are hidden in 
the figure. By dividing the opposition into two balanced, seemingly complete opposed 
pairs, antithesis hides more than it reveals. Antithesis hides the grey areas between the 
two opposites. The contrary relations of antithesis also hide how the two things or ideas 
may create relations of sharing and co-construction rather. This is especially true for 
contrary and contradiction. Only difference is a relation that allows for opposition while 
at the same time preserving complex connections and similarity. 
Antithesis also appears to be natural or inevitable, as if there is no other way to 
understand the relation between the two opposites. As Fahnestock argues, this figure 
“exploits the existence of many “natural” opposites in the vocabularies of languages” 
(Fahnestock 47).  In the case of body-mind dualism, the figure of antithesis does not 
simply set up balance between the two: bodies and minds are the two parts that make up 
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our world. More specifically, if the figure of antithesis sets up these opponents so that 
one is clearly poised to dominate the other, then the figure sets up from the start a relation 
where minds are the dominating, constructing opponent.  
This relation of contrary antithesis is obvious in Turing’s essay. Bodies are 
associated with passive, instrumental verbs. At the same time, spirit is associated actions 
that are willful, productive, and meaning-giving. By setting up this balance that divides 
the world into passive bodies and active minds, the figure of antithesis creates a sense of 
natural, inevitable opposition. Everything associated with bodies appears naturally 
opposed to minds. Women, nature, emotions, sex, bodily desires: all of these fall neatly 
and naturally as opposed to minds, knowledge production, and agency. In the figure of 
antithesis, the split appears natural and inevitable.  
 
Feminist Critique of Antithesis 
When feminists identify and critique the contrary relation between bodies and 
knowledge, their insights are meaningful to women because the critique identifies the 
means through which women have been systemically excluded from the very definition 
of reason, logic, and knowledge. And the significance goes beyond this important 
contribution. This feminist critique matters because they reveals what men have to gain, 
or what men seek to gain, by defining bodies in opposition to reason. Men gain a means 
to elevate the knowledge they produce to the level of universal, eternal, objective truth. 
This gives their knowledge a power of indisputable truth. In addition, by creating 
universal truths that transcend bodies, this knowledge has a power over bodies and a 
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power over and beyond our human lives. When we break down the antithesis between 
bodies and knowledge, we can begin to see the rich, productive, and politically 
significant ways in which bodies inform our knowledge production. We also begin to 
break down the grip of universal truth in favor of particular, contextually contingent 
knowledge.  
 Even at a young age, Alan Turing learned to discipline his body in order to 
communicate. In particular, as will become a theme throughout his life, Alan Turing 
invented technological means of controlling his body so that he can ‘properly’ develop as 
a student. For example, young Alan Turing had terrible handwriting. As Hodges explains, 
young Turing’s handwriting problems “plagued him” (14). In fact, adult Alan Turing had 
pretty messy writing. As a child, he couldn’t seem to write without getting ink all over his 
hands, little arms, and his writing table. This was a serious problem. At the elite 
Sherborne School, students were evaluated more on their ability to conform to standards 
of decorum than they were on their course work. Likewise, the neatness and orderliness 
of his writing and physical appearance was evaluated as much, or even more, than the 
content of his writing. At a young age, Alan Turing learned that controlling and training 
his body was a prerequisite for educated young men. 
  56 
Turing’s first and second inventions, at the age of 11, were writing machines. On 
April Fool’s Day, 1923, Turing describes his first invention to his mother: “Guess what I 
am writing with. It is an invention of my own it is a fountain pen… you see to fill it 
scweeze E and let go and the ink is sucked up and it is full [sic]” (ctd Hodges 14). This 
squiggly line sketch does not appear to represent a particularly promising solution to this 
problem. Apparently this new 
device was intended to slowly 
control the ink to avoid 
smearing onto his arms, shirts, 
and tables. This particular letter, 
which was written using his 
pen, does not necessarily 
demonstrate better handwriting. 
A couple of months later, he 
wrote about his second 
invention: a typewriter with 
“funny little rounds” for letters that press against ink. By this time he gave up on legible 
handwriting in favor of mechanical writing. Turing needed to discipline his body in order 
to progress as a student. At this time in his life, his body was the problem. He solved that 
problem through these childhood inventions, through these technologies.  
Young Turing sought to train his body in order to conform to the standards of an 
educated young man. These can be seen as small, literal manifestations of what Foucault 
Figure 5: Letter to Mother and Father with Diagram of Fountain Pen. 
1929.  
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would identify in his lectures on govermentality as “technologies of the self.” However, 
for Foucault, these technologies of the self are much larger than any literal technology. 
Technologies of the self refer to a broad set of practices, laws, conventions, and 
discourses that individuals practice in order to represent, and even constitute, themselves 
as subjects. Chapter 4 addresses the interactions and co-constructions between bodies and 
writing (a mode of technology of the self) and will engage with Foucault’s concepts in 
detail. For now, I raise this concept in order to call attention to this small example, of 
which many more will be discussed in Chapter 4, in which technology is used to 
discipline Turing’s body. This literal controlling bodies through technologies of the self 
is a specific instantiation of a larger epistemological necessity to control bodies for the 
sake of knowledge production.  
 
Controlling Bodies 
Adrianna Cavarero explains that controlling bodies and managing bodies is of vital 
importance: it is only through controlling or excluding bodies that claims of universal 
truth can be posited. Cavarero explains that Plato first defined philosophy as the pursuit 
of true forms and as antithetical from bodily life. For Plato, philosophy is most like 
mathematics4. This connection would have been especially meaningful for Plato because 
logos can also mean numbers (Cavarero 152-3). Associating philosophy and Truth with 
numbers and mathematics was a much more appealing option than associating Truth with 
                                                
4 Toulmin and Goodfield suggest that Plato’s theory of matter, which explains all matter 
in terms of quantifiable, geometric shape, and volume, would also reduce all physical 
science to mathematics (75-82). 
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bodies and speakers. Bodies and speakers are all different. They change over time. They 
live in concrete reality. The particularity of a concrete body or context informs the truth 
produced. For Plato, Truth and true forms must be free of the instability of material 
reality. True forms must be timeless, invariable, and therefore abstract. Numbers are not 
necessarily connected to material reality. One can think of numbers, count, solve 
problems, without ever associating those numbers with physical things. In addition, the 
relation between numbers is always stable. The value of 3 + 2 is always the same no 
matter what is being counted. As Plato associates truth with numbers (a kind of logos) 
and distances truth from speech (another kind of logos), truth comes to be understood as 
abstract, disembodied, and universal. Again, this separation allows philosophers to 
maintain an illusion of universal truths that are independent from the particularity of the 
speaker.  
 This split allows for a tradition of philosophy that promises to construct Universal 
Truth. This must have been so very empowering to those who ‘discover’ truths. Their 
ideas were not particular, contextual ideas that may have begun and ended with the life of 
the person. Instead, they were discovering timeless truth. They were articulating truths 
that existed for all time, for all men, in any place. This form of knowledge—the 
knowledge that can never and will never change—was the premium for philosophers.  
While Cavarero argues that the body-mind dualism offers the promise of eternal 
truths, in the antithesis titled Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death, Evelyn Fox Keller argues 
that, for scientists, this split may offer the hope of transcending human mortality. This 
hope is “a perennial motif that underlies much of scientific creativity” (39). Science is 
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driven by “the urge to fathom the secrets of nature, and the collateral hope that, in 
fathoming the secrets of nature, we will fathom the ultimate secrets (and hence gain 
control) of our own mortality” (Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death 39). Keller argues that, 
within scientific discourse, the divide between man and nature, a divide that leaves 
women on the side of nature, is a longstanding and well-entrenched figure of antithesis 
that divides the knowledge of men and science is separate from the secrets of nature, life, 
and women. Women and the natural world have been conceptualized as those who can 
nurture and birth new life and hence as mysteries that need to be understood, controlled, 
and replicated. This work suggests an implicit hope that knowledge will lead to 
addressing man’s oldest problem: death. While biology has historically been a science of 
endless mysteries and iteration, Keller identifies a new rhetorical strategy within 
molecular biology and genetics that mimics or parallels the rhetoric of physics and math. 
For the first time, Keller argues, biology appeals to the ethos and logic of physics and 
math: biology became a science with the codes that could unlock all mysteries. Once 
biology could unlock the mysteries of life, then the scientists may eventually control life 
and also death.  
 
Controlling Turing’s Body 
In many ways, Turing was a product and beneficiary of this long-standing antithesis 
between body and mind. Turing was trained to strive for this premium, universal truth. 
He studied Bertrand Russell’s The Principles of Mathematics, which outlines the abstract 
logical foundations that cement mathematics as an objective and rational science (Hodges 
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90-91). J. David Bolter calls the Turing machine the “embodiment” of formal logic. “In 
the computer,” Bolter explains, “symbolic logic has achieved what it could not achieve in 
the cryptic pages of Russell’s Principia; it has become the foundation of computerized 
mathematics” (71). Turing was familiar with Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz’ efforts in 
the 16th century to create a mathematical code to precisely calculate and evaluate all of 
human knowledge (Leavitt 28-30 and Bolter 73). When studying the relationship between 
mathematics and “ordinary life” with Ludwig Wittgenstein, Turing disagreed with the 
philosopher by insisting that a strictly formal logic and code could be developed to 
calculate knowledge, including what Wittgenstein called “common sense” (Leavitt 146-
147). Through his education and his research, Turing learned that premium knowledge 
was abstract, transcendent truths. These logical foundations of his work are only possible 
by taking great efforts to abstract knowledge from any particular body, any particular 
historical time, and even any particular linguistic construction, which the antithesis of 
body and mind makes possible. 
In addition, Turing was also very explicitly pursuing the secret of life and the 
potential to master death. Keller’s research specifically applies to biology and genetics, 
but her same claims can be extended to understand Turing’s essay. By defining mind in a 
contrary relation with bodies, Turing can first imagine human life in alternative bodies 
and then will go on in his career to suggest that a kind of intelligence may exist in 
mechanical bodies. In this early article, Turing pursues scientific explanations for 
imagining life after death. Toward the end of his life, Turing will explicitly develop the 
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connections between biology, code, and the control of life in his work on morphogenesis, 
which is the study of cell growth and development. 
Those who seek Universal Truths and eternal life are not the only ones to benefit 
from the antithesis between body and mind. Susan Bordo explains that even post-
structuralist philosophers, known for their rejection of foundations and universal truth, 
also work out of a notion of body and mind antithesis. In particular, postmodern notions 
of free play, in many ways, depend on abstracting knowledge from particular bodies. 
Bordo recognizes that post-modern theorists effectively challenge the “view-from-
outside” that is idealized in much of philosophy and science. However, it its place, post-
modern theorists have offered a view-from-everywhere. Bordo writes, “the spirit of 
epistemological jouissance suggested by the images of cyborg, trickster, and the 
metaphors of dance, and so forth obscure the located, limited, inescapably partial, and 
always personally invested nature of human “story making” (228). Postmodern play may 
not claim to have unbiased access to stable knowledge. However, it does claim a kind of 
transcendent form of knowledge construction. This free-play of ideas and words 
transcends the situated and grounded of particular physical contexts.  
Instead of this “epistemological jouissance,” Bordo asks for a humble attempt at 
epistemology, which she calls a view-from-somewhere (145). This view-from-
somewhere is always limited and informed by our particular bodies and contexts. 
Similarly, Cheryl Glenn associates her feminist historiography with resistant 
postmodernism. Unlike what she calls ludic postmodernism, which is play without any 
established location, Glenn explains that her feminist histories of rhetoric resist narratives 
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of The history of rhetoric and instead asks “Whose history? Whose rhetoric? Which 
rhetoric?” (5). Answering these questions require scholars to account for the unique, 
relational embodied experiences and how our embodied experiences shape how we 
produce knowledge, what knowledge we produce, and the rhetoric we compose. 
Although Turing’s rhetoric suggests a transcendent view of knowledge and mind, as I 
continue to develop the chiasmic rhetoric that connects bodies and discourse, so too, 
Turing’s rhetoric will appear in a particular social, historical, and embodied context that 
informs his rhetoric and the knowledge he produces. 
 
Losing Antithesis in “Nature of Spirit” 
I’ve demonstrated how antithesis appears both in the concept as well as the form of 
Turing’s short essay. I’ve also demonstrated how, through its history in Western 
philosophy and science, the antithesis between bodies and minds has been reified over 
and over again. And, with each new iteration, this antithesis allows for notions of stable, 
transcendent truth as well as an prerequisite of managing and controlling bodies and an 
underlying patriarchy that excludes women (or those associated with the category 
feminine) from intellectual as well as political engagement. But this choice between mind 
and body is a false alternative. This is based on a shared assumption the relation between 
bodies and mind is a figure of contrary antithesis. Antithesis between body and mind 
allows for notions like Turing’s that transcendence from bodies is not only desirable it is 
also potentially possible. However, even in Turing’s writing, the contrary relation 
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between body and mind begins to blur. These are places where the mutual exclusivity of 
bodies and minds is impossible to maintain.  
While Turing clearly does reify the antithesis between bodies and minds, in the 
argument and the form of “Nature of Spirit,” the contrary antithesis between bodies and 
minds begins to break down. Turing’s body and life intertwine with his writing and 
thinking in a variety of different ways. One of these ways that body and mind antithesis 
breaks down lies in the fact that Turing was motivated to write “Nature of Spirit” out of a 
desire to be reunited with his friend Christopher Morcom. Beyond that, in the style and 
syntactical level of this essay, Turing’s writing figures bodies and spirits with some 
connections and relations. 
The most obvious location where the body mind antithesis in this essay breaks 
down or begins to blur is in his frequent use of ‘I.’ He writes, “Personally, I think that 
spirit is really eternally connected with matter. I did believe it possible for a spirit at 
death to go to a universe entirely separate from our own, but now I consider that matter 
and spirit are so connected…” An ‘I’ can never map cleanly onto one side or another of 
the body mind-dualism. This personal pronoun refers to Turing himself. This writer must 
necessarily connect both body and mind, even if this is simply on the level that a body is 
required for writing to occur. ‘I’ refers to Turing as a person. This includes his thinking, 
but this thinking does not come out of nowhere. Instead, this thinking, in this text in 
particular, is highly influenced by Turing’s personal experiences, his emotions, his 
desires, and his feelings of pain and loss. This ‘I’ does not develop these ideas out of 
nowhere. Instead, this ‘I’ draws these ideas directly from his research, his education, and 
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also his upbringing as a Christian. In addition, this ‘I’ connects the text to Turing as a 
body. He wrote this by hand. His body sat in Christopher Morcom’s room, with a pen in 
his hand, and a lamp so that he could see. By writing ‘I,’ Turing affirms that a person 
with a body, mind, history, education, culture, and language put a pen to paper to 
articulate these concepts.  
In addition, Turing’s use of ‘I’ is prominent. He uses ‘I’ to own all of his claims 
and ideas.  Instead of stating his claims about the relation between bodies and spirits as 
objective facts, Turing places himself at the center of this essay. In the first paragraph, in 
which Turing is reviewing established literature, he does not use any ‘I’s. However, as 
soon as he turns to articulate his understanding of the ostensibly antithetical relation 
between bodies and spirit, he uses ‘I’ in all but 2 sentences. By structuring each sentence 
so that the ‘owning’ subject is the author himself, Turing calls attention again and again 
to source of this knowledge. He makes no attempt to posit objective claims about reality. 
He does not objectively describe the relation between body and spirit as if he were 
describing certain, concrete facts about reality. Instead, he places himself as the active 
subject of each sentence. The claims he develops can only be read by first remembering 
that a particular British, young, well-to-do, white, gay, male person has developed and 
owned these ideas. 
 
From Antithesis towards a New Figure 
In so many ways, the figure of antithesis is insufficient for conveying the relation 
between bodies and minds. The figure creates a black and white opposition where we 
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need to find more shades of grey. The figure appears to be balanced and complete, but its 
use for the body/mind dualism has continually given mind the dominant role and body 
the subordinate. The relationship between bodies and minds is far more complex than 
antithesis allows. For instance, antithesis cannot explain Turing’s inventive thinking that, 
although committed to abstract logic, was also surprisingly concrete.  
In the following chapters, I will develop how chiasmus is a rhetorical figure that 
more fully accounts for the complex relations and interactions between our bodies, our 
writing, and our knowledges. This figure is necessary to understand the interactions 
between bodies/knowledge and writing/idea. Antithesis and chiasmus are related but 
distinct rhetorical figures. Fahnestock includes antithesis between the two phrases as one 
possible aspect of chiasmus (128-9). Lanham describes chiasmus as a larger, umbrella 
category under which antithesis can be included (122). While these figures are related, 
antithesis and chiasmus construct very different relationships between their parts. Both 
rhetorical figures structure kinds of relations between things, ideas, or phrases. Like 
chiasmus, antithesis creates parallel relation between the two parts. In addition, like 
chiasmus, antithesis creates a tension or a dissonance between the parts. However, unlike 
chiasmus, the relation created in antithesis is creates a linear, even teleological relation 
between the parts. The figure chiasmus creates a more complex relation between the parts 
of the figure of speech as well as a more complex relation between bodies and language. 
Chiasmus allows for difference and complex locations of similarity. Whereas antithesis 
between body and mind constructed a mutually exclusive relation, chiasmus potentially 
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creates a co-constructing, dynamic, and productive relation between bodies and 
discourses that produce knowledge.  
Four years after penning “Nature of Spirit,” Turing published his groundbreaking 
essay “On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem.” The 
importance of this essay cannot be underestimated; this article lays the logical foundation 
for digital computation as well as applies that logical foundation into a surprisingly 
simple solution to a long disputed mathematical question. Because of its importance, 
mathematicians and computer scientists have studied it again and again. However, we 
know nothing about his process of developing these ideas. He kept no notes. He 
published no preliminary research. He had not even given lectures in which we may be 
able to find traces of his early development of these ideas. How did he develop these 
innovative concepts? This was the question that his research assistant asked Turing 
decades later. While laying in a sheep pasture, on a lovely summer day, Turing watched 
the clouds pass by. And he figured it out (Hodges 105). There in the grass, Turing figured 
out how to invent the universal computing machine. This process of invention cannot be 
explained through an antithesis of mind and body. A more complex intersection of body 
and mind was at play on that sunny summer day. 
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CHIASMUS 3:  
INTERSECTING BODIES AND DISCOURSES 
 
 
“Chiasmic in their interdependency, but never fully collapsed into one another” 
~Butler, Bodies that Matter 
 
“The behavior of the computer at any moment is determined by the symbols which he is 
observing, and his “state of mind at that moment”  
~ Turing “On Computable Numbers” 
 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated the ways that Turing’s early writing reinscribed 
an antithesis between bodies and minds. However, I also demonstrated the various 
stylistic and formal ways in which a hard antithesis of mutual exclusivity broke down to 
reveal locations of blurring and intersection. In this chapter I will draw on scholars of 
both rhetoric and gender theory in order to posit the first move towards chiasmic rhetoric: 
this is a move to intersect bodies and discourse. This chiasmic rhetoric at the intersections 
of bodies and discourses will help me to demonstrate the many ways that Turing’s 
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knowledge is produced in tight connection with embodied experiences. Bodies are 
present in Turing’s technical writing in “On Computable Numbers, with an Application 
to the Entscheidungsproblem.” In addition, bodies are central for his theoretical 
contributions and breakthroughs in digital computation. This chapter, therefore, 
challenges some common ways of understanding digital technology as disembodied. This 
gives bodies more significant roles in science and technology studies because bodies are 
the starting place for solving abstract theoretical problems and for inventing digital 
computation.  
After providing the disciplinary and social context in which Turing wrote “On 
Computable Numbers,” I will review the definition and theories of chiasmus in rhetorical 
theory. Then, I’ll relate the rhetorical properties of chiasmus to the notions of chiasmic 
bodies in feminist texts. I will also demonstrate how these chiasmic relations break many 
of the objective conventions of rhetoric of science. Finally, I’ll analyze Turing’s texts, 
looking for places where bodies take space and intersect in ways that are productive for 
knowledge production.  
In the four years between writing “Nature of Spirit” and the publication of “On 
Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem” little changed 
in Turing's daily life. Most of his days seem filled with thoughtful quiet stereotypes of 
what the “life of the mind” looks like: He lived alone. He worked alone. He ran alone. At 
Kings College in Cambridge faculty and students dined together, which were Turing’s 
most regular social interactions. He also went out to pubs with friends, saw plays, and 
generally enjoyed a quiet but rich personal and professional life. Throughout this time 
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during and after his undergraduate studies, his life occupied many of the same offices, 
seminar rooms, streets, and labs. He engaged with many of the same friends and advisors 
day after day, year after year. He graduated in 1934 but earned a fellowship that allowed 
him to continue to live in Cambridge. He rowed every morning in college. After 
graduating he ran every morning. His friend group remained largely the same: small, all-
male, intellectual group of close friends. He never successfully entered the most 
prominent echelon on Cambridge society. Nor did he seem to try. His other friends joined 
social clubs. Turing never did. Perhaps, as Andrew Hodges suggests, this reservation to 
move from the margins to the center of elite society was a protection (78).  
Although homosexual acts were illegal and widely stigmatized in British society 
generally, Hodges argues that King’s College was a unique place. Turing's sexuality 
seems to have been common knowledge among his peer-group at Kings. David Leavitt 
describes the culture at Kings as “an ideal environment for intellectual and erotic 
experimentation, encouraging dissent while protecting the incipient dissident from the 
sort of violent counter-reaction that his ideas and behavior might have provoked in a 
more public forum” (23). Hodges and Leavitt make these claims based in large part to the 
presence of other prominent, open gay intellectuals, including E. M. Forester, who lived 
on the same street as Turing, and the theoretical mathematician G. H. Hardy.  
“Homosexuality, in private,” Agar writes, “was a key part of the college culture” (69). 
And Agar goes on to describe the school as “a rare oasis, sympathetic both socially and 
intellectually” (69). Kings had a reputation for teaching students to question the status 
quo. As such, the school also had a “gay reputation,” according to Leavitt, that was open 
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to discussion and practice of alternative sexualities (18). Within Turing’s friend group, 
sex, pleasure, bodies, and desires were openly discussed as lived realities and subjects of 
psychoanalytic and theoretical inquiry. In the letters between Turing and his friends, 
young men all suggest that the boys who attend elite public schools like Sherborn were 
confortable and knowledgeable about same-sex attraction and affection. Hodges suggests 
that Cambridge was perhaps the one place where Turing could develop personally, 
intellectually, and socially as a “complete, consistent whole” (78). Kings was a safe place 
for Turing. “He simply accepted it,” Leavitt concludes but “assumed (wrongly) that 
others would as well” (19). Within this space, Turing built a good life. He also began 
building a name for himself as a mathematician and logician.   
 
Defining Chiasmus 
Chiasmus is a bit trickier to define than antithesis. Antithesis has been defined and named 
relatively consistently throughout the history of rhetoric, but chiasmus has had an 
inconsistent role in the history of rhetorical figures (Fahnestock 131). To be sure, 
chiasmus as a figure can be found in very ancient text and has been identified as a critical 
figure for ancient Hebrew writers (Lund). However, within handbooks and studies of 
rhetorical figures, chiasmus is somewhat obscured because its primary qualities can be 
found in different ways within many different rhetorical figures. Chiasmus doesn't make 
its debut until Cicero’s Rhetorica Ad Herennium, several centuries after the first 
handbook of rhetorical forms. Even when chiasmus does appear as a rhetorical form, it is 
named inconsistently, but the same general features are included. Cicero names this 
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figure commutatio one of the many related forms of chiasmus, which “occurs when two 
discrepant thoughts are so expressed by transposition that the latter follows from the 
former although contradictory to it” (Cicero 325).  Both Lanham and Fahnestock think of 
chiasmus as a genus figure, under which several species of figures derive. Epanados, 
antimetobole, hysteron proteron, commutatio, permutatio, palindrome5: these are all 
different positions of the same root figure. For scholars of rhetoric, looking for the X that 
marks the spot identifies chiasmus and its relatives. Chiasmus is composed of two (or 
more) connected phrases, which may be contrary, contradictory, differing or 
complimentary. The first phrase of the figure is inverted or reversed in the second phrase. 
“Ask not what your country can do for you but what you can do for your country.” This 
creates a mirror image between the first and the second phrase. 
 
Form of Chiasmus 
Fahnestock identifies the chiasmic figure antimetoble in the most formally specific way 
(123-5). This figure must have two balanced phrases connected into a single sentence. In 
addition, at least two of the terms in the first phrase must be repeated in the second. This 
is the easiest variation to find because of the repetition of terms as well as reversed 
repetition of the grammatical structure. However, most of the definitions of chiasmus 
allow for great flexibility in the wording and structure. Fahnestock writes that chiasmus 
                                                
5 Epanados is an inverse repetition on the level of the phrase (Quinn 93). Antimetoble or 
commutatio is an epanados that also includes antithesis between the two phrases (Quinn 
93). Hysteron proteron means a phrase reverses the temporal sequence (Quinn 43). 
Permutatio is a change with a repetition (Lanham, A Handlist 76). Palindrome is a 
chiasmus in letters that make up a word or phrase (Quinn 93).  
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can use synonyms or grammatical variations in the second phrase. This means that the 
same basic X structure is preserved, Fahnestock allows for some variation of wording 
(124). Richard Lanham, predictably more flexible, defines chiasmus only by the 
grammatical structure (122-3). The words in both of the first and the second phrase 
correspond, but the correspondence could be that of synonym, similar parts of speech, 
similar sounds, same first letter, parallel ideas, or contrary ideas. The only specific 
requirement for Lanham is that chiasmus is a formal structure composed of two parts, 
which could be phrases, sentences, or whole sections of books, and those parts must 
reflect or reverse in some way. Quinn defines chiasmus figure as epanados, which is 
“organizing spatially around a center” (95).  Mardy Grothe, author of a book entirely 
filled with examples of chiasmus, Never let a fool Kiss You or a Kiss Fool You, even find 
chiasmus when the first half of the phrase is absent. He calls this an implied chiasmus. 
We find it whenever a popular saying or quote is exactly reversed in order to give the 
popular phrase a different meaning. For example, “time wounds all heels” (115). Grothe, 
who is ever excited about chiasmus writes, “the fun of implied chiasmus is dual first you 
have the pleasure of figuring out what's been reversed; then you get to marvel over the 
ingenuity behind these inspired chiastic creating” (114).  
The size of chiasmus ranges from whole books, as is found commonly in biblical 
chiasmus and hysteron proteron6 to very small forms like the palindrome. Palindrome is a 
                                                
6 Quinn defines hysteron-proteron as another kind of chiasmus. It means to reverse the 
chronological order. To put the horse before the cart, as Quinn puts it (43). In Greek, it 
means “the latter [put as] the former” (Lanham Handlist 58). The etymology of this word 
is the same as hysterics, which means traveling womb. When something (in this case 
time) moves about where it should not, to create an unsettled effect.  
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one-word chiasmus. They can be read from front to back and back to front. My favorite 
palindrome is “taco cat,” which now a widely popular with its own Internet memes, video 
loops, websites, and merchandise. The tiny palindrome is the chiasmus that takes the least 
amount of space. It is also likely the hardest to identify. From whole books to the word 
“dad,” chiasmus can be expansive or diminutive. The same formal X structure applies.  
Chiasmus is a crucial figure in biblical studies, most famously by Nils Lund in 
Chiasmus in the New Testament. The sheer volumes of texts on chiasmus in biblical texts 
serves as evidence of the established prominence of chiasmus as a central rhetorical 
figure in biblical rhetoric (see review in Man’s “the Value of Chiasm for New Testament 
Interpretation”). For instance, Ronald Man argues that chiasmus functions as so much 
more than an ornament. Chiasmus functions in biblical texts as “a means toward more 
effective communication of their messages. In the case of chiasmus, this is accomplished 
by underlining the central emphasis or clarifying correspondences in the text” (154). But, 
scholars of biblical texts most often define the figure with an addition of a central focal 
point. This includes a third element: central point or pivot point. Fahnestock calls this an 
additional element that “populates the center” (126). This formal structure looks like 
ABCBA. John Beck, in “Biblical Chiasmus: Exploring Structure for Meaning,” argues 
that, in biblical studies, chiasmus must contain a significant central element connecting 
the first and last phrase. Whenever the center pivot point is present, that point is of crucial 
importance for scriptural interpretation and even rhetorically symbolic of Christ at the 
center of the on the chiasmic cross. However, many other biblical scholars define 
chiasmus with or without a center (Man 146-147). This formal definition of chiasmus 
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will be central to connecting Turing’s body with the knowledge he produced. And this 
argument that Turing’s body matters for this thinking is especially unusual considering 
that this article, “On Computable Numbers,” contributes to a field that had long created 
and maintained a notion of knowledge and truth in mathematics that are separate and free 
of the weight of bodies.  
 
Universal and Relative Schools of Mathematics 
I will review, as briefly as I can, the major theoretical conversations and trends into 
which Turing was contributing and also intervening. Understanding this context is 
significant for my goal of identifying chiasmic rhetoric in this article because we find that 
Turing was engaging with a discourse community that rigorously separated abstract logic 
from any kind of material or embodied context. Given this context, Turing’s inclusion of 
embodied experiences is an especially surprising and also especially disruptive inclusion. 
Connections between material and logical theory are a-typical for the field of 
mathematics. In his glossary of scientific words, biochemist and science fiction writer 
Isaac Asimov, defines mathematics as an abstract science with no necessary connection 
to material reality. He also notes that the abstract nature of mathematics is part of its 
appeal for Plato and other pursuers of universal truth. Max Newman, this more concrete 
thinker, advised Turing on his undergraduate thesis and also taught Turing the principles 
of mathematics, which covered Bertrand Russell and J. H. C. Whitehead’s Principia 
Mathematica, David Hilbert’s “Mathematical Problems,” and Kurt Gödel’s theorems of 
  75 
incompleteness and incompatibility (“On Formally Undecidable Propositions in Principia 
Mathematica and Related Systems I”).  
Russell, Whitehead, and Hilbert represent the old guard of modernist logic and 
mathematics. They pursued universal principles that would explain all phenomena. These 
universal principles of mathematics would, as Hilbert, Russell and Whitehead hoped, 
create order and control out of an otherwise chaotic world (Leavitt 40-41). Hilbert 
published his attempts at universal foundations for mathematics and logic in 1901. This 
was a new century, and this would be a century of order, logic, and reason. At the same 
time Hilbert published his 27 problems. These problems were, according to Hilbert, the 
most significant questions for mathematician. With the publication of these questions, 
Hilbert set the agenda for theoretical mathematician (Hodges 91). The three most 
significant problems were “Is mathematics complete,” “Is mathematics consistent,” and 
“Is mathematics decidable.” Together, these questions defined mathematics as a science. 
Hilbert posited these as questions, but he also assumed that with time mathematicians 
would find positive solutions to these questions. The program for mathematics, as Hilbert 
defined it, was to prove that mathematics is complete, consistent, and decidable 
(Copeland 46-47; Hodges 91; Leavitt 40). This means that mathematics would always, 
given enough time, be solvable. Evelyn Fox Keller argues that mathematics maintains a 
significantly different relation to knowledge and epistemology than the sciences like 
chemistry, biology, or physics. These later fields are all connected and base knowledge 
from material reality. Mathematics, on the other hand, is separate from material reality. 
During the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, mathematicians like 
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Hilbert assumed that mathematics was inherently logical, internally consistent, and 
ultimately solvable. This is significantly different, Keller points out, from sciences that 
draw knowledge from material phenomena due to diversity and variability of physical 
world. Especially for Hilbert, the mathematical and logical universal forms are there to be 
discovered. He was, as Leavitt points out, a Neo-Platonist (39). Logic and mathematical 
axioms were Absolute True forms that existed above and beyond any human experience. 
These axioms needed to be discovered through rigorous methods of logical proof. Leavitt 
notes that Hilbert metaphorically referred to mathematics as a paradise of logic and 
reason (40-41). Hilbert and his school of mathematician wanted above all else for logic, 
reason, and formalism to create order out of chaos and to let peace win out over the 
absurd, purposelessness of war. But the 20th century brought with it many challenges to 
the hope for complete mathematics as well as WWI.  
After WWI, a younger group of mathematicians began to trouble the waters in 
mathematics. In particular, in 1931 (Turing was in his first year at King’s College), Kurt 
Gödel falsified the first two problems: he found that mathematics is not complete and that 
it is not consistent (“On Formally Undecidable Propositions in Principia Mathematica 
and Related Systems I”). Copeland explains Gödel’s theorem: “if the system is 
consistent, there are statements of arithmetic that are not provable in the system—the 
formal system fails to capture the ‘whole thought content’ of arithmetic” (48). This 
means that mathematics is not a totalizing science capable of solving all of its problems 
without drawing from non-mathematical means of signification, formalism, and 
information. With these theorems, Gödel showed that the paradise of mathematics would 
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always be full of black holes and that snakes would always lurk in the trees. These 
schools of mathematics also represent significant political shifts (Leavitt 39). In 
particular, the older group of mathematicians held idealist notions that reason, if rational 
humans could only apply mathematical principles appropriately, would bring order and 
also peace. That was the dream in 1900. By 1936, with one world war past and another 
on the horizon, the hope was gone that universal forms could bring order and peace to 
human knowledge and human civilization. All of the younger generation of men would 
go on to play some part in WWII, building computers for everything from cryptology to 
atom bombs. The younger generation of mathematicians seemed to take disorder, chaos, 
and paradox as an unavoidable given. Gödel and others even found disorder, chaos, 
creativity, and even intuition in mathematics, the most objective, ordered science.  
Gödel’s findings were groundbreaking, but they still left mathematics with the 
authority of decidability. In other words, mathematics could always, given enough time 
and the correct procedure, find a solution to mathematical problems. Gödel felt that there 
must be a way to falsify this claim, and he worked, unsuccessfully, for over a decade to 
find the logical proof. This is the question that Turing tackled and his proof, almost 
inadvertently, invented digital computation. One comment in particular that Newman 
made may have been a starting place for Turing’s thinking. Newman referred to Hilbert’s 
“definite method” for deciding all mathematical problems as a “mechanical process” 
(Hodges 93, Copeland 206, Leavitt 53). Newman likely used the word mechanical 
metaphorically, not literal machinery but mechanistic processes performed by human 
computers, who were mostly female clerical workers (Chun 38-41) . Leavitt explains, 
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“The word “mechanical,” in its original sense, had referred to manual occupation, a work 
performed by human beings. By the 1930’s, however, mechanical meant gears, rotors, 
vacuum tubes” (54). Newman, like Turing would continue, approached the pursuit of a 
definite method for mathematic as a physical process. The difference is that Turing would 
translate the physical process of a human solving a problem into a machine solving a 
problem.  
 
Turing’s Place within Mathematics 
Turing enters these conversations as a young man, a relative outsider, and as a 
materialist. From this position, Turing was able to solve a long-standing problem within 
mathematics. And his solution, which is to way that mathematics was not a decidable 
science, contributes towards the shift away from purely abstract, universal notions of 
mathematics.  
What is especially significant for this dissertation is that he begins with the 
embodied process of human computers, thereby intersecting embodiment with abstract 
mathematics. There are volumes of work on the significance of this article for 
mathematics, computer science, and digital computation7. I am not attempting to extend 
these discourses, which are already quite rich. This is especially true considering that 
Turing’s article is a foundational text for the theories of computer science. I am seeking 
to contribute to scholarly discourses on rhetorics of science and rhetorics of bodies. I will 
                                                
7 Of these, I highly recommend for their detailed and accessible explanations of Turing’s 
theories Copland, The Essential Turing; Petzold, The Annotated Turing; Agar, Turing 
and the Universal Machine.  
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draw from much of this research in order to analyze “On Computable Numbers with an 
Application to the Entscheidungsproblem.” In this, we find scientific and technical 
rhetoric in which the chiasmic relations between bodies and discourses of abstract 
mathematics intersect in a way that is central to Turing’s argument and Turing’s machine. 
This chiasmic relation between bodies and abstract mathematics then became the 
foundations upon which Turing, Newman, Von Neumann and others build digital 
computers as well as the field of computer science.  
In “On Computable Numbers,” Alan Turing accomplishes two primary things: he 
mathematics is not a decidable science and, in order to make this conclusion, Alan Turing 
also invents the Turing Machine, which became a significant logical foundation for the 
digital computer, although even Turing didn’t see its significance at the time8. In this 
article, Turing proves that the problem of decidability could never be solved by effective 
method, which is the method of logical and mathematical proof in which problems are 
solved through finite steps and precise instruction so that the solution can be reproduced 
exactly.  
Copeland stresses that Turing’s argument specifically addresses mathematics 
through effective method. Copeland finds that scholars most often get this point wrong in 
                                                
8 This is a complex, theoretical, and esoteric article. The article is partially composed of 
surprisingly conversational exposition and unreadable equations of symbolic 
mathematics. As a scholar far outside of mathematics and computer science, I do not 
claim to understand the full complexity of this article, especially as it relates to 
mathematical symbolism and mathematical proofs. However, this article has been studied 
and explained at length by experts in mathematics and computer science. Of these, I will 
draw primarily from the work of John Copeland and Andrew Hodges, who are both 
scholars of mathematics and the history of computing. Copeland in particular offers 
insights as an expert in philosophical logic as well as mathematics and the history of 
computing. 
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so far as they conflate effective method of calculation with all methods of calculation  
(“Narrow Versus Wide Mechanisms”). Copeland identifies this as the Turing-Church 
fallacy: the claim that Turing found that mathematics was unsolvable by any methods. 
Copeland clarifies that some mathematical problems are not solvable through effective 
method. The key difference is that Turing proved that effective methods (or computable 
methods) cannot solve some problems. As Hodges explains, this question means “did 
there exist a definite method which could, in principle, be applied to any assertion, and 
which was guaranteed to produce a correct decision as to whether that assertion was true” 
(91).  In Turing’s Man, Bolter identifies this method with all abstract, symbolic logical 
proofs.  
Turing offers the Halting Problem as one problem that cannot be solved through 
effective methods. If a computer (either human or machine) was given the Halting 
Problem, the computer could calculate the algorithm but would never reach a conclusion. 
The mechanical (or electric) computer is important here because Turing needed to prove 
that a problem would run forever without solution. If a single human being were 
calculating the problem, the time spent calculating and the accuracy of the calculation 
would be necessarily limited. On the other hand, when Turing replaces each activity of a 
human computer “working in a disciplined but unintelligent manner” (as he writes in his 
manual for the Manchester Electronic Computer Mark II) with a machine, then the 
machine can run infinitely. In the case of the Halting Problem, the computer would run 
infinitely because the problem would circulate back repetitively. Turing proved the 
limitations of effective methods, but alternative methods may still be utilized to solve 
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those problems that are undecidable through effective methods. Later in his career, 
Turing would turn to methods of random selection and intuition to as possible 
alternatives. I will next provide a more complete exposition of chiasmus in order to 
establish the first movement of chiasmus, which is that chiasmus always connects.  
 
Positioning Chiasmus Between Antithesis and Parallelism 
Although I argue for a shift from antithesis to chiasmus as figures that structure the 
relation between bodies and knowledge, the antithesis and chiasmus are actually closely 
related. In fact, Lanham defines antithesis as a kind of chiasmus (125, 133). Both figures 
create relations between two different things. In addition, both figures, when they are 
defined in relatively strict formal terms as Fahnestock does, are composed of two phrases 
that are connected in order to emphasize difference, contrary, or comparison, or changes 
in degree. However, antithesis creates a relation that emphasizes opposition. Especially in 
the case of contrary antithesis, this is a relation of mutual exclusivity where no 
intersection or interaction is possible. In antithesis, bodies and everything associated with 
bodies are cut and separate from discourse and knowledge production. But chiasmus is a 
complex figure and creates a complex relation. 
Chiasmus is also includes formal parallelism. Parallelism is a rhetorical figure in 
which syntactical and semantic similarity repeat in at least two phrases. In actuality, 
parallelism is so common and so often desirable in composition that it is much more than 
rhetorical figure; this is a formal aspect of almost any piece of writing that structures 
everything from sentences to whole arguments. Parallelism is used to emphasize equality, 
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balance, and similarity. Parallelism could be thought of as two parallel lines. Like in 
Euclidian geometry, two parallel lines on a plane will never intersect. The relation 
created in parallelism is one of parity, equality, or balance. While antithesis creates an 
impression of separation and mutual exclusivity that conceals any points of similarity or 
sameness, parallelism is the opposite. Parallelism conveys a sense of sameness or 
equality even though there may be no connections between the two concepts or phrases.  
Chiasmus creates a relation that allows for both the difference that we find in 
antithesis and the equality or balance that we find in parallelism. But there is one 
significant difference: chiasmus always connects. With antithesis, the relation between 
the parts divides to emphasize opposition. With parallelism, the relation emphasizes 
similarity, but that similarity is always between parts that separate. Chiasmus must, by 
definition, create intersections between two things just like the X in chi. Connection is the 
key to chiasmus’ rhetorical force. While antithesis and parallelism can be read linearly, 
chiasmus must be read by interpreting the levels of intersections. This means that reading 
must go back and forth between the different sides, with the meaning changing through 
the complex set of interactions back and forth. Chiasmus may take many forms, shapes, 
and sizes, but chiasmus always connects.  
 
Bodies in Turing’s Mathematics 
According to many scholars, Turing is a thinker who creates more distance between mind 
or thinking and bodies and human embodied experience. This claim is most obvious in J. 
David Bolter’s book Turing’s Man. Bolter’s research focuses less on Turing’s life or his 
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theories than about the larger trends in our understanding of our relationships between 
humans and our technologies. According to Bolter, “Turing’s Man” is a way of 
understanding the human body and human life as immaterial, purely logical, and 
regulated. When Turing invents his Turing machine, according to Bolter, he embodies 
pure logic. Bolter’s larger argument is that this invention then becomes the primary 
metaphor framing how we understand human bodies and life. Humans then, are also 
understood as pure logic, as computing machines who process information and are 
hardwired in particular ways. In a lot of ways, Bolter’s claim is justifiable in Turing's 
article. Turing literally integrates a human computer into a mechanical computer. He 
starts with what a man can do; then he writes on top of that what a machine can be made 
to do. In particular, this was taking the human work of logical proofs and writing that in 
code. According to this logic, by ‘embodying’ abstract logic into digital, electric 
computers, Turing and a cohort of scientists including John Von Neumann, Alfonzo 
Church, and George Stibitz created a pure logic machine.  
When Bolter writes of ‘embodying logic’ he does not mean human bodies or 
bodies in the sense of an organic physical form. Instead, embodying means to give a 
material or concrete form. This argument presumes that logic can be and has been 
disembodied or without any material form. Feminist philosophers, who emphasize the 
situated construction of logic, truth, and knowledge, have routinely critiqued this 
argument. Andrea Nye posits one particularly focused critique in Words of Power. She 
traces the material, political, and social intersections with the definition of logic. This 
work adds nuance to Bolter’s claim in a number of ways. First, logic is not a single, 
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timeless concept but a fluid and evolving notion of what is accepted as valid and 
objective reason. Second, her research demonstrates that, although the definition of logic 
is associated with objectivity, the very definition of logic is always constructed in 
particular material circumstances. In this way, logic has never been disembodied. Logic 
is always already in a chiasmic intersection with material and bodies.  
Turing does come from a generation of thinkers who idealized abstract logic, but 
his writing and theories are surprisingly embodied. Gödel and Hilbert were proponents of 
abstract, formal logic. There is no doubt that Turing also held some of these notions. 
However, this is not the only way that mathematics was understood. Another Cambridge 
mathematician who Turing studied and also was commonly in contact with, G. H. Hardy, 
critiqued Hilbert for pursing abstract logical forms. Hardy understood mathematical logic 
in material terms of games in which the different aspects of mathematics are “the material 
with which we play” (35 in Leavitt). In this mathematical game “the axioms correspond 
to the given positions of the pieces, the process of proof to the rules for moving them, and 
the demonstrable formulae to the possible positions which can occur in the game” (Hardy 
35 in Leavitt). Likewise, multiple biographers note that Turing was a surprisingly 
concrete thinker. When he writes about effective method of mathematics, this effective 
method is a concrete process performed by a concrete body. The point here is that Turing 
understands logic and mathematical process in materialist, concrete, embodied terms. 
Turing’s chiasmic rhetoric features embodied processes of computation that are already 
connecting with discourse.  
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Chiasmus Acting to Take Space and Connect 
Having defined chiasmus in both rhetorical theory and in feminist theory in chapter one, I 
will now continue this examination by discussing what chiasmus does—what is its 
rhetorical and performative power—as a figure in writing as well as a figure connecting 
bodies and words. Jeanne Fahnestock argues that figures of speech can only really be 
understood in terms of what the figure does well (23). Likewise, Arthur Quinn defines the 
figures of speech by what they do in and for a particular text (2). The emphasis of this 
question is on doing: a verb and action. The focus on action is crucial because I will be 
working, in part, from the theoretical perspectives of material feminists, in particular 
Judith Butler and Karen Barad and other feminists who theorize bodies, sex, gender, 
difference, and power relations as sets of interactions and performances. These 
performances are constantly being done and redone, shaped and reshaped. As such, the 
focus on action, performance, and phenomena resists defining a single, stable relation 
between bodies and language.  
 
Figures Taking Space 
Chiasmus takes up space. By repeating terms on both sides of chiasmus, the figure 
inherently includes redundancy. But refusing concision, chiasmus establishes its 
importance through spatial arrangement. This is one of the defining qualities that Arthur 
Quinn notes “such a spatial technique, with its obvious analogies to painting, can be used 
to organize larger and larger units of material” (95).  How may chiasmus work in 
painting? Consider Michelangelo’s Last Supper. The spatial organization is centered 
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around a middle point, Jesus Christ, with balanced but different arrangement of disciples 
on each side. The organization creates a number of effects. First, it focuses the painting 
not on the right or the left side, but on the point of connection and interaction in the 
middle. In addition, the spatial organization creates a sense of balance and parallelism. 
The disciples on each side are separated, but the balance gives a sense of unity or 
wholeness. The image is split, but the composition as a whole appears unified. My eye 
focuses first on the center and then only gradually out to the left and right. There is no 
specifically linear way to read this image. Instead, the eye moves from center out, back to 
center, and out again and again. Likewise, chiasmus as a rhetorical form in text is a 
spatial form that intersects differing parts. Chiasmus takes space on the page as well as it 
does on the canvas. The repetition of terms refuses any desire for concision.  
This particular way of taking space requires a chiasmic way of reading. The 
chiasmus changes the reading process into a non-linear process. In an ABBA or ABCBA 
structure, or even an ABCDEDCBA structure, the meaning of the text only becomes 
clear when read from the outside corresponding parts into the center: the reader must 
move from AABB to AA BB or from ABCDCBA to AABBCCD. Take the biblical 
example: “Do not give what is holy to dogs. And do not throw your pearls before swine. 
Least they trample them under their feet, and turn and tear you to pieces.” Read linearly, 
the swine both trample the pearls under feet then turn and tear apart the addressee. 
However, read chiasmically, this verse is balanced through the reversal of the phrases.  
A - Do not give what is holy to dogs.  
B - And do not throw your pearls before swine.  
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B - Least they trample them under their feet, and  
A - turn and tear you to pieces 
 
Should be read chiasmically as:  
A - Do not give what is holy to dogs.  
A – [lest they] turn and tear you to pieces 
B - And do not throw your pearls before swine.  
B - Least they trample them under their feet, and  
 
This makes reading the text much like peeling an artichoke: we have each the outside 
layers, gradually eating until we finally get the sweetest artichoke heart. One cannot 
simply cut through the outside layers to get to the center. This chiasmic process of 
reading preserves the relation between corresponding parts.  Reading this, chiasmus is a 
process of folding and refolding the figure to compose meaning and argument. In 
addition, when the figure has a pivotal center, the process of reading each part in its 
relation to the center. Upon that center, everything else revolves. The first half of the text 
builds up to that point and the second have of the text unravels from that center pivot 
point. By taking space, and considering the particular shape that chiasmus takes space on 
the page, this figure frames and guides the reading process, which becomes embodied in 
and through it. 
 
 
  88 
Bodies Taking Space 
This taking space is also a crucial concept for feminists. Bodies are physical and as such 
they take physical space. This may seem to be obvious; however, feminists have needed 
to reiterate this obvious experience because, within philosophy, political discourse, and 
rhetorical theory, it is the very physical existence of bodies that is consistently 
overlooked or undervalued. Although this feminist focus on bodies is a long one, within 
the last 25 years, this debate has coalesced around a critique of philosophy and theories 
that are variously called the linguistic turn, cultural turn, the rhetorical turn, and feminists 
have responded by turning towards bodies9. For example, Elizabeth Grosz challenges 
social constructivists notions of bodies, which continue to be prevalent. Social 
construction definitions of bodies, as Grosz grants, de-naturalize the body by 
demonstrating the many ways that language and culture construct the “natural body.” 
 This definition is important and politically valuable for feminists because it 
liberates women from the burden of sexist notions of women’s bodies as essentially 
feminine, weak, or irrational. However, their efforts to demonstrate how culture 
constructs bodies often posit definitions of bodies as passive ‘blank paper’ on which 
active language and culture shape without resistance. Moira Gatens persuasively 
demonstrates that this re-inscribes mind body dualism so that culture and language are 
                                                
9 This new material feminist critique of the linguistic turn is articulated by Gatens, Grosz, 
Braidotti, Barad and others. A useful summary of this critique can be found in Susan 
Hekman’s The Material of Knowledge. Sarah Ahmed, in “Imaginary Prohibitions: Some 
Preliminary Remarks on the Founding Gestures of the New Materialism” adds useful 
nuance to this critique by: 1) identifying ways that new material feminists straw man the 
linguistic turn, and 2) identifying material and bodies as crucial to some aspects of the 
linguistic turn.  
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constructive forces while matter is passive and dumb (Imaginary Bodies). Karen Barad, 
as several others do, charges the linguistic turn with once again erasing bodies. But the 
critique is more extensive. The linguistic turn hasn’t just erased bodies; it has also erased 
matter, reality, and the physical. In the place of material and physical, language and 
semantic language as code have been elevated as the highest epistemic value. “Language 
has been granted too much power,” Barad charges; “it seems that at every turn lately 
every ‘thing’—even materiality—is turned into a matter of language or some other form 
of cultural representation” (Meeting the Universe Half Way 132).  
In addition to their critiques of the linguistic turn, feminist theorists have also 
posited various theories that affirm bodies as active and productive in both epistemology 
and ontology10. In fact, the turn towards bodies has been initiated in a variety of academic 
fields, notably led by Bruno Latour.  However, as Susan Hekman argues, feminists have 
been at the forefront of these efforts. Their work has been particularly significant 
because, unlike Latour and other STS scholars, feminists approach their research with an 
attunement to the power relations and systems of privilege and discrimination that shape 
politics as well epistemology. Heckman reminds us that feminists need material reality 
and bodies. Feminist projects depend on material reality for “making true statements 
                                                
10 This collection of feminists is often labeled “New Material Feminists.” Other labels for 
this feminist theoretical school include “corporeal feminism” (Grosz) and “agential 
realism” (Barad). Hekman argues that the fact that these feminists have not yet been 
identified under a single school of thought indication of the “newness of the approach” 
(68). I would add that the difficulty in labeling this group is also due to the diversity 
within this group of feminists, which range from Barad’s engagement with quantum 
physics to Garland-Thompson’s materialist approach to disability studies. This school 
does share in common the commitment that bodies emerge from the intersection and 
interactions of materials and languages.  
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about the reality of women’s lives—their oppression, their inferior social status, the pain 
inflicted on their bodies. Without the ability to make true statements about women’s 
lives, feminism, like science, makes little sense” (66). In order to make political and 
ethical claims about women’s lives, we must be able to make fact claims on the basis of 
material reality. Among those claims to reality are that women’s real lives, knowledges, 
and experiences are undervalued, marginalized, or targeted with violence. Feminists need 
to be able to identify and critique the “unbearable weight” of our bodies (Bordo) and the 
points of pain and hurt that come with our embodied experiences (Wendall). Elizabeth 
Grosz has argued that our bodies are resources for knowledge (“Bodies and Knowledge,” 
Volatile Bodies). And Adrianna Cavarero writes that a human body that is always unique, 
particular, and never-repeatable, and this unique body is constitutive of our ontology. In 
order to make any of these claims, bodies must be understood as material phenomena that 
take physical space in material reality.  
 
Figures Intersecting 
Chiasmus, in this first movement, intersects two different things in ways that reflect 
feminist critiques of body and language discussed above. The move to intersect is the 
common denominator among all of the different definitions of chiasmus in rhetoric and 
also a constitutive of the relation between bodies and discourses in the feminist theories. 
As a rhetorical figure, chiasmus connects two phrases or concepts. As an embodied 
figure, chiasmic rhetoric intersects bodies with discourse. And this intersection can be 
active toward knowledge production as well as the production and disciplining of bodies. 
  91 
I will first discuss how the intersecting move of chiasmus from rhetorical theory and then 
demonstrate how the same chiasmic intersection figures prominently in feminist theories 
of bodies, especially for Judith Butler. 
Chiasmus figures the relation between bodies and discourse because the rhetorical 
figure allows for a complex relation of balance and similarity found in parallelism as well 
as the difference and divergence of antithesis. In his close reading of Miguel de 
Unamuno's novels, Paul Olson traces how chiasmus works as a formal device connecting 
flesh and word. Through this formal structure, Unamuno’s novels use chiasmus to frame 
words and flesh as mutually dependent entities without ever collapsing one into the other. 
This complex intersection is crucial for the figure’s rhetorical power. This intersecting 
figure creates complex relationships between parts. Fahnestock write that chiasmus, and 
the specific sub-class of chiasmus, antimetabole, is causal in opposite directions and 
reversible: “The antimetabole expresses an interchangeability that suggests not identity 
but mutual constitution” (141). The two terms co-construct their meaning and rhetorical 
force. She also writes that within science writing, chiasmus is most often used to define 
relations of “reciprocal causality” and “mutual dependence” (141). Rhetorically, this 
figures creates “a sense that the two entitles always require each other and therefore 
cannot be separated” (141). This will later figure the relation between bodies and 
discourse co-construct each other and cannot be understood outside of that co-
construction. Similarly to Fahnestock, Richard Lanham uses the example “do unto others 
as you would have them do unto you” in order to demonstrate how chiasmus emphasizes 
mutual reciprocity (Analyzing Prose 123).  
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Fahnestock also explains that this principle of reversibility, that the causal 
relationship is co-constructing, was crucial for Aristotle’s notion of chiasmus. In Topics, 
Aristotle uses examples of chiasmus as a premise-generating machine (Fahnestock 132). 
Chiasmus had to be reversible and the phrases have to make sense both ways. “Since one 
term so depends on the other, it does not matter which comes first, and indifference 
displayed iconically in the syntax of the figure” (141). For instance, “if the honorable is 
pleasant, what is not pleasant is not honorable” (133). The phrase “a human is a body and 
a body is a human” does not work when reversed. That is because the two terms are a 
genus-species relation where body is a larger category under which human is contained. 
In order for chiasmus to generate logical theses the relation between the two things must 
be parallel or balanced (132). Just as chiasmic figures of words create balance and 
reversibility, so too bodies and discourse are connected so that one does not determine or 
dominant the other. Rather, bodies and discourse are co-constituting.  
 
Intersecting Bodies and Discourse 
Intersecting is also a crucial concept for feminist theories of bodies. In particular, bodies 
are defined at the intersection of material, culture, language, and power relations. It is 
through these intersections and interactions that human bodies are meaningful and 
sensible. Butler describes this intersection explicitly as chiasmic. For instance, in Bodies 
that Matter, we find that “language and materiality are fully embedded in each other, 
chiasmic in their interdependency, but never fully collapsed into one another, i. e., 
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reduced to one another, and yet never fully ever exceeds the other. Always already 
implicated in each other, always already exciting one another”  (38).   
 This definition of the chiasmic relation between bodies and language includes the 
exact same qualities that define the rhetorical figure chiasmus: through both parallelism 
and antithesis, the two entities are connected, interdependent, but never collapsible. As 
both parallel and antithetical, “language and materiality are never fully identical nor fully 
different” (38). Now, when Butler writes about materiality, she is using a particular 
notion of materiality. This is not the common usage of materiality. Instead, she is 
thinking of materiality that is always already constituted in and through language. She 
clarifies this notion of materiality in her introduction to Bodies that Matter. Although she 
has been criticized for making bodies passive to the construction power relations, in fact, 
her intent is to “return to a notion of matter, not as a site or surface, but as a process of 
materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effects of boundary, fixity, and 
surface we call matter” (xviii). In other words, she is interested in the process and 
performances, by which the appearance of stability is created. Again, this is a definition 
of bodies that resists fixing the qualities and stasis. Instead, the focus of the definition of 
this relation is always on action, process, and performance. Bodies are not understood so 
much as things to be defined and more as embodying actions that are phenomena to be 
studied.  
This focus on action and process is most explicit in the work of Karen Barad. She 
approaches her feminist theories of embodiment first as a physicist and expert on Niels 
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Bohr’s theories of quantum mechanics11.  No doubt Turing read the work of Bohr, 
especially his contributions to quantum mechanics, which were central to Turing’s 
materialist world-view that also allowed for some random or unexplained phenomenon. 
Barad defines the material-discursive reality through a theory of agential realism, which 
claims that if we shift our focus from identifying things and matter and towards the study 
of actions, phenomena, and process, then we can understand discourse and matter as fully 
entangled and as always enacting a form of agency. Barad argues that material and 
discourse are intersecting in a constant state of inta-action.  
In this context, discourse could be understood as any relationality between 
entities. Like Grosz’s definition of embodied subjectivity and Butler’s theory of 
performativity, the body is the site of contestation or negotiation between material and 
culture. Within these negotiations between material and culture, both have access to 
agency in so far as both determine and affect the other. However, Barad takes this 
argument one step further by arguing that neither material or culture exist before inta-
action. Rather, all material and meaning emerge through inta-action. This means that the 
foundation of human ontology requires interaction with other things, beings, and 
discourses in order to come into being.  
The process of inter-action is constant. With new inter-actions and new 
discourses, the agential material changes. At the same time, as discourse and culture 
encounter and entangle new material, the discourse and culture adjust and adopt. 
                                                
11 Both Bohr and Turing’s work are influenced by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. In 
addition, both Bohr and Turing met with Heisenberg in Princeton. However, Turing was 
at Princeton before WWII started and Bohr was there during WWII in order to discuss 
Heisenberg’s work on the atom bomb.   
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Meaning/discourse and material/bodies are in a constant process of inta-action, 
negotiation, and co-constitution.  
Barad’s theories go beyond most feminist theories of the body in two primary 
ways. First, a thing or a meaning emerges not only through inter-actions between matter 
and discourse, but also through the interactions of matter and matter. In this way Barad’s 
theories focus on matter, even matter outside of human experience. Second, Barad 
identifies a form of agency with all matter, not just human consciousness. This is not a 
normative use of the word agency, which is often defined as a quality a subject possesses 
or does not possess and that is enacted with intention. Instead, agency emerges through 
intra-actions and entanglements between phenomena. With this definition, agency is the 
ability to impact or shape other phenomena, even if that impact is through resistance or 
recalcitrance.  
Bruno Latour and similar scholars of Actor-Network Theory also contribute to the 
study of science and technology. In particular, this scholarship investigates the 
construction of facts within networks of people, laboratories, methods, with specific 
technologies and methodologies (Reassembling the Social). These complex factors 
contribute to the construction and circulation of facts. Although this research does 
demonstrate the social construction of facts, the goal is not to invalidate science or 
reality. His intent is to move closer to facts and reality by studying how empirical reality 
intersects and interacts within a full network of material, cultural, social, and personal 
nodes (“Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” 231). However, as Barad and Hekman both 
argue, ANT focuses so closely on the concrete actors and actants, it does not account for 
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the social, political, and cultural forces that contribute to the construction of facts and 
reality. 
Feminist scholars of science, technology and bodies also study the construction of 
facts. However, they add to this discourse a focus on the political, cultural, and rhetorical 
factors that influence knowledge construction. The work of Barad makes an explicit 
connection to the rhetoric of science. In addition, the work of Butler and Grosz 
establishes that bodies play a central role in knowledge production. As such, these also 
inform the rhetoric of science. Within the past 20 years, the field of feminist science 
studies has enacted a shift in science studies and rhetoric of science. In particular, this 
field has not only contributed to the study of how facts are made and distributed.  
This field has also accounted for how facts are made within power relations that 
construct knowledge, facts, and shape our embodied experience. Ann Fausto-Sterling, 
who is both a biologist and a feminist philosopher, is most widely known for her feminist 
critiques of entrenched sexism in scientific discourse. Her work is explicitly rhetorical in 
so far as she analyzes how the words, categories, and metaphors used in science 
perpetuate sexism and essentialist notions of gender. For instance, Fausto-Sterling 
demonstrates our normative notions of two sex is a myth that reduces complex relations 
between internal genitalia, external genitalia, chromosomes, hormones, and social 
construction, into two limited categories when at least five categories are needed to 
define sexual difference (Myths of Gender and Sexing the Body). Fausto-Sterling’s 
scholarship exposes how complex biological data are constructed and explained in ways 
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that support sexist beliefs about women, perpetuate essentialist notions of gender, and 
reinforce gender norms of masculinity and femininity in the study of material reality.  
In the case of “On Computable Numbers,” bodies and discourse intersect to 
construct new knowledge about the foundation of mathematics and also construct the 
theoretical and applied foundation of digital computation. Attention to Turing’s chiasmic 
rhetoric makes the connections between embodied experiences and discourse visible. In 
addition, this chiasmic figuring allows us to see how the chiasmic intersection between 
embodiment and discourse are constitutive of Turing’s solution to the problem of 
decidability.  
 
Turing’s Turn Toward Bodies 
In this article, Turing composes his solution from a surprisingly concrete, embodied 
notion of mathematics. This concrete approach to mathematics stems from his relatively 
new conviction in materialism. Between writing “Nature of Spirit” and “On Computable 
Numbers,” Hodges explains that Turing lost his faith in an eternal, separate spirit form. 
Instead, Turing invested more and more in quantum mechanics and applied mathematics 
as well as the more abstract logical mathematics. When he wrote “Nature of Spirit,” 
Turing was reading John McTaggert and Arthur S. Eddington with great interest. Both of 
these writers were adopting the findings in quantum mechanics very loosely in order to 
find scientific justifications for Christian notions of human spirit and free will in minds 
that are somehow independent or separate from bodies. Turing clearly wanted to believe 
that Christopher’s spirit could live beyond his body. He missed his friend. The hope that 
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science could potentially explain the continued life of Christopher’s spirit drove Turing to 
consider scientific justifications for spirit’s transcendent life after a body’s death. And 
this this time, Turing could more readily reinsribe antithesis between bodies and minds. 
However, Turing was also a rigorous and committed scientist. College for Turing, like so 
many of us, led down a path of commitment to alternative forms of knowing that 
contradicted the religion of his youth. Hodges writes that before completing his 
undergraduate thesis, Turing “would soon emerge as a forceful exponent of the 
materialist view and identify himself as an atheist” (108).  
As a materialist, Turing believed that all phenomena are material phenomena. 
Nothing exists outside or apart from the matter. However, Turing’s materialism is 
different from an earlier pre-quantum mechanics notion of materialism. The notion of 
material that he learned as a child, which was a notion that material was inert and 
mechanical, had been complicated significantly by quantum mechanics. Since 
Heisenberg introduced his uncertainty principle, matter, atoms, and physics were seen to 
behave in random, unpredictable ways. As he matured as a theorist, he embraced 
randomness and uncertainty as inherent in material life. This shift towards materialism 
also complicates the relations between bodies and abstract through. Or, to put it more 
precicely, his shift towards materialism means bodies and material would intersect with 
discourse, even in the most abstract theoretical proofs.  
Equipped with this materialist, concrete mode of thinking and Turing’s embodied 
experiences, Turing composes “On Computable Numbers” so that embodied experiences 
form the very foundation of his abstract theory. In this way, chiasmic rhetoric is the 
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relation between embodied experiences and his theoretical writing, which together 
produce new knowledge within the field of mathematics. And feminist theories of science 
studies remind us that not only are these abstract theories and bodies connected, they are 
also all implicated in similar social, political, and cultural dimensions. In later chapters I 
will call further attention to the connections between Turing’s ideas, his body, and also 
the larger social system in which his ideas and body were composed. Next, I will 
highlight three primary ways—in his style, his method, and his conclusion—that 
chiasmic rhetoric intersects bodies with Turing’s theoretical contributions to mathematics 
and later to computer science.  
 
Turing Intersects Bodies and Logic 
Chiasmic rhetoric intersects bodies and Turing’s thinking first, on the level of style. The 
style the Turing uses in this article is surprisingly concrete and even conversational. The 
most obvious way that Turing connects these abstract proofs with his concrete life is with 
the first person pronouns. He personally claims each of his arguments with “I give some 
arguments” and “I show…” (58-59). He also connects himself with his readers with the 
pronoun we when we writes comments like “We may compare a man in the process of 
computing a real number…” (59). Turing uses these first person pronouns throughout the 
article. Even though much of this text is composed of symbolic numbers and equations, 
much of the article is also composed of surprisingly conversational tone. This style does 
not conform to established conventions of scientific writing, which include introduction, 
methods, results, analysis/discussion (Penrose and Katz 93-95). However, these primary 
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parts can be interpreted as present. In fact, Turing explains his ‘method’ of effective 
method throughout. This method of solving the problem of decidability is also, for most 
of us, his most meaningful contribution. His method requires him to build a machine that 
becomes the prototype of a digital computer.  
A second way, and more obvious way, that bodies are in chiasmic intersection 
with Turing’s thinking in this article is through his method. His method of solving this 
problem begins with the embodied human process of calculation. When he writes, 
“imagine a computer…” Turing is referring to a person, in Turing’s case ‘a man’ 
although computers were most often women (Chun, Bolter). Turing then describes the 
process of computing as a physical process: This man sits at a desk, writes with a pen, on 
paper, reads instructions, and moves the paper along from one step to another step of the 
instructions. Turing describes the paper that the man uses. Turing’s man, this computer, 
is given very complex calculation, which was typical and tedious. These calculations 
would take any man a very long time, which means he would have to take breaks. “It is 
always possible for the computer to break off from his work, to go away and forget all 
about it, and later to come back and go on with it. If he does this, he must leave a note of 
instructions, written in some standard form” (79). Before stopping he would need to write 
down instructions for himself “in some standard form” in order to know what to do next. 
Then, Turing suggests, “suppose that the computer works in such a desultory manner that 
he never does more than one step at a sitting” (79). This man has to get up after each 
step… perhaps to get a drink of water or stretch. Each step of the calculations must be 
written down in the most basic terms.  
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This embodied experience of a lazy man writing down instructions is the basis on 
which Turing invented the digital computation. These instructions for each step become 
the prototype for software. These are the instructions that tell computers each step. Then 
Turing describes a kind of machine that can read the tape, mark 0 or 1, and move the tape 
from right to left. With these simple functions, Turing invents the very basic model of the 
hardware for computers. Hodges noted that Turing’s method of solving one of the central 
questions of mathematics “but it was not only a matter of abstract mathematics, not only 
a play of symbols, for it involved thinking about what people did in the physical world… 
All he had done was to set up a new model, a new framework” (107). 
This method of embodying the process of computation was considered highly 
unusual. Hodges calls his method unique for its “definite, down-to-earth resolution of the 
paradox of determinism and free will, not a wordy philosophical one” (108).  Bolter calls 
this method “strange” and even “simple-minded” (169). Its originality can be seen most 
clearly when comparing it to Alfonzo Church’s method for solving the problem of 
decidability, which was published just a few short months before Turing’s article. 
Church’s “well formed formula” is comparable to the Turing machine, as Turing admits 
in the appendix to his article (88). However, Church remains abstract. The formula is 
equally as functional for concluding the problem of decidability. However, Church never 
discusses how the formula would be calculated. He was not attentive to the physical 
process. Turing’s thinking is unique in so far as he is thinking very literally and 
concretely about the physical processes of calculation and mathematics. By starting with 
  102 
the embodied process, Turing ties mathematical theory directly to the concrete, embodied 
process of performing calculations.  
This concrete, embodied method was the key to the invention of digital 
computation. As Hodges wrote, this solution was almost too applicable and concrete. 
Hodges writes that, when Newman, Turing’s mentor who taught a course on the 
Foundations of Mathematics at King’s (Hodges 90) read the article, Newman, “could 
hardly believe that so simple and direct an idea as the Turing machine would answer the 
Hilbert problem over which many had been laboring for five years since Gödel had 
disposed of the other Hilbert questions” (112). Theory was the drug of the day. 
According to William Pager, an American mathematician who contributed towards 
computer developments in the US, “there was a widespread belief that you turned to 
applied mathematics if you found the going too hard in pure mathematics” (in Rees 607). 
And Hodges comments regarding Turing’s turn to application that “such a foray into the 
practical world was liable to be met with patronizing jokes within the academic world” 
(157). But Turing solved this theoretical problem by starting with the least theoretical 
place: a man, sitting, at a table, with a pencil and paper. In particular, the kind of paper a 
child would use to work through math problems. What could more simple? And starting 
in this place, Turing entered the field as a relative outsider, solving a theoretical problem 
through very concrete methods. 
Finally, chiasmic rhetoric allows us to see that bodies take space and intersect 
with Turing’s very conclusion. This form of taking space is more subtle but still 
significant. When Turing concludes that the problem of decidability could not be solved 
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through effective methods, he proves mathematics will always be in some ways 
unexplained and unexplainable. Using effective methods of logical proofs, a Turing 
machine could calculate some problems, like the halting problem, but the problem would 
need to be calculated infinitely without ever coming to a conclusion.  
Turing’s conclusion is the final end to the dream posited by Hilbert and an entire 
school of mathematics that imagined mathematics as a garden of logic, order, and control. 
Turing’s conclusions, in effect, derail the drive to control within mathematics. And in 
order to make this final blow to ideal mathematics, Turing had to start with a chiasmic 
relation between bodies and knowledge. Although he does not explicitly discuss quantum 
mechanics in this article, he studied it at length throughout this time period and goes on 
to investigate quantum mechanics in more depth after publishing this article. Quantum 
mechanics had decades earlier proved that not all material phenomena were explainable. 
There would always be some mysteries to the material universe. However, because 
mathematics is defined as abstract and without matter, some mathematicians continued to 
maintain that math was solvable and that mathematical principles could eventually rid 
this logical science of mysteries and randomness. Turing’s materialist understanding of 
mathematics, logic, and bodies, then, became the foundation on which he toppled the 
abstract, formalist, modernist notions that numbers and mathematics may somehow be an 
abstract, perfectly logical, universal science. By applying materialism and quantum 
mechanics, Turing insists that mathematics must be material and physical process. 
Starting from this commitment, he was able to demonstrate the limits of mathematical 
knowledge and of mechanical calculations.  
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Intersecting Bodies without Difference 
By defining chiasmic relations in which bodies and discourse are always already 
intersecting but also exceeding each other, Butler’s arguments allow me to refocus a 
reading of Turing’s writing so that we can see the deeply integrated ways that embodied 
experiences inform and shape his knowledge production. By starting with bodies, Turing 
was able to clear the theoretical air and make great progress. In this way, bodies intersect 
directly with Turing’s thinking, invention, and writing. Here, the chiasmic rhetoric moves 
to connect bodies and discourse. Although this is a simple movement, for Turing, his 
rhetoric that intersects bodies and discourse allowed him to solve abstract mathematical 
theories, develop the foundations for computation, and also challenge the long-standing 
believe that mathematical knowledge is separate from material and therefore freed from 
the limitations and variability inherent in our material world.  
Turing was certainly not the first to try to build a thinking machine. A century 
earlier Ada Lovelace and Charles Babbage worked to invent an analytical engine that 
they hoped would be a thinking machine. At the same time as Turing was writing this 
article, John Von Neumann was at Princeton trying to create a computation machine but 
was stuck on the logical foundations (Copeland 23-25). Turing was reading Von 
Neumann’s work throughout the 1930's, and Von Neumann gave a series of lectures at 
Cambridge that Turing attended. But Von Neumann was making it too complicated. He 
had the correct hardware, but his coding was too complicated and cumbersome. The 
beauty of Turing's invention, again, was in its simplicity.  
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However, the bodies that we find in Turing’s chiasmic rhetoric are not rich 
notions of human bodies. Instead of human embodied difference, Turing makes explicit a 
long-standing metaphor between human bodies and machines. Turing writes, “We may 
compare a man in the process of computing a real number to a machine which is only 
capable of a finite number of conditions” (59). Hodges explains at multiple points how 
commonly the notion of man’s body as a machine would have been to Turing (96, 107). 
This metaphor, then, would have been an easily accepted starting place for Turing’s 
theoretical claims. He came to this project with a mechanical notion of bodies. Based on 
this mechanical notion of bodies, it seems almost inevitable that he could then easily 
replace each aspect of this mechanical body with a computation machine.  
However productive this chiasmic intersection may be, Turing’s particular notion 
of bodies that he articulates in this article excludes, erases, and ignores many of the rich 
aspects of human embodiment. Turing’s discussion of bodies as a foundation for 
computation offers a limited perspective on what bodies are and what bodies can do. 
What do we know about these bodies that Turing has laid at the foundation of digital 
computation? The only particularities or needs that this body has is 1) male, 2) finite 
memory, 3) has a hard time staying in a chair for long periods of time, and 4) has 
different states of mind.  
Considering that Turing didn’t have an assistant to perform his computations, he 
was probably imaging his own body. What did he leave out? As Turing sat performing 
computations he was perhaps in Cambridge. As he wrote this article, Turing was serving 
as Don at his former school. This position required very little from Turing. He had the 
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freedom to research and write. He spent his free time with friends, most of whom were 
other scientists or mathematicians. Turing ran long distances every day. He ran for the 
runner’s high. He ran to keep his body strong and healthy. He also ran to think. We see 
no particularity of Turing’s body in this metaphor of the mechanical body. These 
particularities may include his overall physical strength, his fair skin, his proclivity for 
vacationing in sunny places, or his preference for British ale. None of these particularities 
factor into Turing’s development of the computer as a man into a computer that is a 
machine and a process of formal logic and symbolic forms.  
Throughout his life, Turing learned how to dress like a man of privilege. He was 
taught to value physical fitness, competition, and athletic events. This bodily training was 
not incidental to his intellectual training: the same values were conveyed in both. The 
bodily training taught restraint, the importance of conforming to conventions.  Likewise, 
we see in this article how Turing applies the rigorous rules for logical formalism in order 
to create a machine that can perform calculations. His notion of bodies in “On 
Computable Numbers” is stripped of the touches of subjective needs or perspectives. 
Like a man trained to perform in polite, British society, Alan Turing’s rhetoric 
metaphorically learns to walks the walk of acceptable scientific rhetoric. Surely, these 
embodied experiences must also intersect in Turing’s chiasmic rhetoric. 
In the next chapters, I will develop chiasmic rhetoric in increasingly complex 
ways by drawing from increasingly complex notions of bodies. The embodied 
experiences discussed in this chapter were relatively simple: sitting, calculating, moving 
paper from side to side. Likewise, the chiasmic move to intersect is also relatively simple. 
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I have demonstrated that bodies and discourse are inseparable. But I will continue to 
develop notions of chiasmic rhetoric to include more complex notion of bodies that have 
been disciplined, constructed, and also punished by a broad set of embodied experiences. 
Thus, chiasmic rhetoric will develop so that it integrates the social, epistemic, and 
cultural construction of our bodies. And particularly in Chapter 4, these will include 
bodily experiences of education and disciplining as they relate to Turing as a subject of 
governmentality and sexuality. 
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CHIASMUS 4: 
DYNAMIC EMBODIMENTS 
 
 
“As you gaze at the flickering signifiers scrolling down the computer screens,  
no matter what identifications you assign [in the Turing test],  
you have already become posthuman.”  
~ Hayles, How we Became Posthuman 
 
“Playing [chess] against such a machine gives a definite feeling that one is pitting one’s 
wits against something alive.” 
~Turing, “Intelligent Machinery” 
 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that chiasmus creates a relation that combines the 
equality and balance of parallelism with the contradiction and distinction created in 
antithesis. And the foundational first move of chiasmus is to create intersections. Now, I 
develop these arguments further by demonstrating the dynamic movement of chiasmus. 
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By dynamic, I mean that chiasmus moves and creates change. This chapter will focus on 
dynamic movement of chiasmus in which bodies and discourse co-construct each other. 
This will be seen primarily through a discussion of the disciplinary practices that 
construct Turing's subjectivity but also the disciplinary practices that construct 
knowledge or what qualifies as intelligence according to Turing’s early work on artificial 
intelligence. I will also discuss how chiasmus between bodies and discourse are not only 
discipline but also dynamic in productive ways, in particular, productive for knowledge 
construction. I will show these dynamic relations, which is both disciplining and 
productive, through an analysis of Turing’s 1948 report “Mechanical Intelligence.” In 
this report, Turing sets out his initial theories of how to train computing machines so that 
they can gradually learn and eventually demonstrate a form of intelligence. This is 
significant for our discussion because I demonstrate how Turing’s computers and 
intelligence dynamically interact with embodied experience to produce new knowledge.  
 
Dynamic Chiasmus  
Chiasmus creates intersections, but these are not necessarily static intersections. Rather 
chiasmus figures relations that are dynamic and productive. Jeanne Fahnestock most 
directly addresses the dynamic qualities of chiasmus within scientific writing. “It is 
movement,” (131) and creates “transformations—like stretching, rotating, translating, and 
reflecting” (134). The movement of chiasmus creates an experience so that a reader 
“enters the [chiasmus] at one conceptual location and comes out at another; it has the 
trajectory of a parabola” (131). Fahnestock finds this figure epitomizing the state of 
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eternal flux in Heraclitus. Within the rhetoric of science, this dynamic figure can be 
found throughout Newton's discussion of the third law of motion, which states that for 
every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. Although Newton does not form this 
law in the form of a chiasmus, each of his examples are chiasmically structured. For 
instance, Newton illustrates, “if you press a stone with your finger, the finger is also 
pressed by the stone” (in Fahnestock 142). Like Newton’s law of motion, the two 
different parts of chiasmus are reversible and co-constructing. The figure “epitomizes 
arguments concerning reciprocal causality, a causal influence that goes in opposite 
directions, or a reversible process” (141). Here, we find the very law of dynamics that 
conveys dynamic co-construction is figured in language through a chiasmic figure that is 
also dynamic and co-constructing.  
This notion of dynamic co-construction through chiasmus can be found 
throughout literary and religious studies of chiasmus. For example, Henry David 
Thoreau’s use of chiasmus creates a pattern that is balanced but mutually dependent 
relation between the individual and social or natural forces (Kopley). In his analysis of 
chiasmus in the Old Testament of the Christian bible, Nils Lund describes the Hebrew 
chiasmus as two parallel ladders. This extended chiasmus (sometimes whole chapters) 
creates dynamic processes of reading that lead towards a climax in the center and then 
descended (132-136). Thomas Mermall, in his literary analysis of Unamuno, finds that 
the figure allows Unamuno “to avoid closure, sustain tension, dissociate terms, 
undermine identities, generate perpetual contradiction, and affirm the eternal struggles” 
(246). These rhetorical, literary, and biblical scholars all understand chiasmus in terms of 
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dynamic co-construction that, many times, connects material and discourse on the page. 
In addition, I have used feminist theory as well as rhetorical theory to apply chiasmus as 
a heuristic for figuring relations between bodies and discourse in and outside of texts, 
specifically in this dissertation in Alan Turing’s technical writing. In order to make this 
shift from chiasmus within text to chiasmus between bodies and discourse, I will again 
draw from Judith Butler and other gender theorists who discuss chiasmus or use chiasmic 
figures in their theories.  
For Butler, bodies and language are “perpetually negotiated” (38). They are 
always in a chiasmic relation that is intersecting, never subsumed into each other, and 
dynamically co-constructing. It is in this complex performance and re-performed 
negotiation that the dynamic characteristic of chiasmus is of crucial importance.  The 
relation between bodies and language is one of constant chiasmic negotiation allows 
feminists and scholars of bodies to move beyond essentialist notions of bodies. Instead, 
we are able to theorize gender with a “a notion of matter, not as a site or surface, but as a 
process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effects of boundary, 
fixity, and surface we call matter” (xviii). Because bodies are always in this “process of 
materialization” in relation with discourse, the chiasmic relation that I am describing 
must constantly be described and re-described. This figure can never be stable or solid. 
Rather, bodies and discourse are always dynamically changing, reacting and producing in 
relation to each other.  
While this chiasmic relation can be productive—they construct bodies in 
knowable, recognizable subjects—this relation disciplines and normalizes so that through 
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performance over and over again, subjects are disciplined into conforming to norms for 
sexuality and gender. These chiasmic relations are how bodies come to matter in 
knowable ways. This is a construction through power relations so that “the recasting of 
the matter of bodies as the effects of a dynamic of power, such that the matter of bodies 
will be indissociable from the regulatory norms that govern their materialization and the 
significance of those material effects” (Butler 2). She writes that the materializing effects 
of discourse are restricted by the “historicity of discourse” (138). That discursive 
performativity of material effects “does not mean that any action is possible on the basis 
of a discursive effect. On the contrary, certain reiterative chains of discursive production 
are barely legible as reiterations, for the effects have materialized are those without which 
no bearing in discourse can be taken” (138). In this way, discourse’s historicity ossifies 
material effects through “reiterative chains of discursive production.” Thought 
chiasmicly, these reiterative chains of discourse produce bodies that, in large part, 
conform to naturalized material forms, like sex, that become invisible. However, by 
paying attention to the material discursive interactions, Butler is able to make those 
formally invisible effects not only visible, but also demonstrates their instability. 
 
Dynamics of Biopolitics 
We can draw on Foucault’s theories of sexuality in order to interpret some of the 
technologies that enacted power on Turing’s body and how those relate to Turing’s own 
thinking on machine bodies and machine intelligence. Although Foucault does not 
discuss chiasmus, his work here is crucial because it explains the larger historical, 
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discursive, political, and social mechanism and practices that compose bodies an 
intelligible and normalized. Discourses construct and reconstruct his identity as a 
homosexual man represented and articulated within the history to computer science and 
computer technology and intersecting with practices that produce knowledge. In other 
words, Turing as a thinker, inventor, and writer cannot be understood as separate or 
distinct from Turing as a man who identified as homosexual. Sedgwick makes this claim 
most specific when she opens Epistemology of the Closet with the assertion, “an 
understanding of virtually any aspect of modern Western culture must be, not merely 
incomplete, but damaged in its central substance to the degree that it does not incorporate 
a critical analysis of modern homo/heterosexual definition” (1). This is not to say that 
Turing’s inventions and theories are reducible or explainable as products of a queer 
sexuality (although this is what Lassègue attempts to posits in “What Kind of Turing Test 
did Turing Have in Mind”). Rather, sexuality and knowledge production are both co-
constructed through a complex network of practices, institutions, and power relations.  
Butler explains in her preface to Bodies that Matter that her efforts to talk about 
sexuality always bring her into talking about other things (ix). As much as she tried to 
focus her thought on bodies themselves, she found “not only did bodies tend to indicate a 
world beyond themselves, but this movement beyond their own boundaries… appeared to 
be quite central to what bodies “are” ” (ix).  For instance, scholars slide from sexuality to 
punishment and trauma by mentioning Turing’s sexuality only in connection with his 
death (Copeland). When scholars frame Turing’s sexuality as an identity category, they 
do more than name his subjectivity and sexuality; they also frame his identity as 
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constituted and knowable, in part, by a set of presumed activities, values, characteristics, 
and established knowledge about those activities (Leavitt).  
However, this difficulty is exactly the richness that makes the study of sexuality a 
high stakes pursuit. Because of these intricate relations between knowledge production 
and sexuality, attention to Turing’s sexuality as well as the material-discursive 
construction of his multiple subjectivities, inform how we understand Turing’s thinking 
as well as his notions of machine intelligence. On the other hand, Turing’s education, the 
values of the systems of knowledge production in which he contributed, and the power of 
those institutions all construct Turing as a subject in relation to sexuality, governance, 
and technology. To explicate this point I will discuss Turing’s embodied experiences as 
informed by Foucault’s theories of biopower.  
First, I need to define what I mean by sexuality. Foucault’s History of Sexuality 
traces the construction sexuality as a category that identifies people and with which 
people can identify themselves. This category is a construction between power-
knowledge-pleasure (11). For Foucault, it is very important that the act of sex not be 
separated or defined as more natural or real than the category of sexuality. To separate 
the two would leave the act of sex potentially in the natural or authentic definition with 
sexuality as a construction of power and knowledge. The act of sex is no less socially 
constructed notion than sexuality. This is because ““sex” made it possible to group 
together, in artificial unity, anatomical elements, biological functions, conducts, 
sensations, and pleasures, and it enabled one to make use of this fictitious unity as a 
causal principle” (154). Together, this grouping of different actions, things, and 
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experiences were given the status of a natural and universal concept. Based on this notion 
of sex, the concept of sexuality seems to causally rise: “sex…is doubtless but an ideal 
point made necessary by the deployment of sexuality and its operations… Sex is the most 
speculative, most ideal, and most internal element in a deployment of sexuality organized 
by power in its grip on bodies and their materiality, their forces, energies, sensations, and 
pleasures” (155). The categories themselves do not simply regulate and normalize 
identities. Rather, sex as an act is also embedded in power relations that deploy sexuality. 
In this way, the category and the embodied act are always connected and producing each 
other. Regarding Turing’s embodied sexual acts and sexuality, I know and therefor can 
say relatively little about the particular practices of pleasure. These practices are not 
necessary to know in order to understand Turing’s sexuality because this project is not 
interested in defining or dissecting Turing’s sexual practices. Instead, this project is 
interested in Turing as a homosexual subject as constructed within and against 
normalizing practices that are historical, social, material, and discursive.  
While Foucault is a central theorist in this dissertation and his scholarship informs 
my reading of the construction of Turing’s embodied experiences, his work has been 
critiqued for lacking the particularity of unique bodies, especially by Michel de Certeau 
(Practices of Everyday Life), Nancy Fraser (Unruly Practices pg 55-66), and Katherine 
Hayles (How We Became Posthuman pg 194-199). Foucault discusses institutions, 
general practices, and bodily characters that are produced and normailized through 
biopower. However, with this focus on historical and social trends, his work erases bodily 
particularity. As Hayles argues, that bodily particularity is crucial for understanding how 
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particular bodies resist, twist, and alter bodily codes. In particular, for Hayles particular 
bodies and particular technologies interact to affect each other through practices. She 
writes, “Formed by technology at the same time that [embodied practices] create 
technology, embodiment mediates between technology and discourse by creating new 
experiential frameworks that serve as boundary markers for the creation of corresponding 
discursive systems” (205).  
Considering Turing’s particular body as well his particular writing in “Intelligent 
Machinery,” we find that the systems that discipline and normalize his particular 
experience are dynamically re-inscribed into the training and construction of machine 
intelligence. This adds the richness of particular experience to the larger normalizing 
effects of biopower. In this way, Turing’s description of the machine he would invent, 
program, and train to be intelligent reflects and reproduces Turing’s own education, 
embodied experiences, and therefore his understanding of his own mind and body. In 
order to invent these notions of machine intelligence, Turing had to already understand 
himself in somewhat mechanical terms. 
 
Dynamic Production of Sexuality 
Like all bodies, Turing is composed through this dynamic, productive process of 
interaction. In this way, not only does chiasmic rhetoric move to intersect bodies and 
discourse, chiasmic rhetoric also dynamically produces both bodies and rhetoric. Turing’s 
body is produced within a particular historical, social, and political context. I cannot 
unpack all of these levels of interaction, but this chapter will begin to address the 
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composing of Turing’s body especially his body as a subject with sexual and national 
identities.  
Turing, in some ways, is a queer figure. He is a gay man. But in many ways he 
conforms to normative standards for men of his social status. By in large, after his college 
years at Cambridge, Turing revealed his private life to a very small set of individuals. 
Primarily he was a private man, especially private about his sexual life. In the entry on 
Alan Turing in the Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader, Barbone states, “Turing’s place in 
homosexual studies is problematic because he neither hid nor proclaimed his sexuality 
and would likely wonder why it might concern anyone anyway. Perhaps his own inability 
to grasp why his sexuality should be of interest to others is what makes his an enigma 
both to those in and out of gay studies” (594). And this is likely more complicated by 
Barbone’s suggestion that Turing was “neither in nor out of the closet and may not even 
be aware, perhaps, that there was one” (595).  
Even in his biographies, Turing’s identity as a homosexual man is discussed in 
ambiguous ways. For instance, immediately after identifying Turing by the stereotype of 
“an ordinary English homosexual, atheist, mathematician” Hodges writes, “It would not 
be easy” (115). Here, Hodges highlights that Turing is peculiar in a lot of different ways. 
Turing’s particularity would mean that he does not quite fit or easily move into any clear-
cut, dominant identity category.  Hodges writes that Turing was an ‘ordinary’ English 
homosexual, atheist, mathematician,” but for certain, this could not have been a time 
worn stereotype. Despite, or perhaps due to this ambiguity, Turing is an interesting 
figure. Like so many of us, Turing both conforms to and defies normalizing codes that 
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represent bodies. Unlike so many of us, Turning achieved national and international fame 
as an genius, became a war hero, was arrested for homosexuality, and was chemically 
castrated. 
 
Turing in Transition 
Alan Turing’s life changed considerably between 1936 when he published “On 
Computable Numbers” and 1948 when he wrote his next major contribution to artificial 
intelligence, a report, titled “Intelligent Machinery,” to the National Physics Laboratory. 
In 193812 the almost-certain world war and Turing’s own dissatisfaction with the hoped 
for mentorship under Alfonzo Church led Turing from Princeton back to Cambridge. But 
he did not remain in Cambridge long. With the beginning of WWII, he left theoretical 
mathematics and its location in universities and moved towards mathematical 
applications and cryptology for the British government at Bletchley Park.  
As war with Germany became an ever more likely possibility, the British 
government needed to expand its intelligence operations. To an unprecedented degree, 
the British government would need mathematicians, scientists, and engineers to fight this 
war of information. The German government was encoding messages with the Enigma 
Machine, which was not a digital computer but was an electronic encoder that could 
encode information at a level of complexity that, at the time, was undecipherable. This 
                                                
12 This is also the year that he completed his dissertation under the mentorship of Alfonzo 
Church at Princeton. Turing theorized what he called an O-machine “a new kind of 
machine.” This O-machine would be different from his universal Turing Machine that he 
proposed in 1937. The O-machine contained a random ‘oracle’ or black box that would 
insert a random figure that is not calculable by a standard Turing machine. 
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machine was the “central problem that confronted British Intelligence in 1938” (Hodges 
148). Turing was a “natural recruit” according to Hodges: Turing was a mathematician 
with experience solving complex mathematical problems with the help of electronic 
machines (148). While most men were enlisting in the British army and leaving for the 
battlefield, Turing joined a group of elite scientists and engineers in the British 
Government Code and Cipher School and left for the countryside at Bletchley Park.  
Although many men and women worked in the US and America to advance 
mathematics and computer technology during WWII, Turing’s particular contributions 
earned him some fame and recognition for his creativity and his ability to think in 
flexible ways (Leavitt 8). Turing played a central role designing many of the computers 
and techniques for decoding and encoding messages, including the ‘bombe,’ which 
intercepted and decoded messages in order to locate the German U-boats (Copeland The 
Essential Turing 2). He also designed a computer he named Delilah, which used random 
noise to encode messages. British historian and veteran of Bletchley Park, Sir Harry 
Hinsley, suggests that the work done at Bletchley Park reduced the length of the war by 
as much as two years. Likewise, Copeland argues that Turing’s contributions towards 
computing and cryptology made a significant impact on the course of WWII (Copeland 
“Turing After the UTM” 493). A fellow cryptologist wrote after Turing’s death: “I won’t 
say that what Turing did made us win the war, but I daresay we might have lost it without 
him” (in McCorduck Machines Who Think 53). British Lord Chancellor Chris Grayling, 
when he announced Turing’s pardon on Christmas Eve 2013, even called Turing “a war 
hero like Winston Churchill.” Many of these accolades were reconstructed after Turing’s 
  120 
death. During his life, his received some prominence during the war, but he floundered 
some outside of Bletchley Park’s selective, protective social circle.  
Turing wrote “Intelligent Machinery” in 1948 at a time of social transition that 
caught his career at a moment of uncertainty. Turing was offered a prestigious position 
with the National Physics Library in 1946, and he set to work designing and building a 
general-purpose, digital computer, the ACE machine. During the war his superiors gave 
Turing the latitude to execute his unconventional methods because they produced results. 
These included methods by intuition, random selection, “sheer bloody guesswork, 
guessing and hoping” (Hodges 185).  After the war, however, Turing’s superiors and 
colleagues questioned his peculiar methods. The ACE machine was one particular 
sticking point. The British officials decided to follow Von Neumann’s design. This 
decision was indicative of the general recognition that the United States was the world 
leader in computer technology (Rees 611). Turing’s ACE machine was being built, but 
not in the way that Turing designed (Copland Essential Turing 398-399). Max Newman 
showed up yet again to offer a new opportunity for Turing. Newman founded the Royal 
Society Computing Machine Laboratory at University of Manchester and offered Turing 
the position of Deputy director. This position offered Turing flexibility and intellectual 
freedom. Turing asked for a one year sabbatical but soon broke what Director of the NPL 
Sir Charles Darwin referred to as a “gentleman’s promise” to return after the sabbatical 
(Copeland 400). By May 1948, Turing submitted his resignation to NPL and begin 
working at the University of Manchester.  
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Biographies Constructing Sexuality 
Of course, I am not the first to discuss Turing’s sexuality. With each new biography and 
each new account of Turing’s contribution to computer science, scholars discursively re-
construct Turing’s sexuality. By in large, Turing’s sexuality is exclusively discussed in 
biographical work on Turing, not theoretical or scientific discussions13. For instance, 
although Copeland has worked for years to petition an official pardon for Turing’s crime 
of ‘indecency’ (see Copeland, “Pardon the Digital Warrior?”), he makes no mention 
Turing’s sexuality in his most extensive text on Turing The Essential Turing. In these 
cases, Turing’s sexuality is excluded within the context of Turing’s intellectual work. 
This silence also suggests that the field itself is free of or objective to sexuality. In logical 
mathematics in particular, any subjective, personal, or even material connections are 
excluded. When scholars focus on Turing’s theories they exclude any mention of 
Turing’s sexuality. Leavitt also notes this trend: “most popular accounts of his work 
either fail to mention his homosexuality altogether or present it as a distasteful an 
ultimately tragic blot on an otherwise stellar career” (6). If his sexuality is mentioned, this 
is often a passing mention of the tragic circumstances of his sentencing of crimes of 
indecency, chemical castration, and his death.  
Jean Lassègue posits the most explicit connection between Turing’s sexuality and 
his thinking in “What Kind of Test Did Turing Have in Mind.” Lassègue seeks to answer 
the question “is the so-called “Turing test” as objective and scientific as it is claimed to 
                                                
13 Some of the many publications on Turing that make no mention of his personal life or 
sexuality include: Bolter, Turing’s Man; Copeland, Essential Turing; Dyson, Turing’s 
Cathedral. 
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be in the AI and cognitive science community?” with a resounding and final “no” (2). 
And his reason for rejecting Turing’s scientific theories is due almost exclusively to 
homophobic justifications. Instead, Lassègue argues that the “test says in fact more about 
Turing’s psychological life than about the science of the mind itself” (2). Lassègue links 
Turing’s homosexuality with a possible traumatic memory of his circumcision: 
“circumcision may be interpreted as a wound on the skin… and it may result in the same 
creative function in Turing’s mind” (11). While the circumcision is the wound that 
Turing supposedly mourns, his particular design of the Turing machine, with tape that is 
read step-by-step from side-to-side is also symbolic of the cutting of the foreskin. 
Lassègue lays out this argument:  
The function of the tape itself would be to recollect the lost integrity of Turing’s 
body burnt in the circumcision in the stepwise procedure of a temporal 
succession. From this point of view, the tape would represent the now missing 
integrity of the body and more specifically the lost skin itself. As to the stepwise 
procedure itself, it would represent the specific way Turing found to save his hide. 
(12)  
Lassègue pathologizes homosexuality by explaining its cause as a wound and trauma. 
Furthermore, he presumes that Turing’s driving ambition in his inventive life was to 
subconsciously ‘save his hide’ by reversing or healing the wound. Any possible personal 
motivation or repressed (as Lassègue acknowledges that this is repressed) trauma related 
to homosexuality are serious enough infractions of the ‘objectivity’ of knowledge that 
Turing’s contributions must say nothing about computing or artificial intelligence and 
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instead only tell us about Turing’s personal life. Despite the homophobic overtones, 
Lassègue’s argument was received unproblematically and without critique within science 
and technology studies and histories of technology14.  
Both Hodges and Leavitt discuss Turing’s sexuality in a way that is complex and 
productive. Andrew Hodges’ biography of Turing, Alan Turing: The Enigma, offers the 
most detailed representation of Turing’s sexuality. In particular, Hodges integrates 
Turing’s personal life in a way that shows its relevance or significance for understanding 
his thinking. As his title suggests, Hodges’ biography not merely to collect facts on 
Turing, but also to solve the enigma that is this influential thinker. Steven Barbone reads 
this book as a collection of influences, facts, situations, and limitations that together 
inform why and how Turing may have died.  Connecting Turing’s theories and his life 
addresses the enigma behind his death because “the solution lies not in any one fact, but 
in the whole pattern that led up to the event [of his death]” (Barbone 594).  
Leavitt’s The Man Who Knew Too Much also offers a complex account of 
Turing’s sexuality. Turing’s assumption that homosexuality is “nothing at all wrong,” for 
Leavitt, reflects his “startlingly original—and startlingly literal—nature of his 
imagination” (6). He also sees a connection between Turing’s sexuality and his claim that 
machines may also have a form of intelligence. He finds, “after all, his insistence on 
questioning humankind’s exclusive claim to the faculty of thought had… encoded a 
subtle critique of social norms that denied to another population—that of homosexual 
                                                
14 See Leavitt The Man Who Knew Too Much, Wilson Affect and Artificial Intelligence; 
Moor The Turing Test: The Elusive Standard of Artificial Intelligence, Saygin et all 
“Turing Test: 50 Years Later 
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men and women—the right to a legitimate and legal existence” (5). His goal, as he 
explicitly states it, is to write a biography of Turing to repair or revise the representation 
of Turing as a homosexual man (6). Both of these accounts are important contributions. I 
will build on Hodges and Leavitt’s accounts of Turing’s biography and read within the 
context of Foucault’s theories of biopower, in order to show the ways that Turing’s own 
embodied experiences being disciplined also inform his own writing and invention.  
In the chiasmic relation between bodies and discourse that I have been theorizing, 
both sex and sexuality are embodied and discursive performances. Like all of us, 
Turing’s body and his discourses are both shot through with practices of sex and 
sexuality. All of these mechanisms for producing subjects are disciplining as well as 
productive: these produce bodies as knowable subjects and also produce new knowledge. 
We can find traces of these disciplining norms in both Turing’s biography and in 
Turing’s writing on artificial intelligence. I will focus this on two primary concerns: 
norming through intervention and a targeted focus on bodies.  
 
Machines in Transition 
In these years between Turing’s proposal of a universal Turing machine and his 
arguments for intelligent machinery, computer technology advanced rapidly due, in large 
part, to meet the increasingly technological face of warfare in WWII. In her first-hand 
account of the rise of mathematics for application into computers, Rees writes:  
although automatically sequenced electronic computers were not available before 
the end of the war, the needs of the war played a decisive role in their initial 
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development and the military services continued their interest and provided much 
of their financing of the post-war developments. (610)  
With considerable investment from both the British and American governments, 
computer technology saw its first official birth immediately after WWII. It would still be 
another 2 years before a fully digital, storied memory computer would be patented, and 
that would happen in the United States.  
Scholars have hotly debated the exact birth date and the particular inventor of the 
first computer. By most American accounts, the Electronic Numerical Integrator and 
Computer (ENIAC) in the Ballistic Research Lab in Maryland the first electronic, general 
purpose, stored-programing, digital computer (Haig; Dyson). John Mauchly and J. 
Presper Eckert are credited as the primary inventors who had the machine fully functional 
by 1946. Jon Von Neumann is also an important inventor who put the ENIAC to work 
towards one of its first major tasks: calculating the viability of the Hydrogen bomb. 
While the ENIAC most closely functioned as a blueprint for the modern computer, many 
engineers and mathematicians were developing computing technology in America and 
England. From a British perspective, the Colossus is claimed to be the first fully 
programed digital computer. This was designed in part by Turing’s long time mentor and 
friend, Max Newman, during WWII at Bletchley Park. Although Turing did not work 
primarily with the Colossus, he was a lead cryptologist and mathematician at Bletchley 
Park at the time. Agar documents many universal machines that were developed 
concurrently in the US, England, and in Europe (Turing and the Universal Machine). At 
the same time, he defines the first fully functional computer at University of Manchester  
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in operation by 1949. Turing wrote the computer manual for this machine, which the 
technicians called the Blue Pig (Turing 121-2). 
In general, the fields of computer science and mathematics were in a state of 
dynamic flux. Many computers existed that functioned, in part, as digital, universal 
machines. What is more, all of these machines were designed, built and functioned in 
very different ways. Turing’s ACE machine probably required the most physical 
legwork, which very much reflects Turing’s own physicality and exercise routine. The 
operators had to literally run from one tightly packed room of equipment into another in 
order to input instructions from one machine to another. Scientists, theorists, and 
mathematicians, including von Neumann and Norbert Weiner, were gathering at the 
Macy Conferences, which were annual meetings on cybernetics and information theory 
from 1943-1954. It is in these foundational meetings that the fields of cybernetics and 
computer science were beginning to take shape. 
 
Transitioning Technologies to Transitioning Bodies 
In How We Became Posthuman Hayles traces the Macy Conferences discourses during 
this time of dynamic change in order to trace the emergence of a materially neutral notion 
of information. At this time, it was not obvious or agreed upon that information should be 
understood as separate from material. A notion of information or data that was somehow 
transcendent or indifferent to material was developed “not because it had no opposition 
but because of scientifically and culturally situated debates made it seem a better choice 
than the alternatives” (50). Through the Macy Conventions, these founders of cybernetics 
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gradually settled on a notion of information that was defined as separate from material 
substance. Thus, it is through these discourses that the founders of cybernetics reinscribe 
the antithesis between bodies and minds, material and information. Information is free 
and indifferent from material or media that may serve at its temporary container.  
One of the effects of this notion of immaterial information is that material came to 
be thought of as dynamically and endlessly pliable and passive. Weiner draws emerging 
digital computation to develop cybernetic theories of altering human bodies. In making 
this shift, he tacitly assumes that human bodies are endlessly pliable and needing to be 
change. Especially for Weiner, these passive bodies needed constant improvement, 
alterations, and additions in order to better human thought as well as human physical 
capabilities. Again, Weiner presupposes antithesis between bodies and minds. And he 
does so to a relatively extreme level: he imagines leaving bodies behind entirely by 
uploading human minds into computers.  
For Hayles, posthumanism includes a notion of humanity that can and should be 
pushed or ‘enhanced’ beyond our ‘natural’ bodies in the service of advancing technology. 
This is a posthuman attribute in which bodies are “the original prostheses we all learn to 
manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a 
continuation of a process that began before we were born” (3). Hayles demystifies this 
notion of information free of particular media and material by tracing the discourses and 
inventions that separate information from its material form. Hayles also shows that 
information must necessarily have a material form. In this way, Hayles identifies media 
bodies as always intersecting with information and mind. Although she does not call 
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these chiasmic relations, her work establishes the ways that bodies and information 
dynamically interact, especially how those interactions change with changing 
technologies.  
Turing never attended the Macy Conferences, but he was certainly associated with 
conversations. He corresponded with and studied with the most prominent members of 
these conferences: Weiner and Von Neumann (Hodges 117-8 402-3). Turing also directly 
addresses, at length, the kind of body and the role of bodies in constructing intelligent 
machinery. Like the discourses of the Macy Conferences, “Intelligent Machinery” 
contributes toward shifting discourses on the relation between bodies and technologies. 
However, Turing does not articulate an immaterial notion of information. Rather, this is a 
notable text because intelligence and embodiment dynamically interact. “Intelligent 
Machinery” not only addresses how Turing understands a complex, dynamic relation 
between material and information (as Hayles would predict), but also reveals how 
Turing’s own embodied experiences informed his arguments for intelligent machinery.  
 
First Manifesto on Artificial Intelligence: “Intelligent Machinery”  
In June 1948, Turing wrote “Intelligent Machinery,” which was his final report to the 
National Physical Laboratory. Copeland describes this article as “far-sighted” and 
“strikingly original,” which is significant because it “brilliantly introduced many of the 
concepts that were later to becomes central in [Artificial Intelligence]” (401). Copeland 
calls this article the first manifesto of artificial intelligence.  Copeland’s praise aside, the 
article originally was received with disappointment. NPL director Sir Einstein described 
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this article as a “schoolboy’s essay” that was “not suitable for publication” (in Copeland 
Essential Turing 401).  
 I focus on this article because Turing first articulates his thinking on machine 
intelligence. This article is a detailed and very imaginative exposition of defining and 
producing intelligence.  “Intelligent Machinery” is also significant because Turing 
composes this at a time in which Turing’s thinking and also computing technology are in 
a time of dynamic flux. In this way, Turing is ‘trying out’ ideas for the first time and in 
his working these ideas out we find unusual notions of machine embodiment. Most 
significantly, Turing’s chiasmic rhetoric in “Intelligent Machinery” posits notions of 
intelligence and body in ways that are thoroughly integrated and even dynamic.  Turing 
directly addresses the question of what or how our machine intelligence may be 
embodied.  
 In “Intelligent Machinery,” Turing composes dynamic, chiasmic interactions 
between bodies and intelligence and these interactions are primarily composed through a 
discipline that focuses on the body of the machine. He opens: I propose to investigate the 
question as to whether it is possible for machinery to show intelligent behavior” (410). 
After acknowledging and refuting several objections, he proposes an unorganized 
machine, which he compares to the blank slate brain of a human child. This machine 
would have potential networks of connections or pathways. However, the machine would 
learn through ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ to continue using the correct pathways and stop using 
the incorrect pathways. This, according to Turing’s view, is a replication of how humans 
develop intelligence. His primary claim for making machines intelligent is that a machine 
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could be built like a man: “a great positive reason for believing in the possibility of 
making thinking machinery is the fact that it is possible to make machinery to imitate any 
small part of man” (420).  
As this logic goes, given that we can build mechanical replicas of some body 
parts, then we may also one day be able to replicate human thought. In order to develop 
towards intelligence, just like raising human children, the machinery would have to be 
‘raised’ in environments with training particular to complete more simple tasks and not 
expected to master complex human thought. This ‘raising’ of intelligent machinery is a 
process of programing the machine to follow different practices, gradually learning from 
the dynamic, iterative practice.   
 
“Failures” of Turing’s Technical Writing 
Turing wrote this article with the supposed intention of submitting it as a technical report 
summarizing and concluding Turing’s research from the past year. In some ways, this 
article does contain some of the typical markers of technical writing. Turing opens by 
defining machinery and separating it into distinct categories, only one of which he will 
address. In each section, Turing begins by setting out the categories of a particular 
concept and then defining exactly what he will focus on. Each time he introduces a new 
term, whether a neologism or a technical term, he always defines its meaning, even if that 
definition is then followed by qualifiers like “this does not pretend to be an accurate term. 
It is conceivable that the same machine might be regarded by one man as organized and 
by another as unorganized” (416). Turing reveals that, although this article has some 
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appearances of technical writing, in many ways his writing “does not pretend to be” a 
fastidious example of technical writing. This is partially because his rhetorical choices do 
not conform to standards. Most strikingly, this failure to meet the expectations of good 
technical writing is, in part, due to his tendency to thinking in terms of embodiment. This 
defies the basic standard to write objectively. His primary audience was the National 
Physics Lab, who expected this report to include concrete findings from Turing’s year of 
sabbatical research. In this expectation, they would certainly be disappointed. 
 “Intelligent Machinery” exhibits much of the rhetorical bravado of a manifesto. 
Regarding the content of his writing, his claims are based on future hypotheticals not on 
any current, material technology. The hypotheses found in this article are unusual for 
scientific or technical writing, to say the least. For instance, he imagines a group of all 
male scientists raising this machine like a baby. His suggestion of re-making the human 
body out of mechanical parts is a familiar, though strange, revision of Dr. Frankenstein’s 
monster. Also like Dr. Frankenstein, he even calls the intelligent machine a “creature” in 
the report (420).  He describes creating a human-like body with mechanical parts and 
then worries that if the machine were allowed to roam it would frighten citizens (420). 
This level of imaginative and hypothetical writing breaks even the most loose of 
conventions within professional, technical, and scientific discourses.  
Further, stylistically, Turing’s style often lacks the specificity and modal 
qualifiers that often define good scientific and technical writing. Instead, Turing makes 
sweeping, broad claims about what future machines may be able to do and their impact 
on society. He even calls attention to the vague quality of this style several times by 
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acknowledging, “This definition is probably too vague and general to be very helpful” 
(425). This article does not conform to any particular expected form of technical report. 
What is especially unusual is that Turing opens with possible objections to mechanical 
intelligence before he even describes how the machine would be built or programed. 
Again, we find in this article that Turing fails to conform to technical writing standards in 
nearly every way.  
Although many of the choices he makes, his conclusions, his examples, all seem 
strange or out of the ordinary from the standpoint of technical writing or science and 
technology studies, I will demonstrate that all of these strange aspects of the article can 
be explained given a dynamic, chiasmic relation between Turing’s embodied experiences 
and his writing and thinking. The co-construction between Turing’s body and Turing’s 
thinking share a similar emphasis on discipline and normalizing. Through an analysis of 
Turing’s proposed design for training intelligent machinery and informed by Foucault’s 
concept of biopower, I will show the dynamic co-construction between Turing’s 
embodied experiences and the knowledge he composed in “Intelligent Machinery.”  
 
Sexuality That Produces Knowledge 
Michel Foucault’s History of Sexuality has long shifted our thinking on discourses of 
sexuality away from a repressive hypothesis that needs to be liberated with more 
discourse on sex and sexuality, to more analysis of the productive discourses around 
bodies and sexuality, in order to understand how these discourses construct, discipline 
and normalize subjects. As mentioned, Leavitt’s biography is an example of a text that 
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continues to assert that there is a repressive stance towards discourses on Turing’s 
sexuality. In addition, Leavitt’s goal is in a way to resist that supposed repression with 
more discourse on sexuality. He states that his goal in The Man Who Knew Too Much is 
to counter the repression of discourses on Turing’s sexuality by including more 
discussion and connections to Turing’s sexuality (4).  
 In History of Sexuality, Foucault traces the material and discursive contingent 
histories that establish western societal norms and have developed practices that 
intervene on bodies in order to normalize them. In Foucault’s account, Western, 
technologic, liberal society is a normalizing society15. Later, I will demonstrate places in 
Turing’s biography that conform to much of the normalizing society that Foucault 
describes. This normalizing society, which means a society in which the individual 
people are socialized into conforming to an ideal norm and evaluated by their relative 
approximation to that ideal norm, is the “historical outcome of a technology of power 
centered on life”16 (144). People become normalized through technologies of power.  We 
see in this quick analysis of “Intelligent Machinery” that Turing resisted conventions. 
Technologies of power are institutions and practices that are dispersed, shared, 
enacted, and negotiated constantly. This notion of power is not administered or held by a 
single person: this is not a unilateral, intentional holder of power. Instead, for Foucault, 
technologies of power can best be understood as processes, relationships, and 
                                                
15 In his later lectures on govenmentality he will argue that neoliberalism alters the 
practices of normalization so that that the practices under neo-liberalism differ from the 
practices found in the panoptic society described in Discipline and Punish.  
16 Technologies of power focused on death would include the public, symbolic 
interference (torture and death) on the human body that Foucault describes as a political 
operation used by the sovereign power (Discipline and Punish 53).  
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performances and not a thing that one either has or does not have. Power is enacted not 
possessed. These can include literal technologies like computers and also social, 
economic, and political systems. Likewise discipline is not exclusively through the very 
public and brutal forms of disciplining. A whole complex set of institutions and practices 
must already be in place and ready to intervene on human life. These institutions and 
practices include laws that define norms and institutions that regulate life to fit into 
norms, including scientists who at the time studied hormones in order to establish how to 
correct deviant sexualities and genders and schools that define processes of acceptable 
knowledge production. These institutions regulate life to define norms, discipline bodies 
to become productive parts of economies, and regulate populations in ordered and 
controlled ways. While these forms of intervention discipline bodies in many different 
ways, sex is an especially effective location of intervention. Foucault explains that this is 
because “sex was a means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the 
species” and “at the juncture of the “body” and the “population,” sex became a crucial 
target of a power organized around the management of life rather than the menace of 
death” (146-7).  
I will focus on how two main elements—interference and a focus on the body—
that Foucault describes as the normalizing practices. I will also connect these to Turing’s 
text and his biography in order to demonstrate that the normalizing practices that 
Foucault describes also shaped Alan Turing as a sexual subject and these same practices 
reemerge in this foundational text on artificial intelligence. In particular, I find the 
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chiasmic relationship as a dynamic one in which discourse and bodies intersect to 
produce Turing as a subject of sexuality and also shape his knowledge production. 
 
Analysis of Intelligent Machines and Biopower 
Foucault identifies the work of biopower on bodies as a process of interfering with bodies 
and populations to regulate towards a norm.  This interference comes in a few different 
forms. Obviously, laws can be seen as interference and disciplining, as in the case of 
Turing’s sentence to prison or chemical castration. Instead of laws prohibiting or 
restricting dangerous behavior, laws are also used to protect or regulate populations 
towards a norm. In particular, Foucault traces the move towards laws that focus on the 
life of the state and population. Although Foucault does not discuss England’s anti-
homosexuality laws, this is an egregious example of the state using laws to regulate the 
population by focusing on the sexual life of individual men and the general population. 
But Foucault demonstrates that laws are not the most prevalent or the most effective 
forms of interfering on the life of the population. He also finds these interferences in 
organizations of space and bodies, including “schooling, the politics of housing, public 
hygiene, institutions of relief and insurance, the general medicalization of the population, 
in short, an entire administrative and technical machinery” (126).  
 These interfering practices on bodies can be found to work on the level of the 
population and on the individual. Regarding the population, this operates through laws as 
well as though education reform and statistics. Biopower, which focuses on sex and 
sexuality of populations, “gave rise as well to comprehensive measures, statistical 
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assessments, and interventions aimed at the entire social body or at groups taken as a 
whole” (146). Through these different institutions and technologies, the state produces 
knowledge about populations in order to apply that knowledge towards intervening on the 
life of the population.  
In addition to this generalized mode of producing knowledge and regulating 
populations, Foucault also describes more individually targeted forms of intervention on 
bodies. This is far more dispersed form of biopower. In addition, this form of power, like 
that of the population, focuses on the on bodies. For examples, while birth controls and 
laws banning homosexuality operate on populations generally, the diagnosis, treatment, 
and monitoring to hysterical women is more individually focused form of intervening on 
women’s bodies. The individual woman was disciplined and regulated for the “health of 
their children, the solidity of the family institution, and the safeguarding of society” 
(147).  In this case, “the intervention was regulatory in nature, but it had to rely on the 
demand for individual disciplines and constraints (dressages)” (147). These interventions 
regulate and normalize chiasmic relations between bodies and discourses.  
 
Interference on Machinery 
Interference is also a key concept for Turing in his conception of artificial intelligence in 
“Intelligent Machinery.” In this article, Turing uses the term interference to describe his a 
mode of disciplining machines towards intelligence, which is a productive form of 
disciplining, through dynamic changes, additions, alterations, and influences on the 
instructions and the hardware of the computer. This is necessary because, if a machine is 
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going to demonstrate intelligence, it must be able to learn. Turing’s describes his 
understanding of the human intelligence by writing, “We may say that in so far as a man 
is a machine he is one that is subject to very much interference. In fact interference will 
be the rule rather than the exception” (421). And he defines this interference as first a 
man’s education and teachers, and also as “frequent communication with other men, and 
it is continually receiving visual and other stimuli which themselves constitute a form of 
interference” (421). In order to get a machine to learn and develop towards intelligence, 
Turing devised a system of educating machines through interference. Turing proposes: “if 
we now consider interference, we should say that each time interference occurs the 
machine is probably changed. It is in this sense that interference ‘modifies’ a machine” 
(419). Regarding the hardware, a machine would be designed with relatively few 
established connections or pathways but many possible pathways. This, by analogy, 
would be like a child’s brain, a blank slate. In order to create the connections, pathways, 
and systems of processing problem solving, the engineer or scientists would need to 
interfere. Turing outlines a few specific details about what this interference for educating 
intelligent machinery.  
First, in “Intelligent Machinery,” for Turing interference would be limited to two 
kinds: “one for ‘pleasure’ or ‘reward’ and the other for ‘pain’ or ‘punishment’” (425). By 
referring to the process of interfering as pleasure and pain, Turing creates an analogy 
with human experience. He compares this to how children are raised with systems of 
rewards and punishments (428). The computer would be made to feel pleasure by finding 
a solution and establishing a system of thought. A machine would be made to feel pain by 
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shutting down a path or connection that led into infinite loops or no solution. Through 
“judiciously operated by the ‘teacher,’ one may hope that the ‘character’ will converge 
towards the one desired, i.e., that wrong behavior will tend to become rare” (425). Turing 
imagines gradual, iterative, interventions not onto the machine’s mechanical makeup but 
the machine’s performance of tasks. In this way, Turing demonstrates that he considers 
the construction of intelligence not to be an innate quality or a set of instructions. Rather, 
intelligence and thinking are produced through iterative practices and through socially 
constructed interferences of pleasure and pain that guide Turing’s childlike machine 
towards the ‘correct’ way of operating intelligently. That is, intelligence and thinking are 
produced chiasmically. 
We also find that Turing’s intelligent machinery needed two other things for 
intelligence: experience and social context. Regarding experience, it is only through 
doing problems, feeling pleasure or pain, creating and shutting down connects, that this 
hypothetical machine becomes intelligent. He writes that, “it would be quite unfair to 
expect a machine straight from the factory to compete on equal terms with a university 
graduate… This contact [with human beings] has throughout that period been modifying 
his behavior pattern” (421). A new machine’s intelligence is more like a new human 
infant: it would need experiences in order to become intelligence.  
Machine intelligence would develop socially. He seems to be musing when he 
suggests that the machine would ‘go to school’ within the labs led by engineers and 
scientists as teachers (425). Turing describes a hypothetical social space, which also 
resembles his actual social space: a place of all men working together to ‘raise’ an 
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intelligent machine. And that is exactly how Turing and his colleagues imagined their 
inventive, technical work. The computer he worked on while at University of Manchester 
was called the ‘baby machine’ (Hodges 394, Leavitt 231). Each of the technicians and 
also the interactions with other machines would ‘socialize’ these machines to learn new 
tasks, solve new problems, and gradually even learn to use language, play games, and 
possibly even write creatively. These interventions, both on Turing’s body and the Turing 
machine, focus directly on bodies in order to produce dynamic intelligence and 
knowledge.  
 
Focus on Dynamic Bodies 
Foucault demonstrates that disciplining norms are regulated through a particularly intent 
focus on bodies, those of individuals and populations. Foucault traces how “deployments 
of power are directly connected to the body—to bodies, functions, physiological 
processes, sensations, and pleasures” (151). Throughout his work, Foucault traces 
changes, transitions, and histories. But what doesn’t seem to change is that there is a 
focus on the material body. However, this focus on bodies is always connected to and 
dynamically intersecting with discourses. And as the discourses change, so to do bodily 
practices, bodily norms, and bodily pleasures and pain change.  
In History of Sexuality, institutions and practices all regulate and produce 
knowledge about bodies, including organizations of  “schooling, the politics of housing, 
public hygiene, institutions of relief and insurance, the general medicalization of the 
population” (126). These material-discursive practices interfere with bodies by 
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disciplining and regulating how bodies are organized in space, instructing and training for 
“good” behavior, and by producing and distributing knowledge regarding medicine and 
health. Discourse and bodies are always connected in Foucault’s analyses. For example, 
while he is analyzing the construction of the child as a sexual subject, he is also analyzing 
the physical construction of spaces and the practices of observing and disciplining 
children (104). Throughout his work, discourses and material dynamically influence each 
other. Discourse slides into material bodies and bodies slide into discourse.  
 
Disciplining Machine to Discipline Knowledge 
Turing’s program for educating and training his computer reflects many of the trends that 
Foucault describes at the time including an intent focus on the ‘body’ of the machine. 
Turing’s descriptions of intelligent machinery resonate in some ways with Foucault’s 
description of the power over life. In particular, Foucault describes biopower as “centered 
on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities… all this 
was ensured by the procedures of power that characterized the disciplines” (History of 
Sexuality 139). However, for Turing the focus on the machine includes the computer’s 
body as well as the metaphor of the human body that is used to compose Turing’s theory 
of machine intelligence.  
Turing first imagines the possibility of metaphorically reproducing the whole 
body of a man in order to construct artificial intelligence. This machine body would have 
eyes and ears: “that the microphone does this for the ear, and the television camera for 
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the eye are commonplaces” (420). The machine’s body also would need to travel and 
experience the world in order to know the world.  
“one way of setting about our task of building a ‘thinking machine’ would be to 
take a man as a whole and to try to replace all the parts of him by machinery… 
this would of course be a tremendous undertaking. The object if produced by 
present techniques would be of immense size, even if the “brain” part were 
stationary and controlled the body at a distance. In order that the machine should 
have a chance of finding things out for itself it should be allowed to roam the 
countryside, and the danger to the ordinary citizen would be serious” (420). 
Like Frankenstein’s creature, Turing acknowledges that this would frighten people. Also, 
secondarily, this would be impossible or impractical to build. Therefore, Turing limits the 
body of the intelligent machinery to just the brain: “Instead we propose to try and see 
what can be done with a “brain” which is more or less without a body” (420).  
Although in the end he describes the machine without a replicated human body, 
he continues to attend to a body of the machine through use of metaphor and also through 
his attention to the feeling or experience of the machine. At each stage in the computer’s 
development, he uses a metaphor of human embodiment. This begins with the baby as the 
blank slate, which is the state at which Turing sees computers at the time of his writing 
this article. Later he compares the machine to a schoolboy learning through experience. 
Turing describes machines that would be indistinguishable from a grown human, in 
particular indistinguishable from a man’s chess playing ability.  By the end, Turing 
compares the computer to a man who has 18 years of experience in the world of men.  
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In addition, by focusing on pleasure and pain, Turing connects computer 
intelligences with feeling or experiencing as well as solving and working. In this way, his 
definition of intelligence requires an attention to bodies.  While machines without 
intelligence would not learn through experience, for intelligent machines the ‘body’ has 
the ability to feel, respond, and learn from feelings of pain and pleasure. In this way, the 
particular body of the machine informs its intelligence. Without a human-like body, 
Turing concedes, the machine could never be very intelligent about most things. In 
particular, this machine would be drastically limited because “the creature would still 
have no contact with food, sex, sport and many other things of interest to the human 
being” (420). Here, Turing does two things: first he affirms that experiences (including 
sex and sport) inform the knowledge that we produce and he second acknowledges that 
without these rich set of human experiences a machine would be limited in what it could 
know.  
Given these limited experiences (Turing concluded in “Intelligent Machinery that 
producing a machine body with full sensory abilities and the ability to travel would be far 
too complicated.) and limited sociability (all male scientists), Turing acknowledges that 
the machine would have very limited intelligence. It would only be good for chess, math, 
and language learning and language translation17 (420). These four things are achievable 
for this machine because the tasks are learnable without a human body, without the 
ability to experience the wider world, and are structured through a set of rules.  
                                                
17 As it turns out, machines continue to struggle to learn language. As Agar concludes, 
“Proficiency in natural language… has broken each new generation of Artificial 
Intelligence machine” (Turing 131) 
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Regarding the relation between bodies and intelligence, Turing limits what a 
machine could know to what a machine could experience in an embodied way. Implicitly, 
this argument for machine intelligence depends on a chiasmic relation and dynamic 
interaction between the machine experience and the machine’s intelligence. Machine 
intelligence is limited by the lack of bodily experience. Therefore, we find in Turing’s 
work, embodiment shapes and allows for specific kinds of intelligent behavior. Different 
bodies allow for different experiences. And these different embodied experiences allow 
for different forms of intelligence. This is not a natural form of knowledge of bodies. 
Rather, through experience, pleasure and pain, interference, and social construction, 
knowledge is a factor of embodied experience. Humans know because we have bodies. 
Given the limited bodies of machinery, their intelligence would be limited to the kind of 
experiences, which could be constructed for them by machinery, instructions and code, as 
well as the social context engaging with other machines and scientists. Although the 
embodied experience of an intelligent machine is highly limited, the significance here is 
that Turing imagines intelligence as a product or result of experience and intelligence is 
shaped by the embodied particularity.   
 
Embodying Turing within Intelligent Machinery 
Foucault’s historically contingent theories of biopower and normalization include the 
time period in which Turing was raised and the times in which he was writing. Although 
Turing does not explicitly connect his experience to his proposal for intelligent 
machinery, parallels between his notion of training a machine and his own embodied 
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experiences are easy to find. His experiences shape his identity as a subject with sexuality 
as well as a subject who produces knowledge. These experiences serve as a kind of 
foundation or analogy for Turing’s invention of artificial intelligence. The interference 
through pleasure and pain that Turing describes as a practice for training intelligent 
machinery parallels Turing’s own education. In particular, his training at prestigious 
boarding schools involved intense disciplining and even pain. As a child, Turing was 
sensitive. His brother was sent to a prestigious French school. He wrote back telling Mrs. 
Turing “for god’s sake don’t send him here… it will crush the life out of him” (19). At 
Sherborne School, Turing experienced what Hodges describes as “continuous public 
scrutiny and control of every individual boy. These were the true priorities” (22). The 
headmaster stated the goals of this education: “to become familiar with the ideas of 
authority and obedience, of cooperation and loyalty” (Hodges 22). Agar describes the 
education at Sherborn: “favoured instead the encouragement of classical languages for 
the brain, and physical sports, specially rugby and cricket, for the Imperial virtues of 
manliness, hierarchy, and leadership” (65). His day-to-day routine as well as his physical 
appearance was strictly regimented (Hodges 23). At Sherborne, Turing learned what it 
meant to be a man through physical and emotional pain: he was disciplined for untidy 
behavior and also mocked for his performance in sports.  
But Alan Turing also would have learned about what it means to be a scientific 
man by the pleasures he was afforded throughout his life. In this way, although Turing 
certainly struggled, he was also afforded a lot of privilege due, in part, to his ability to 
conform to expectations of an eccentric, introverted young genius. Because he showed an 
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aptitude for science and math, teachers let him skip out on required social and physical 
activities to work in the lab (Agar 18-19). He was given a space and time to experiment. 
By withdrawing into science, Turing was able to find pleasure in work and safety from 
disciplining. As a scholarly student, Turing could “take on the role of an intelligentsia in 
the ‘nation in miniature’, tolerated provided [he] interfered with nothing that mattered 
[i.e. sports and competition]” (Hodges 22). While at Bletchley Park and then later at 
University of Manchester, Turing was afforded leverage and freedom to be a bit peculiar. 
People would comment on his strange behavior: locking his coffee cup to his bicycle, 
showing up to work sweaty after 10-20 miles of running or biking, tying his pants up 
with a piece of rope. But they still referred to him as ‘the professor’ at Bletchley and 
Manchester. In Manchester, he was given freedom of what his colleagues called his 
“creative anarchy” (Hodges 343). This freedom was granted because Turing was seen as 
an intellectual, which is a role that was respected despite his social oddities. 
Turing would have also felt the pleasure from the recognition and approval he 
gain for his intelligence and single-minded commitment to his work. It is no wonder he at 
times appeared to have a greater fondness for computers than for people. Turing would 
have had years of experience negotiating safe and unsafe spaces for gay men. He was 
relatively open about his sexuality (Leavitt describes him as “naïve, absent-minded, and 
oblivious” [4]). But in many ways he remained outside of the major social scenes: Turing 
never joined major social clubs nor did he attend large social functions. His social 
experiences looked very much like what he imagined the computer social experience: all 
male and highly intellectual. He went to an all male school and lived there for his entire 
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education. At King’s College Cambridge, he lived and worked with all men. These men 
explored their sexuality as well as their intellectual and political interests together 
(Leavitt 17-19). And in these social settings Turing was relatively safe being open 
regarding his sexuality. At Princeton, he lived and worked with all men. The only time in 
Turing’s life in which women were present were the 5 years that he was at Bletchley park 
because women did most of the computing work at that time. Other than this, Turing 
worked on problems, calculations, and even engineering either in solitude or with groups 
of all male scientists and technicians. It was also the social scene of all intellectual, 
highly educated men. These experiences inform his later program for artificial 
intelligence. When Turing imagines the social context in which the machine is ‘raised’ 
towards intelligence, he describes the social setting as exclusively masculine. It is not 
simply that Turing imagined his computer intelligence through similar mechanisms that 
disciplined his own body. In addition, Turing’s own embodiment and the embodiment 
that he imagines for the AI are both dynamically constructed through practices and 
relations of biopower. The practices that I describe above are not passive or neutral 
activities. Rather, they are the historical consequence of political, economic, and social 
practices that tend towards normalizing bodies like Alan Turing.  
 
Constructing Posthuman Bodies in the Empire 
Above I describe the ways that Turing’s embodied experiences parallel the particular 
ways that he goes on to propose the future of mechanical intelligence. However, before 
even beginning, Turing already held an understanding of bodies, human life, and his own 
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life in an ambiguous relation with technology. More specifically, Turing already had to 
understand his own life and human bodies dynamically in ways that disrupt humanist 
ideals. The material and social institutions framed Turing as a subject who is at least 
partially understands human bodies, minds, and experience in mechanical terms. And 
those relations, through that Turing understood his body, are shaped by historical, 
political, economic, and social settings.  The discourse communities in which Turing 
engages in are the same discourses out of which the posthuman subject emerges. Hayles 
looks to Turing’s article “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” as an important ‘birth’ 
of this posthuman subject (xii-xiii). In Chapter Five, I analyze  this paper to demonstrate 
that Turing was always already constructed as a posthuman subject. And like Hayles, I 
recognize that this can be empowering for Turing. And at the same time, this posthuman 
subject also led to greater levels of control and disciplining of Turing’s body. 
 
British Body as Beta Version Computer 
Jon Agar’s work on the history of the computer contributes to this discussion by 
explaining the political context in which Turing writes, lives, and invents. Foucault writes 
that biopower, as opposed to sovereign power,  “gave rise as well to comprehensive 
measures, statistical assessments, and interventions aimed at the entire social body or at 
groups taken as a whole” (146). And the computer is implicated in this work, as Agar 
explains. Although Foucault does not discuss the computing technologies specifically, 
Jon Agar writes the history of computers as the central tool for the British government 
bureaucracy to regulate global populations. In The Government Machine, Agar 
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demonstrates that the British Civil Service provided the prototype to the computer’s 
organization and implantation. This bureaucracy had long been surveying and studying 
populations through its complex and extensive network of diplomats, civil servants, 
frameworks, and governmental structures. Computing machines had long been used to 
calculate, store, and compile data. This use of computation and statistics, Agar 
demonstrates, was a critical tool in maintaining and regulating a colonial power that 
spanned the globe.  
 The model of the British governance is so closely tied to the model of computer 
technology that Agar asserts, “to study the history of technology is to study the state, and 
vice versa” (3). Of course, Turing, whose father held a fairly high ranking position in the 
International Civil Service in India, was born into this legacy of computation for state 
control. As the Second World War became almost certain, Turing quickly enlisted to aid 
the British government in developing technologies that would further facilitate the 
processing, interpreting, and control of statistical data. This was not Turing’s initial 
purpose for developing computer technology. Nevertheless, his wartime inventions were 
quickly adopted for more administrative use by the British government. His inventions 
were also directly put back into the service of maintaining the expansive work of British 
government and commerce around the globe.   
In Agar’s historical account of digital computation, the body of British Civil 
Servants—like Turing’s father—is the prototype for the computer. Mechanical computers 
were built to simulate and eventually replace the work done of a large administrative staff 
of human computers. When Turing first introduced Turing machines in his 1936 article 
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“On Computable Numbers,” he based his development of digital computation on the 
embodied work of humans working unintelligently but with discipline on calculations. 
Later, Turing’s machine would eventually replace the calculating work done by humans. 
And the goal of this computational invention was further regulate, manage, and control 
the expansive population of the British colonial power. But before Turing could even 
have imagined his computer taking the place of these human bodies, he already had to 
understand humans’ role as somewhat mechanical parts in the larger machine that was 
the British government. In this account, we see that the posthuman subject is regulated 
and assimilated into the work of empire. Computers and human bodies are both at the 
service of government, science, and progress generally. 
 
Posthuman Bodily Enhancements 
But this notion of human subjectivity, which Hayles calls posthuman, does not only 
operate on the level of populations. In addition, we can see this working on the individual 
subject through a focus on the individual body, especially the individual body as a pliable 
matter that can and should be enhanced through technology. This notion of posthuman 
bodies as plastic and porous for technological improvements can best be seen in Norbert 
Weiner’s writing on cybernetics and Hans Moravec’s cybernetic man, both of which 
Hayles includes as founding thinkers of posthuman subjectivity. Moravec and Weiner 
contribute towards the shift towards posthumanism by articulating a dynamic notion of 
the human body that his pliable and plastic for technological enhancement. For Moravec, 
technological enhancements of bodies included feedback loops to allow for breathing and 
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improved circulation to survive extended space travel. In addition to these invasive 
enhancements for the benefit of science and space travel, Moravec would image, one day, 
uploading human consciousness into digital computers.  
David Serlin traces how this same plastic notion of bodies became apparent in the 
post-WWII serge in plastic surgery and other forms of bodily enhancements. In 
Replaceable You, David Serlin argues that bodily modifications became popular after 
WWII because the individual body needed to achieve its utmost level of wholeness, 
health, and “normalcy” in order to reflect the strength and vitality of the national identity. 
Although he does not use the term posthuman subject, Serlin describes a notion of the 
individual body that is shaped to best reflect the power and vitality of the nation as a 
whole. Two related aspects of Serlin’s research relate to both Foucault’s discussion of 
intervention and Turing’s experience. First, Serlin argues that the health and ‘normalcy’ 
of the individual citizen represented a microcosm of the state generally. He asserts that, 
after the brutalities and also the social changes experienced during and after WWII, there 
was a drive to re-affirm the strength and health of the state by reasserting the manliness 
and health of its citizens. In particular, with so many men and women who had been 
wounded in war, cosmetic surgery was seen as a way to technologically reinstate the 
strength of men and also the beauty of women. Second, Serlin points to the increased use 
of hormone therapy to regulate gender and sexuality. Serlin documents how 
“Psychologists and sexual scientists, moved by what they perceived to be the glandular 
basis of behavior, maintained the orgotherapy [estrogen that was to neutralize 
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sexuality]… was a successful program that contained the patient’s tendency towards 
sexual transgression” (137).  
Although Serlin focuses specifically on American identity and the American state, 
this is the same hormone therapy that was administered to Turing in order to punish him 
for homosexual sexual acts. The scientific findings that Serlin describe are the same 
forms of hormone therapy that were used to ‘neutralize’ Turing’s transgression of 
homosexuality. This punishment was perceived to be a ‘treatment’ of chemical castration. 
British judicial and civil institutions, as well as individual citizens, looked towards these 
treatments as ways of controlling and artificially bringing “abnormal” genders and 
sexualities to “natural” norms of feminine and masculine gender identities.  Together, in 
this case, we find knowledge as a kind of dynamic power that is used to determine and 
regulate norms. In addition, we see how the individual must be managed and the 
individual body must be managed and intervened upon to regulate and represent the 
upmost health of the state.  
 
Biopower and the Punishment of Alan Turing 
At this point, we see that the institutions of science, governance, and education all form 
Turing as a subject with sexuality as well as a kind of posthuman subject of the British 
empire. And these different forms of subjected-ness that form Turing’s embodied 
experience all coalesce and converge at this moment of trial and punishment. In Turing’s 
punishment, the regulation of the subject of the state is absolutely dependent on the 
mutual regulation of Turing as a sexual subject. Both as a subject of government and a 
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subject of sexuality, Turing’s thinking and his embodied experiences are shaped and 
controlled through mutual regulation, intervention, and focus on his body.  
Just 2 years after the publication of “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” 
Turing met a young man at in front of the movie theaters. They had a brief affair, which 
quickly turned sour. The young man seemed to be trying to take advantage of Turing, 
who seemed unusually willing to be taken advantage of (loaning him money even after 
the young man stole from him). When Turing returned home one day to find that 
someone had broken in and stolen valuables, he immediately called the police and alerted 
them that this young man may have been involved. In the process of investigating the 
burglary, the police ‘uncovered’ the sexual nature of their relationship. At that point, they 
dropped the investigation of the young man and started investigating Turing.  
Turing was arrested in March 1952.  The young man who Turing had sex with 
that led to the police ‘discovery’ was not arrested. This detail is important in order to 
understand why Turing in particular was arrested, tried, and found guilty. Yes, 
homosexuality itself was illegal. In particular, male homosexuality was illegal. Female 
homosexuality seems to have either not been understood as a reality or not be understood 
as a threat.  So not every form of homosexuality was found serious enough for 
punishment. In addition, not every case of male homosexuality was punished. The young 
man who slept with Turing did not get arrested. In the process of investigating Turing’s 
‘crimes’ the intelligence agencies would surely have discovered that Turing had previous 
sexual relationships. Those men were not investigated. Rather, it was Turing in particular. 
To explain why he in particular was perceived as a threat, we have to consider how he 
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was not simply his sexuality, but also his status as a war hero. 
The intersections between Turing’s identity as a subject with sexuality, Turing’s 
identity as a subject with national identity, and his intellectual and public status, are 
significant here. Homosexuality itself, while illegal and stigmatized, was often treated 
with the standard of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell.’ However, in the early 1950’s, homosexuality 
increasingly came to be defined as opposed to the health and security of the state. This 
can be understood in a few different ways. First, as Serlin argues, the post-war state 
needed to affirm its strength and power. These perceptions of state health and power 
reflect the need to affirm manliness. Turing was not just a man who could be sidelined as 
an outcast or marginal figure in relation to the British state. He was a war hero. He was a 
personal contact and favorite of Winston Churchill. He was also in the spotlight as an 
inventor and an intellectual. His arguments regarding machine intelligence were widely 
publicized and promoted. He was known both as a national hero and a national genius 
whether or not most people agreed with his arguments.  
In addition to homosexuality being perceived as an affront to manliness, 
homosexuality was also perceived as opposed to nationalism or patriotism. Leavitt 
explains that the homophobic culture at the time associated homosexuality and any 
personal deviance with from the norm of heterosexuality with immorality and as a sign of 
bad character18. In this case, homosexuality was seen as opposed to manliness, which was 
also seen as unhealthy or unsound for the strength and manliness of the strong British 
state. Homosexuality was perceived as a kind of immoral act. Given this perception of 
                                                
18 This casual connection between homosexuality and treason would again be drawn in 
the case of Anthony Blunt in 1979.  
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immorality, other forms of bad character were associated with homosexuality including 
deceit. Given the level of sensitive state secretes he was privy to, Turing’s sexuality was 
seen as a security risk. He had been a part of the inner circle of Bletchley Park. He was 
given a level of access to all forms of the British intelligence and top-secret technology. 
He was also granted rare access to the Bell Labs in the US. With these knowledges in his 
head, how could he be trusted? This connection between Turing’s sexuality and his 
character, as well as his status as a war hero, became the focus of the trial. It was 
unquestioned that he had sex with another man. Turing’s character was what was really 
on trial. He was found guilty.  
After the trial, things did not improve. Turing was given estrogen treatment, 
which was seen to neutralize or sterilize his dangerous sexuality. But that wasn’t all. The 
estrogen impaired his ability to have sex, but he was still considered a security risk. He 
was forbidden from leaving the country, which he had previously done often for holidays. 
In addition, police officers would follow him, park in front of his house to make sure that 
he came and left at expected times, and also showed up at surprise times. Turing had 
every reason to believe that all of his activities were watched carefully. This level of 
policing was administered because his sexual “betrayal” of “natural order” suggested a 
likelihood that he may also would betray his loyalty to country as well. 
Turing did not admit any guilt nor did he try to defend himself. When faced with 
the choice of prison or one year of estrogen injection, Turing chose to sacrifice his 
sexuality in order to continue to work and continue to live his life. The ‘treatment’ of 
estrogen as a form of chemical castration can also be understood from this perspective of 
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posthuman subjectivity. As Serlin explains, estrogen treatments were seen as a significant 
and progressive development to improve the sexual health of the state. And as Hayles 
outlines, this posthuman notion of bodies is always already embedded in technology. As 
we see in Moravec’s and Weiner’s cybernetic theories, the dynamic human body is 
subject to enhancements for the betterment of the health of the state or for the sake of 
scientific progress. Given these factors, we can better understand why the court offered 
Turing a choice between prison and chemical castration. The ‘choice’ of estrogen 
treatment was offered as a lenient and generous sentence. By choosing chemical 
castration, Turing was further making decisions within a posthuman notion of his own 
body.  In this way, giving up his sexuality and using technologies to alter his body 
towards a norm were both preferable to giving up his work and his reputation within the 
scientific and engineering communities.  
Artificial intelligence too would be, in Turing’s projection, co-constituted 
between mechanical design of unorganized or random machines and interferences of 
pleasure and pain, experience and sociability. This text is chiasmically connected with 
Turing’s own embodied experience. However, in this chapter we are seeing a far more 
complex notion of bodies. This body may still be mechanical in many ways, but even this 
mechanical notion of bodies is composed through a historical, political, and social 
process of intervening on life and bodies. The systems of biopower that compose 
Turing’s body, his sexuality, also compose his status as subject of the British state. Here, 
the chiasmic rhetoric that Turing composes brings with it the weight of political, social, 
cultural, and discursive construction and deconstruction. These bodies that intersect and 
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appear within Turing’s text are dynamic in so far as they come charged with the 
historicity of the particular body. In addition, Turing then imagines a system of educating 
machines so that these bodies also experience systems of intervention and disciplining 
their bodies. In Turing’s conception of intelligence, discipline and bodily interference are 
critical for intelligence. Likewise, his own experience of embodied disciplining form his 
intelligence, his subjectivity, as well as his knowledge production.  
Later in life, a critic of Turing objected that if a computer could learn to write a 
poem, that poem would not be any good. Turing responded by saying that maybe you 
would have to be a computer to appreciate the poem. And maybe Turing always engaged 
with computers on their terms. He would read the computer’s output in hexadecimal code 
because he wanted to read in the computer’s native tongue. What I am trying to do is 
demonstrate that the interventions on Turing’s body form him as a subject of government 
and a subject with sexuality. In the end, Turing identity as a gay man, his identity as a 
British civil servant, and his invention of artificial intelligence all dynamically, 
chiasmically inform each other. Turing had been so rigorously disciplined through 
interventions and violence against his body. Nevertheless, Turing is not simply a cog in 
the mechanized British state. His embodied particularity reveals small locations in which 
he moves away from or resists normalization, even despite the intense disciplining. His 
ability to resist normalization is no doubt, in part, due to his bodily particularity: he had 
been afforded privileges and great liberty because he played the role of eccentric genius 
so very well, and this role he played depended on embodied differences including male 
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and class privilege. In the next chapter, I will further complicate Turing’s chiasmic 
rhetoric by adding the complexity of bodily difference, especially gendered differences.  
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CHIASMUS 5: DESTABILIZING FORMS 
 
 
“Bodies never quiet comply.” 
~Butler, Bodies that Matter 
 
“Machines take me by surprise with great frequency.” 
~Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” 
 
Chiasmus creates relations that allow for, at one time, both difference and similarity 
between bodies and discourse. As a heuristic for analysis, chiasmus figures the relations 
between bodies and discourse so that bodies and discourse intersect and interact in 
dynamic, productive ways. In each chapter, I have turned to the figure of chiasmus to 
analyze how bodies and discourse interact to construct Turing’s rhetoric as well as the 
knowledge he produces. These interactions are productive for knowledge and also 
disciplining forces on Turing’s body and his writing. For instance, I’ve shown how 
Turing’s embodied experiences learning to discipline and control his body inform his 
design of computers. In this chapter, I again return to chiasmus to analyze the relations 
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between bodies and discourse in Turing’s life and writing. However, this time, the 
dynamic relation is more than productive (in so far as productive is also controlled and 
usable for science); instead, we find that chiasmus destabilizes.  
In this chapter, I argue that Turing’s writing in “Computing Machinery and 
Intelligence” is a unique time in this history of the computer in which technologies were 
embodied and gendered in feminine ways. Turing’s writing genders artificial intelligence 
in the famous Turing Test as feminine and includes notions of gender that are flexible 
and unstable. This feminine gendering is not limited to machines; rather, Turing’s 
gendering of machine intelligence also implies feminized notions of intelligence. While I 
will discuss Barad’s work in more detail later in the chapter, I will now define that, by 
using the word ‘gendering,’ I am drawing on Karan Barad’s notion of gender not as a 
thing or a state but as a material-discursive performance or experience that produces 
temporary, flexible notions of femininity and masculinity. Gendering is always produced 
through material-discursive practices and is not attributable to a single material, 
biological status. In this rather unique time in the history of computer technologies, 
femininity is central to Turing’s development of not only thinking machines but also his 
definition of what qualifies as a legitimate exhibition of intelligence. Turing destabilizes 
relations between emerging computing technologies and humans through his use of 
destabilizing chiasmic rhetoric. This unstable, chiasmic relation calls attention to the 
ways in which humans and machines are not definitionally opposed, but are rather 
connected and intertwined.  
 
  160 
Turing Moves Towards Machine Intelligence 
Before he composes this gender-bending notion of machine intelligence, Turing begins to 
settle down in his work and his home for the first time in his life. Although the 1948 
article “Intelligent Machinery” was not well received by the National Physics Laboratory, 
that made little difference to Turing. He was moving on. In the fall of 1948, he moved to 
take a position at the University of Manchester. While Cambridge was ornate, refined, 
and had all the markers of an elite social status, Manchester was austere, dingy, and was 
dominated by the decay of old manufacturing industries.  
Turing seemed to make himself right at home in Manchester. He bought a home 
in the suburbs and hired a housekeeper who would write to Turing’s mother snickering 
about his peculiar bachelor habits. He built a bike that only he could seem to figure out 
how to ride without crashing. He continued to have a reputation as a strange fellow, even 
in this less refined city. For instance, Turing would run long distances, sometimes over 
20 miles on the way to University of Manchester, where he would start working covered 
in sweat. He traveled often and dated some. Things were going well, overall.  
Turing’s work in the lab was going relatively well. Max Newman started the 
Manchester Computing Lab and began work on the University of Manchester Computer 
in 1946. Although the machine was technically named the MARK II, the technicians 
called this machine ‘the baby.’ Compared to the Colossus that many of these men worked 
on during WWII at Bletchley Park, this computer was just a baby. It still took up multiple 
rooms and required legwork to operate. So perhaps it was only natural that this baby soon 
became Turing’s baby. He wrote the computer’s manual, which is quite entertaining to 
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read as far as computer manuals go (“Programmers' Handbook for the Manchester 
Electronic Computer Mark II”). Turing designed the language of the machine, and this 
language was so complex that the other technicians depended on Turing’s training just to 
be able to use and operate the computer. Although the baby was cumbersome, prone to 
operator failure, and at times inaccurate, it still gained some attention for its speed and 
flexibility in completing different kinds of tasks. Norbert Weiner traveled from the 
United States to see the machine and to talk to Turing. From this exchange, Weiner was 
emboldened in his belief that machines could be developed to replicate or even replace 
human bodies (c.f. The Human Use of Human Beings). Turing held a more modest belief. 
He didn’t necessarily think that machines would replace humans; however, as we ill see 
in “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” machines did challenge and expand the 
notion of intelligence and even challenged traditional notions of humanity. 
Whether or not the baby was ready, the press picked up on the developments 
underway with Mark II. And Turing became the ‘face’ of this development. In addition to 
complex mathematical calculation, they taught the computer, their ‘baby,’ language, 
songs, and poetry. During a radio broadcast, a reporter brought children to see and hear 
the baby try to sing popular songs. The technicians explained that the computer was also 
learning to play chess. A reporter who interviewed Turing cited his goals as “the 
investigation of the possibilities of machines for their own sake…and to what extent it 
could think for itself” (Hodges 406). Although this is more moderate than Weiner’s goal 
of replacing human bodies, the general public did not receive news of Turing’s work and 
the computer at Manchester with open arms (Hodges 404). In particular, a prominent 
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neurologist, Sir Geoffrey Jefferson, composes the most widely read critique of Turing’s 
work. Jefferson explicitly objects that Turing’s intelligent machine challenges the 
humanist exclusive claim on intelligence. This critique is especially of note in this 
dissertation research because Jefferson’s arguments reveal that, even at the time, Turing’s 
machine and his writing were received as threatening and destabilizing.  
 
Destabilizing Chiasmus 
Chiasmus is a dynamic figure. In Chapter 4, I demonstrated that chiasmic figuring 
between bodies and discourse could produce a dynamic, co-constructive relation. In that 
movement of chiasmus, to be dynamic means to be active and also suggests the capacity 
to create a change. In particular, dynamic chiasmus allow for changes that are a co-
constructive shaping of both Turing’s discourse and embodied experiences. Turing’s 
original and innovative writings are composed, in part, through the dynamic relation with 
his embodied experience. Although I identify this as a form of disciplining, it is also 
productive for Turing’s inventive and original thinking.  
Now I return to the dynamics of chiasmus to demonstrate that the relations 
between bodies and discourse are at time destabilizing or disruptive as well as productive. 
To be dynamic suggests power and the ability to cause changes. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines dynamic specifically as “force producing motion.” In Greek, 
“dynamis” means power or strength. Dynamics, the science, is the study of “the action of 
force” (OED). Dynamics thus at once can be understood as a physical property of force 
and also more generally as the capacity or potential to change or exert force. In the 
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history of rhetoric, the physical notion of dynamics can also be found animating 
discourse and persuasion. Fahnestock finds chiasmus in Heraclitus: “Cool things become 
warm, and the warm grows cool” or “the moist dries and the parched becomes moist” 
(141). These chiasmic phrases structure Heraclitus’ philosophy of reversibility, flux, and 
eternal change. Jean-Pierre Vernant defines the sophistic practice of dissoi logoi as a 
“dynamic view of argument” (286). He compares this method to mechanical devices, like 
pulleys or weights, which can change the dynamics of moving a load or weighing a 
quantity. Similarly, Vernant describes the technê of dissoi logoi as one that changes the 
dynamics of an argument so that the orator in the weaker position may appear stronger. 
Steven B. Katz argues that Cicero should be considered in the sophistic tradition because 
Cicero, like the sophists, understood rhetoric as a musical and poetic form. That is, 
rhetoric has a sensual as well as a symbolic function, and that sensual function is a form 
of dynamic experience: poetics, rhythm, and rhyme. Together, these forms of sensuous 
language use are not simply decorative but also produce a form of “affective knowledge” 
(108-9). 
Chiasmus, as a rhetorical form and as a relation between bodies and discourse can 
produce rhetorical effects that destabilize, that disturb, that unsettle. When figures 
emphasize balance, as parallelism and in a different way antithesis do so well, they may 
also make relations appear natural and harmonious. To appear as a natural and 
harmonious relation between bodies and discourse would, in effect, cover over the 
movement, negotiations, and tensions between the language that we use, the technologies 
of bodies, and also the bodies that compose our lives. Therefore, chiasmic relation 
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between bodies and discourse may not always create a peaceful, calm relation that is 
settled and stable. No, the opposite is the case. Chiasmus allows us to see the unsettled, 
constantly negotiating, reforming movement between bodies and discourse. This is 
significant because there is no one relation between bodies and discourse. Rather, there is 
a constant relation-ing, a constant forming and reforming. Likewise, in this dissertation, 
chiasmic rhetorics—those rhetorical effects that emerge out of the relation-ing between 
bodies and discourse—are processes or movements that change with the particularity of 
the bodies and the particularity of the discourse. In each chapter, bodies, discourses, as 
well as Turing’s own writing and life, have been forming and re-forming to produce new 
chiasmic rhetoric as well as new knowledge and new technologies.   
However, in this chiasmic movement, there is also tense negotiation. With each 
chiasmic relationing between bodies and discourse, we find new iterations of bodies and 
new forms of discourse. These surprise and even startle. Turing’s article was certainly 
received with surprise, even if that surprise was also a largely negative one. Although I 
would not go so far as to say that these moments are necessarily empowering or 
progressive, I do want to suggest that in the chiasmic relationing between bodies and 
discourse, new relations, new discourses, and new embodied experiences can be 
produced. These new relations open the possibility of disturbing reified, naturalized 
notions of bodies. Before I can say that a positive chance is perhaps possible, I can say at 
the very least these out of balance relations between bodies and discourse call attention to 
the process of constructing relations between bodies and discourse. This relation often 
remains unnoticed in its ossified form where bodies are so often defined as natural and 
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passive. Unstable chiasmic rhetoric allows us to see what is often so naturalized that it 
goes unnoticed: the unstable, chiasmic relations between our bodies and our discourses.   
 
Critiques of Machine Intelligence 
When word of Turing’s machine reached the general public, this unstable relation 
between human and computer elicited a strong negative reaction, notably from University 
of Manchester neuroscientist Sir Geoffrey Jefferson. Jefferson published his critique in 
the article “Mind of the Mechanical Man,” which circulated widely. Jefferson begins his 
critique by addressing the question of the relation between brain and mind. Jefferson was 
a renowned expert on this topic: he innovated neurosurgery during and after WWII. He 
saw firsthand how physical, neurological, and psychological trauma would affect not just 
the brain but also the mind and body in different ways. In his discussion of mind and 
brain, Jefferson argues that human intelligence is directly connected to embodied 
experience. He then goes on to argue for a version of ‘true’ intelligence (the machine 
could at best hope to be a parrot spitting back a few lines it could learn) that would be 
unattainable by machines: this would be creative, emotional, and even sensory 
intelligence.  
Jefferson concludes that even if we could build an intelligent machine, to do so 
would be inherently anti-humanist: an affront to the centrality and superiority of 
humanity. In this article, Jefferson defends a strong humanist notion of intelligence in 
which intelligence is the sole property of humans, and excludes any machine, and even 
animals. This is so, for Jefferson, because the human brain is completely and 
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unexplainably unique: “its functions may be mimicked by machines, [but the human 
mind] remains itself and is unique in Nature” (1106). For Jefferson, humanity is the 
definition of intelligence, and intelligence is the defining quality of humanity.  
And what qualifies humans to be the sole possessor of thought and intelligence? 
Jefferson defines this as the whole range of human experience of pleasure, pain, and even 
love and sex. In particular, Jefferson defines language as the thing that sets humans apart 
from even the highest animals: language use, and the ability to use language to remember 
more and to advance human knowledge.  
Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of thoughts 
and emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that 
machine equals brain—that is, not only write it but know that it had written it. No 
mechanism could feel (and not merely artificially signal, an easy contrivance) 
pleasure at its successes, grief when its valves—fuse, be warmed by flattery, be 
made miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by sex, be angry or depressed when it 
cannot get what it wants. (1110) 
A machine may be able to spit out correct answers or repeat stock phrases, but 
intelligence requires a full range of embodied and discursive behaviors. A machine could 
never have these things; hence, a machine cannot be said to think.  
At the heart of Jefferson’s argument, we find a humanist argument, and also the 
human body. The embodied experiences of humans—our experiences, passions, and 
emotions—these constitute intelligence. In some ways, Jefferson’s arguments align with 
the Barad and Grosz’s arguments that intelligence is embodied and that our embodied 
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experiences inform our thinking and knowledge production. However, Jefferson’s 
primary critique is that the human mind has some thing, some soul like essence, that is 
always more than bodies and always unexplainable through material sciences. In many 
ways, I also agree with Jefferson’s nuanced and complex description of the relations 
between bodies and intelligence. 
In his response, Turing agrees on many of Jefferson’s points. Turing agrees that 
the analogy between human brains and computing machinery is a weak analogy in so far 
as human brains and bodies are far more complex. In addition, Turing will agree that 
human intelligence is a product, in part, of our human embodied experiences and 
emotions. However, Turing will shift the conversation.  
As we found in “Intelligence Machinery,” Turing locates intelligence through a 
broader set of experiences and bodies. What is especially significant here is that when 
Turing moves to defend machine intelligence against these humanist critiques, Turing not 
only ‘humanizes’ computing machinery, he also genders machines as feminine. He does 
this first by comparing creating a parallel between a test to guess the difference between a 
man and a woman with a test to guess the difference between a machine and a man. In 
addition, this descriptions of machines at work include discursive practices that feminine 
the machines, the technicians, as well as intelligence itself. This gendering of computer 
technology creates a blurred relation between technology and humanity. This moment of 
blurred gendering and embodying of computer technology is a significant point in which 
Turing expands notions of intelligence. To complete this argument, Turing creates 
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dynamic relations between humans and computers that further disturbs and challenges 
humanist definitions of intelligence.  
 
Dynamic Rhetoric 
While I have been discussing chiasmic rhetoric as especially dynamic and even 
disturbing, in so far as its goal is to create a change, rhetoric itself has been understood as 
a form of dynamics. Contemporary rhetorical theory revives a notion of rhetoric that is 
energetic with life. That is what George Kennedy suggested in his surprising article 
“Hoot in the Dark.” Scholar of Greek and Classical rhetoric and translator of Aristotle, 
Kennedy argues that rhetoric is energy and as such rhetoric includes more than language, 
including “physical actions, facial expressions, gestures and signs generally” (4). Starting 
with the definition that rhetoric is energy, Kennedy expands his notion of energy of 
rhetoric to exist before speaking or writing and even prior to the speaker’s intent. The 
result is that animals and even plants can behave rhetorically by exerting their energy to 
enact a change or response, whether or not that exerted energy is intentional. In this 
definition, rhetoric becomes defined in a way that is indistinguishable from life and 
living. Steven Katz also proposes an energetic notion of rhetoric in Epistemic Rhetoric of 
Music. In this book he theorizes the non-referential knowledge of language, which is 
driven by emotion and the body of the author, as a form of knowing. This form of 
knowledge can only be understood in the experiential and temporal qualities of language. 
This is the sensuous side of language, which is always tied to language’s symbolic 
function, but also exceeds the symbolic function in ways that are experienced rather than 
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defined. This musical, sensuous function of language is exclusively dynamic in that sense 
because it exists in time and action. Debra Hawhee also turns to the ancient Greeks to 
develop a theory of energetic rhetoric. Agon is a significant term for her thinking on 
Greek rhetoric and athletics because it connects persuasion and physical strength with a 
focus on bodily struggle. Agonism is struggle and competition between athletes, orators, 
as well as heroes, statesmen, and the gods. It is a “dynamic through which the ancients 
repeatedly produced themselves, and which functioned as a point of cultural connection 
between athletics and rhetoric” (15). And this point of production is significant. The 
Greek body and mind were not simply thought to be: body and mind are brought forth or 
constituted in action. This is where agonism comes in: through dynamic energy, struggle 
and gathering, the art of bodies and words were constituted. Both Hawhee and Dolmage 
also theorize the Greek term metis, which was a Greek term for craft, skill, or practice 
that lead towards artful mastery and knowledge, as a major concept for rhetorical practice 
because of its emphasis on embodied practice and knowledge. 
 Feminist philosopher Karen Barad can also contribute to our notions of energetic, 
dynamic rhetoric. Her theories of material-discursive relationing offer a definition of 
rhetoric that speaks to both rhetoric studies and feminism. In this dissertation, I focus 
specifically on the rhetoric that emerges from the interactions among bodies and 
discourse. This form of rhetoric, which is represented in this complex movement of 
chiasmus, is always connected, intersecting, and dynamic relation between material and 
discourse.  
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Chiasmic rhetoric is different from Kennedy’s notion of rhetoric in so far as 
chiasmus cannot be pre-linguistic. Kennedy would hold that even before language 
developed, rhetoric was energizing and evolving pre-human life. Because it is pre-
linguistic energy, rhetoric can be seen as a force in organic evolution. However, I have 
theorized chiasmic rhetoric that needs to always be intersecting with both material and 
discourse. This chiasmic relation is like the Möbius strip that Elizabeth Grosz describes 
between body and mind. The Möbius strip allows us to see relations of body and mind 
that “are disparate “things” being related, they have the capacity to twist one into the 
other… [The Möbius strip] enables subjectivity to be understood as fully material and for 
materiality to be extended and to include and explain the operations of language” (209-
210). With these dynamic figures, discourse always twists and turns into material and 
material likewise twists and turns into discourse. The purpose of these figural heuristics is 
to make visible the connections and twists between bodies and discourse. Likewise, when 
Jean-Luc Nancy imagines a radically de-centered, postmodern notion of bodies, what he 
calls corpus, is always already touching writing. In the process of naming, language 
brings objects, actions, values, concepts into being identifiable and knowable. Karen 
Barad calls this work the ‘temporary cut’ of discourse intra-acting in material. Language 
and discourses name, and naming is a mode of composing the diversity of material reality 
into things that are knowable. Language distinguishes some assemblages, events, and 
qualities as significant within larger network of material and energies. 
Here, Karen Barad’s work contributes by defining a rhetorically significant theory 
of ontology that also can help us comprehend the change in Turing’s body life, 
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represented and instantiated (embodied) in “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” 
Barad, like so many before, argues that the workings of the material universe and the 
workings of human discourse are not so dissimilar. She comes to her ontological and 
philosophical claims through her background as a physicist and a feminist. All material 
and all cultural phenomenon are constructed through interrelation between 
“phenomenon” and “force,” which are the terms Barad uses instead of thing or object 
because phenomenon and force both suggest movement, space, and time. Barad’s 
theories of actions allow for an account that “refuses the representationalist fixation on 
“words” and “things”…advocating instead a causal relationship between specific 
exclusionary practices embodied as specific material configurations of the world” 
(“Posthumanist Performativity” 132). The interactions between matter—atoms, planets, 
and physical forces—constitute each other. Likewise, discourse and bodies interact with 
learned language practices and other bodies performing those language practices. In 
performative language, words are defined as “discursive practices/(con)figurations” and 
things are “specific material phenomena” (132). From this, Barad gives us an ontology 
that is defined and constituted through a “dynamic process of intra-activity in the ongoing 
configuring of locally determinate causal structures” (135).  And this dynamic process 
is—for all human ethical and political purposes—always already discursive, in so far as 
language is one of the most significant “locally determinate causal structures” that 
produce our ontology. 
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Dynamic Rhetorical Bodies 
In Barad, we find ontology defined as interactions, but are all of those interactions equal? 
Are all interactions as meaningful as others? Are the interactions between Turing’s body 
and the cold Manchester industrial landscape as significant as the interactions between 
Turing’s body and the court mandated estrogen treatments that he will experience just 2 
years after the publication of “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”? Certainly both 
affected the man and his knowledge production. Politically, I have to find the relations 
between Turing body, the doctors administering the chemical castration, and the estrogen 
that infused his body and changed his physical appearance as well as his thinking, mood, 
and sexual ability, as more significant. This is because these later interactions regulate 
Turing as first a ‘deviant’ body, and then normalize it through physical interventions and 
medical ‘treatment.’ These later interactions subject Turing’s body to disciplinary 
practices that regulate heteronormativity. These interactions reinscribe a notion of gay 
men as being dangerous, pathological, and in need of medical treatments to pacify this 
threat.   
For making these distinctions, I have to think that we need rhetoric. Barad uses 
the term ‘agential cuts’ to indicate the rhetorical work of identifying and demarcating 
specific objects and specific interactions. These cuts “are at once ontic and semantic. It is 
only through specific agential intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of 
“components” of phenomena become determinant and that particular articulations 
become meaningful” (Meeting the Universe 148). We make temporary cuts in the world 
to define ‘woman’ as a meaningful and real category of human. Now, this temporary cut 
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is not an intentional cut. Although Barad refers to these as “agential cuts” she specifics 
that the cuts are “enacted not by willful individuals but by the larger material 
arrangement of which “we” are a “part”… Cuts cut “things” together and apart. Cuts are 
not enacted from the outside, nor are they ever enacted once and for all” (Meeting the 
Universe 178-179). Through the repetition, fixation, and consistency of woman as a 
category of human reifies and ossifies this as a meaningful, significant, and even can 
appear fixed or natural. This does not mean that the category of woman is constitutive of 
our ontology, but the material discursive performance of naming, categorizing and 
knowing ourselves as gendered is constitutive of our ontology. The temporary cut that 
defines my body as woman constitutes my body as legible and knowable as a particular 
kind of human subject among other humans. With this temporary cut as woman, 
discourse and material interact so that I may identify myself. In some ways this 
temporary cut can work to limit my experience as sexism, but has so often worked to use 
the temporary cut of woman to regulate limits on the experience and potential for women 
subjects. At the same time, I myself come to know myself in this subject position and 
also can use this knowable category to identify with, however contingently and 
temporarily, with other women.  Barad does not identify these temporary cuts as rhetoric. 
However, this work is wholly rhetorical. These are the practices that make order, sense, 
knowledge, and value through the temporary cuts made in material-discursive practices.  
With Barad’s theories and an energetic notion of rhetoric, we can define rhetoric 
as material-discursive practices that create knowledge, value, and power through 
‘temporary cuts’ into the larger always-connected fabric of human experience. However, 
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like Kennedy’s notion of rhetoric, the rhetorical force of Barad’s temporary cuts is not 
intentional in the traditional form of authorial intent as something planned or willed or 
chosen by Turing or any other human agent. For Kennedy this is because the energy to 
cry for help or the energy for a plant to turn towards the sun does not require a conscious 
will. When I yell because I stub my toe, my yell has rhetorical energy, but it lacks 
intentional meaning and intention to create a change. Nevertheless, change may happen: 
my roommate may come to my aid.  
Again, Barad can help to theorize notions of agency that are rhetorically 
significant, without depending on a notion of intention or a free moral agent. She defines 
the agency of bodies and material through a theory of agential realism, which claims that 
all matter has some form of agency. This agency should not be understood as choice or 
intention. The agency of matter represents grounds for negotiations or inter-action. Barad 
argues that material and discourse are in a constant state of inter-action. The energy and 
intra-actions are constantly becoming through material discursive practices. This dynamic 
process is agency: “Agency is not an attribute but the ongoing reconfigurings of the 
world” (135). In this context, ‘discourse’ could be understood as any relationality 
between entities. Like Grosz’s definition of embodied subjectivity, embodiment is the 
site of contestation or negotiation between material and culture. Within these 
‘negotiations’ between material and culture, both parties have access to agency in so far 
as both determine and affect the other. In this way, agency is not a thing to own or to 
give. Rather, “It is through specific intra-actions that a differential sense of being is 
enacted in the ongoing ebb and flow of agency. That is, it is through specific intra-actions 
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that phenomena come to matter—in both sense of the word” (135). Hence, agency is 
enacted.  It, too, is a dynamic performance.  
Chiasmus has allowed the ‘temporary cut’ of my rhetorical work to always 
connect both bodies and discourse. Together, these connected bodies and discourse have 
been shown to be powerful for knowledge construction. Turing’s material-discursive 
rhetorical practices give us a temporary cut in which bodies and technologies inform each 
other. What we find in  “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” is that the temporary 
cut Turing represents as the relation between bodies and technologies, between humans 
and machines, displays Turing’s dynamic and ambiguous definition of human and 
gendered experience. This dynamic nature is visible in all rhetoric, as I have defined 
rhetoric as an energetic set of material-discursive practices that create action, construct 
meaning, produce knowledge, enact power, and also to assign value. In “Computing 
Machinery and Intelligence” the gendered discourse creates relations that are especially 
unstable. Turing’s chiasmic rhetoric expresses relations between bodies and discourse 
that are destabilizing. But that out-of-balance  in Turing’s writing is the key in so far as it 
calls attention to the relation between bodies and mind, machines and intelligence, and 
also offers a unique and unusual notion of technology that challenges humanist notions of 
mind and body. This challenges not only humanist notions of human intelligence, but 
suppositions in the rhetoric of science and technology about humans and machines.     
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Later Critiques of Turing Test 
Although Jefferson’s critique is an early one, similar lines of argument continue to 
critique Turing and the shift towards digital technology and artificial intelligence 
generally. Jefferson faults Turing on many of the same grounds that scholars fault Turing 
and the computer technologies that are so often attributed to him: by arguing that 
machines can think, Turing has disembodied intelligence. Turing’s arguments for 
intelligent machinery continue to be understood as an anti-humanist and disembodying.  
Jay David Bolter articulates an extensive discussion of disembodying technology 
in Turing’s Man. In order to argue that Turing disembodies human intelligence, Bolter 
depends on what he defines as an age-old metaphor between humans and technologies. 
Metaphor is a rhetorical trope that, unlike schema, is not defined by any particular 
syntactic or formal qualities.  He argues that Turing’s invention allows for the tightest 
and closest metaphor between human bodies and technologies. Turing takes the logic of 
abstract mathematics—pure logic without material referent—and applies that as the 
foundational concept for digital computers. This, for Bolter, allows for a metaphor in 
which bodies are understood as metaphors with the exact terminology and purpose as 
digital computers. This metaphor that Bolter associates with Turing’s digital computer 
perpetuates a notion of of intelligence that is abstract, universal and disembodying. To be 
sure, this notion excluded any bodily specificity, especially gender. While Bolter is 
tracing a larger social trend regarding digital technologies, he also places the weight of 
the instigator on Turing’s shoulders. Friedrich Kittler also associates Turing with the 
trend towards disembodying. The logic of Turing’s machine is “tantamount to declaring 
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nature itself a universal Turing machine” (1). The particularity of nature, bodies, and 
machines is irrelevant, in Kittler’s reading, once code has subjected everything to 
universal computability. Turing split software instructions and hardware machinery and, 
in doing, erased the materiality of technology under the rule of abstract code. Wendy 
Chun also points towards Turing as one of many inventors who allow for the “erasure of 
the vicissitudes of execution [and]… the conflation of data with information, of 
information with knowledge” (53). This erasure happens through a tautology from code 
to meaning: “source code as logos: as something iterative and universal. Word becomes 
action becomes word becomes the alpha and omega of computation” (167). 
All of these claims, in general, are valid critiques and descriptions of trends in 
technology in general and digital computation in particular. However, we need to look 
more closely at Turing’s work because, especially in “Computing Machinery and 
Intelligence,” we find an unstable blurring between human bodies and computer 
intelligence. The embodiments and intelligence that Turing describe blur the lines 
between human and machine, and that blurring is of central importance because it 
disrupts the ossified, sterile notion of technologies. If we define bodies strictly in 
humanist terms, then Turing can be understood as positing disembodied notions of 
intelligence in the machine. However, Turing does not maintain a notion of human-only 
intelligence. Nor does he attempt to create machines that will be exactly like human 
bodies. Rather Turing defines machine intelligence in a way that is ambiguously between 
human and machine. The locations of blurred overlap between human and machine 
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intelligence widen, for Turing, new possibilities for thinking, creating, and problem-
solving.  
These machines must have a material form or ‘body’ of some sort. In other words, 
computers may have been defined in abstract, immaterial form, but even digital 
computation is also material, concrete, and ‘embodied.’ They are a particular form of 
body, and they differ from human bodies for sure. However, they are bodies nonetheless. 
And ignoring these bodies we ignore their material design and also their material 
experience. In the case of Turing’s article, ignoring the embodiment of the thinking 
machines also means ignoring the gendering of machines. It means ignoring a moment in 
the history of computing in which gender was being negotiated: both the gendering of the 
inventors and also the machine. Finally, this means ignoring a time in which computers 
were not sterile of the messy lives of humans. But in the ambiguity of the chiasmic 
rhetoric, of Turing’s writing, of the Turing Test, and probably of Turing’s mind, the 
machines were indistinguishable from humans, with their genders, desires, loves, deceit, 
failures, and rewards. Clarifying up this ambiguity means ignoring an unstable chiasmic 
intersection between human and machine life.  
 
Computing Machinery and Intelligence 
 “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” is Turing’s most widely read and also his most 
famous article. Is popularity is in no small part due to the style of writing, which is both 
surprisingly clear and surprisingly entertaining for an article by a mathematician. Turing 
was writing not for other mathematician but for a broader audience that would have 
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discovered Turing’s thinking for the first time—in this article published in the premier 
philosophy journal Mind. In this article, he introduces what has become known as the 
Turing test. This test has become a well-rehearsed standard of evaluating computer 
intelligence. Although the general concept of the Turing test is well known, I am going to 
analyze Turing’s text in more detail in order to demonstrate that, not only is this text fully 
enmeshed with bodies and embodied experiences, it is also integrated with feminine 
gendering discourses.  With these gendering discourses, Turing‘s text articulates a 
chiasmic rhetoric that shifts normative relations between our bodies, our discourses, and 
our digital technologies.  
Turing opens by replacing the question “can machines think?” with a more 
specific question that can be tested through an imitation game. To introduce this imitation 
game, Turing starts with a gendered imitation game:  
It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) 
who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart from the other 
two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine which of the two 
is the man and which is the woman.  (441)  
The interrogator can ask the man and woman questions, but the interrogator cannot see 
either or hear their voices. In this game, deception is the rule. The trick is that the woman 
is supposed to be honest and the man is tasked with tricking the interrogator with making 
the wrong choice: “it is A’s object in the game to try and cause C to make the wrong 
identification” (441). After establishing this first game of gendered deception, Turing 
switches the man for a computer: “What will happen when a machine takes the part of A 
  180 
in the game? Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played like 
this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These questions 
replace our original, ‘Can machines think?’” (441).  
Turing then defines machines in this test specifically as digital, electronic 
computers. Next, Turing extends the discussion he started in “Intelligent Machinery” on 
how to train these machines to demonstrate intelligence. This time he finds that the 
pleasure/pain model, which he outlined in “Intelligent Machinery” and was discussed in 
Chapter 4, would not be enough. Instead, he adds gradual training through practice and 
repetition. Turing then moves on to review and address objections, including specifically 
Jefferson’s objections. This discussion is some of the most interesting and surprising of 
Turing’s writing. For instance, he addresses the “theological objection” that only men 
have souls and hence only men demonstrate intelligence (449). To which he writes that if 
intelligence is a sign of a soul, perhaps these machines are just new homes for souls. 
When addressing the “disability’ objection”—which addresses Jefferson’s objection that 
because computers cannot perform a wide set of human activities, then they cannot be 
said to think—Turing writes that, presently, computers are too limited but that with time 
machines may be able to perform a greater array of behaviors (453-455).  
In this description of the famous Turing Test, Alan Turing describes a very 
confused game between genders, humans, and machines. And scholars of artificial 
intelligence have long been sorting through this confused game. Is the computer acting 
like a man acting like a woman? As Leavitt reads it, this is the most literal translation of 
the text. Is the computer acting like a man while the woman acts like a woman and the 
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other test is which is genuinely human? These genders are further confused because 
Turing goes on to refer to the human subject B, which was originally a woman as ‘he.’ 
Although reading this text leaves open some very provocative ambiguities, most scholars 
of Turing and machine intelligence have been quick to reform this confusion so that it 
excludes gender and embodied experiences. Hodges quickly assumes Turing’s use of 
gender unnecessary to the general concept: gender is a distracting and poor choice, a red 
herring (415). Hodges then proceeds to explain the test gender-free. Copeland argues that 
gender of the test is necessary for comparing scores, but that the actual test of intelligence 
is gender neutral (435-436). Lasségue does allow the gendered aspect of the test to 
remain ambiguous, but he does so in order to reject the test and Turing’s thinking as 
illegitimate for scientific work. Most often in contemporary versions of this test, gender 
is erased completely (Copeland & Proudfoot, “The Computer, Artificial Intelligence, and 
the Turing Test;” Schnelle, “A Note on Enjoying Strawberries with Cream;” Whitby, 
Artificial Intelligence). Even Turing erases the gendered aspect of the test in later 
arguments for mechanical intelligence (“Can Automatic Calculating Machines Be Said to 
Think”). He, too, must have felt the discomfort of this ambiguous relation between 
human and machine life. By erasing gender from the test, these men proceed with a more 
cleanly demarcated difference between man and machine. Arguably, by erasing gender, 
they are then able to define intelligence free of the complex particularities of bodies. 
I am not interested in providing the most accurate or effective reading of how to design or 
execute the Turing test. Instead, I want to take this ambiguous relation and allow it to 
remain productively ambiguous. This is because in this ambiguous relation between 
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human and machine we find a discursive gendering of not only machines but also 
intelligence. Like Hayles, I wonder “What do gendered bodies have to do with the 
erasure of embodiment and the subsequent merging of machine and human intelligence” 
(xii). Hayles leaves this question regarding Turing unanswered while she turns in detail to 
the Macy Conferences and their role in discursively segregating bodies and material. 
However, Turing’s article is especially significant exactly because he does not allow for a 
clear distinction between human and machine experience and intelligence nor does he 
allow for an erasure of bodies. Instead, he leaves a dynamic chiasmic relation between 
human and machine. Next, I will demonstrate this ambiguity by addressing the particular 
embodiment of the machine, the feminizing discourse, and finally the relations between 
gender and intelligence. 
 
Gendering the Turing Test 
As with all of Turing’s writing, embodiment can be found in “Computing Machinery and 
Intelligence” informing Turing’s thinking, his invention, and also his concern with the 
design and capabilities of thinking machines. However, in this article the character of that 
embodiment is unique in so far as the machines are gendered to a degree that is unusual 
in technical writing, and even Turing’s unusual style of technical writing. But notably, 
feminizing intelligent machinery can be found throughout the article. Gendering 
technologies through discourse is by no means unusual. Brian Easlea demonstrates that, 
when building the technology for nuclear warfare, the engineers and scientists 
consistently framed themselves as fathers birthing and breeding their nuclear weapons. 
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However, Easlea also demonstrates that the scientists or engineers as well as the 
technologies themselves were gendered masculine. Through technology, these men 
metaphorically erased the need for female reproduction. Feminist scholars and gender 
theory scholars have demonstrated the many ways that computers, weapons, and other 
technologies in the 20th century were gendered as masculine, thereby becoming 
technological extensions of masculine strength and power (see Grint and Gill; Seidler; 
Cockburn). Contrary to this discursive code, Turing genders both the machine and its 
inventors as feminine.  
 The first way that Turing genders this intelligent machine is by the gendered test. 
The man and the woman are supposed to serve as a ‘control group’—a standard to 
evaluate how effectively an interrogator can guess the ‘true’ body based only on the 
subject’s responses. The man A is supposed to pretend to be a woman. The questions for 
this test are decidedly feminized: “will X please tell me the length of his or her hair” 
(441). Even when the interrogator is choosing between a human (unsure if that is male or 
female) and a computer, the questions are still ambiguously gendered: “please write me a 
sonnet on the subject of the Forth Bridge” (442). The interrogator also asks about chess, 
and poses a mathematical problem, which the machine answers incorrectly. Later, Turing 
does refer to the human player in the human/machine examination with masculine 
pronouns. The woman in the first scenario seems to have disappeared without 
explanation or comment.  
Although Turing seems to have dropped the woman in this test, other forms of 
gendering can be found throughout the article. We also find feminizing phrases and 
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metaphors throughout this article. Turing writes, “we do not wish to penalize the machine 
for its inability to shine in beauty competitions” (442). Here, Turing humorously 
imagines how poorly his ‘baby’ will perform when evaluated for its physical beauty. 
When considering what qualifies as intelligence, Turing writes this beautiful list of things 
that qualify as intelligence but that the machine cannot do:  
Fall in love, enjoy strawberries and cream, make some one fall in love with it, 
learn from experience, use words properly, be the subject of its own thought, have 
as much diversity of behavior as a man, do something really new. (453) 
Turing then addresses each of these concerns and argues for ways that machines can be 
said to perform these forms of thinking. We also find feminine gendering with Turing’s 
inclusion of emotion. But not just any emotion: falling in love and making someone [or 
some machine] fall in love with a machine. Notice, sandwiched between falling in love 
and being loved, Turing includes the feminizing and somewhat sexualizing “enjoy 
strawberries and cream.” With these considerations, Turing aligns the performance of 
intelligence with stereotypically feminine activities. It is also notable that in this long list 
of things a computer is not supposed to be able to do, Turing address each of the 
objections, but he leaves falling in love or being fallen in love with unanswered. In these 
ways, Turing’s feminizing discourse destabilizes the usual relations expected between 
human bodies and machine bodies. 
To be sure, gendering a machine as female is no rare task. There is a historic 
precedent for gendering tools, bodies, and things that are seen as in the service of life as 
feminine. One of the very first films on the possibility of machines to run out of control, 
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Metropolis, portrays technology not only as feminine but also as hyper-sexualized 
femininity. Ships have long been christened with feminine names and adorned with 
feminine figures. Pilots name their planes women’s names. Car companies feminize their 
products in order to appeal to male drivers. However, Turing’s use of feminizing 
discursive practices is unique because Turing is gendering technology not as a tool for 
use but as a new form of intelligence. This feminized construction is a thinking machine, 
and that thinking is not in the service of someone or something else, but in the service of 
thinking itself. In particular, feminine gendering, in this article, is constructed as an 
essential and even defining quality of intelligence and humanity, thus making the 
feminization particularly important.  
Consider what Turing imagined what this machine could do: play chess, write 
poems, learn language, and sing songs. This machine then, is doing the creative, 
intelligent work. Some of these tasks, like math and chess, are characterized as 
masculine. (Turing almost exclusively played chess with men. The one woman who he 
found to be a worth chess opponent he also proposed to marry. Turing continually 
remarked on how she could play chess like the men. He called off the engagement after a 
few months.) At the same time, the machine could do things like write poetry and sing 
songs that are associated with femininity. The pursuit of these arts, especially by 
connecting them to the sciences, was decidedly feminizing move. This brought 
considerations of taste, emotion, and pleasure into a field that has been dominated by a 
telos of productive, efficiency, and rationality.  
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What about the scientists who ‘raise’ this machine? How does this article gender 
their role in connection with the machine? This would include Turing as well as any 
technician or scientist constructing a thinking machine. To begin, Turing specifically 
states, in one especially strange place, that Turing would need to be “all of one sex” 
(443). At Manchester, the team would have been composed primarily of men. Some 
women also aided in the coding and operation of the machine, but they would have had a 
secondary, supportive role in the operation of the machine. No women were included in 
the public debates over machine intelligence. One may expect that these expert minds 
that Turing describes would be masculine gendered due to being an all male group, and 
also associated as masters over this machine. But that is not what we find. Instead, Turing 
genders the scientists as feminine also. They are all mothers. When discussing the work 
of coding instructions for this machine, Turing uses the analogy: 
Suppose Mother wants Tommy to call at the cobbler’s every morning on his way 
to school to see if her shoes are done, she can ask him afresh every morning. 
Alternatively she can stick up a notice once and for all in the hall which he will 
see when he leaves for school… and also destroy the notice when he comes back 
if he has the shoes with him. (445) 
In this example, the work of coding is compared to a mother training a child. This work is 
done in a domestic sphere, the home, and for domestic pursuits, getting her shoes fixed. 
The narration that Turing writes differs significantly from his earlier proposal for training 
with pleasure and pain. Here, the material coder gives instructions and tasks without 
threatening the child-like machine. Later, Turing identifies the work of setting up the 
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initial state of the mind (either human or machine) as a “birth” (460). These (male) 
mothers (scientists) first birth, then raise and train their ‘baby’ to perform tasks, learn 
new skills, sing songs, and write poetry. Turing’s chiasmic rhetoric creates a unique 
feminine gendering of an all-male, typically masculine, group of engineers, technicians, 
and scientists.  
This gendering should not be misunderstood as Turing’s assigning any essentially 
gendered qualities to machines. Both the gender as well as the intelligence cannot be 
thought of as genuine or original. In this test, originality and authenticity cannot be 
included as criteria for judging gender or intelligence. Originality, Turing finds, is not 
necessary or even possible for machines or humans. The gender of both the man and the 
woman was a deception or a performance, not an authentic quality determined by their 
bodies. Even creative works and intellectual work are not original. When addressing the 
objection that the machine can only produce new solutions or combinations out of what 
the machine has been given by the engineers, Turing finds that machines are not alone in 
their lack of pure originality: “There is nothing new under the sun.’ Who can be certain 
that ‘original work’ that he has done was not simply the growth of the seed planted in 
him by teaching, or the effect of following well-known general principles” (455). In this 
way, Turing identifies the intelligence of humans and machines to be equally shaped by 
education, ability, and previous experience, even language and culture. 
In fact, not only is authenticity outside of this consideration, but also the abilities 
to trick and to fail are not only incidental but also pre-requisites for intelligence. Turing 
states this explicitly: “The question, “Can machines think?” should be replaced by “are 
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there imaginable digital computers which would do well in an imitation game?” ” (448). 
Even in the first test between man and woman, Turing states the man’s “object in the 
games it to try and cause C [interrogator] to make the wrong identification” (441). Turing 
includes deception in this test by having the machine produce an incorrect answer in 
response to a calculation: in response to “add 34957 to 70764,” the computer first waits 
30 seconds then answers “105621” (442). The computer would actually need to decide to 
fail in order to “deliberately introduce mistakes in a matter calculated to confuse the 
interrogator” (454). When directly addressing the objection that intelligence requires the 
ability to err or fail, Turing agrees that, hypothetically, machines cannot err, but, 
practically, the functioning of the machinery and the code both lead to errors. More than 
that, at times these failures to follow the expected conclusions are not errors at all, but 
new conclusions. “Machines take me by surprise with great frequency,” Turing relates 
(455). One way in which the Manchester University Computer took its inventors by 
surprise was with the little love letters that they programed the machine to produce. 
Shortly before Turing’s death, Christopher Strachey, Turing’s colleague at Manchester, 
programed computers to write letters  (Hodges 477-478). These love letters were 
awkward. But, to these inventors who were so invested in this baby, these random 
compositions of stereotypical affection were surprisingly charming notes that were posted 
about the halls of the Manchester Computing department:  
DARLING SWEETHEART 
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YOU ARE MY AVID FELLOW FEELING. MY AFFECTION CURIOUSLY 
CLINGS TO YOUR PASSIONATE WISH. MY LIKING YEARNS FOR YOUR 
HEART. YOU ARE MY WISTFUL SYMPATHY: MY TENDER LIKING. 
YOURS BEAUTIFULLY 
M. U. C.  
Turing at the Beginning of Posthumanism 
Hence, we find a notion of intelligence that is gendered, performative, and deceptive in 
“Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” Turing’s discourse creates a blurred distinction 
between human and computer intelligence. These ambiguous distinctions between human 
and machine are significant because these disrupt humanist definitions of intelligence that 
have so often excluded women and people of color. And Turing acknowledges this 
significance of his work. He writes that arguments that exclude animals and machines 
from intelligent thought resonate with many of the same claims that have excluded 
women from intellectual pursuits (449). Jefferson charges Turing with erasing the 
quintessential humanness from intelligence. However, Turing is not erasing the human as 
much as he is disrupting what it means to be a thinking subject. And in doing so, Turing 
also disrupts the security of the humanist subject. In place of a humanist subject, he 
describes an early version of the posthuman subject. Hayles also describes “Computing 
Machinery and Intelligence” as a “primal scene” for the posthuman subject (xii). Before I 
continue to describe the posthuman subjectivity found in Turing’s article, let me define 
the distinctions between humanist and posthuman subjects. By humanist I mean a liberal, 
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atomistic, notion of humans as the authentic owner of a unique body and identity and the 
executer of unique will. This is the human that the enlightenment defined.  
By post-human, I mean the subject who is always already embedded and 
constructed in relation to other humans, objects, technologies, institutions, and rhetorics. 
Hayles writes that the posthuman subject is first a foremost a notion of embodied 
subjectivity that is culturally and technologically embedded: “embodiment makes clear 
that thought is a much broader cognitive function depending for its specificities on the 
embodied form enacting it. This realization, with all its exfoliating implications, is so 
broad in its effects and so deep in its consequences that it is transforming the liberal 
subject, regarded as the model of the human since the Enlightenment, into the post 
human” (xiv). When Barad calls for a posthumanist performativity, she starts with her 
revised notion of agency, not as a thing which humans own and administer, but as a 
dynamic process of intra-actions. And these intra-actions are material-discursive 
practices, which are also rhetorical practices. The significance here is that agency is 
distributed between and among humans, non-human animals, and really the entire 
material, discursive world. The most significant shift here is that human life is not the 
only form of life that is active. Humans share active, constituting, and even discursive 
practices in relation and negotiation with “the world-body space in its dynamic 
structuration” (“Posthuman Performativity” 147). For Haraway, the posthuman 
subjectivity is ironic and tense but in that confusion tension she argues for the “cyborg as 
a fiction mapping our social and bodily reality and as an imaginative resource suggesting 
some very fruitful couplings” (149). This fruitful coupling that Haraway describes 
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resembles the chiasmic relations of bodies and discourse: both are tense, productive, and 
even overflowing.  
 
Feminist Posthumanism 
Braidotti, Hayles, and Haraway all theorize posthuman subjectivity while also 
recognizing the limitations of the posthuman figure. In Braidotti’s analysis of posthuman 
subjectivity, she does want to find a way to use posthumanism as a critical interjection 
into ethics that accounts for human within a complex network of non-human actors and 
environments. However, she also very soberly recognizes that the post-human shift is 
also at the heart of advanced capitalism and bio-genetic technologies, which she 
addresses as a “perverse” and at times “inhumane” capability of the posthuman notion of 
subjectivity (4-5). Likewise Katherine Hayles is critical of the posthuman subject in so 
far as its discourse gradually ossified a notion of information and knowledge that is 
separate and transcendent from material and bodies. This is not a physical erasure. 
Rather, she identifies the rhetorical production of an epistemic commitment to 
information without matter. However, behind this discourse of disembodiment, Hayles 
always points towards the often-excluded bodies and material form. Haraway has been 
read as an overly naïve celebrator of posthuman cyborg subjectivity (e.g. Bordo 228; 
Wendell, 169). However, she does recognize the many ways that posthuman is tied 
systems of control and exploitation. For example, she writes, “Modern production seems 
like a dream of cyborg colonization work, a dream that makes the nightmare of 
Taylorism seem idyllic. And modern war is a cyborg orgy, coded by C3I, command-
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control-communication-intelligence, an $84 billion item in 1984's US defense budget” 
(149). In addition, Haraway identifies how cyborg subjectivity disproportionately 
intervenes women’s bodies and restricts women’s experiences and possibilities. 
Haraway’s cyborg is in a “pleasurably tight coupling” with both disruptive and 
controlling potentials (152). All of these texts analyze digital technology in relation to 
human bodies. From that analysis they reveal the significant political and ethical issues. 
In particular, they reveal the ways that technologies intersect with gender and politics of 
sexual difference.  
For Braidotti, Hayles, and Haraway, post-humanism is a fact of our current social 
condition. Hayles writes that the machine in Turing’s test doesn’t even have to pass the 
test in order to establish post-human subjects. This test is from the beginning based on 
post-human presuppositions: 
The important intervention comes not when you try to determine which is the 
man, the woman, or the machine. Rather, the important intervention comes much 
earlier, when the test puts you into a cybernetic circuit…in which represented 
bodies are joined with enacted bodies through mutating and flexible machine 
interfaces… no matter what identifications you assign to the embodied entities 
that you cannot see, you have already become posthuman” (Hayles xiv) 
Simply the act of setting up the test—asking a human to judge intelligence based on 
questioning unseen subjects and reading text off of a computer screen—presupposes a 
post-human subject. For Braidotti, post-humanism is a fact of our current social 
conditions but it is also a shift that opens grey areas and “introduces a qualitative shift in 
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our thinking about what exactly is the basic unit of common reference for our species, our 
polity, and our relationship to the other inhabitants of this planet” (1). Haraway also 
identifies a posthuman subject, always interpolated with technology, throughout human 
history. Whenever tools, even language, structure the human experience, then pure, 
atomistic notions of humanism become contaminated with the construction from 
technologies, materials, and contingent historical contexts.  And this interpolation opens 
possibilities: “The cyborg skips the step of original unity, of identification with nature in 
the Western sense” (150). 
Although they all recognize the ways that posthumanism perpetuates and extends 
systems of human oppression, Hayles, Braidotti, Barad and Haraway all look for fissures 
or ruptures that are possible with posthuman subjectivity that were not possible with the 
notion atomistic, unified notions of human. These all find in the posthuman subject a grey 
area or an ambiguity that allows for the possibility of positive change. Braidotti writes 
that she has never been given access to this humanist self and has no nostalgia for its loss. 
Haraway writes that she would rather be a cyborg than to strive for the impossible ideal 
of goddess. It is surprising to me that Turing’s writing does not play a more central role 
in any of any of these discussions of posthumanism. Only Hayles even mentions Turing, 
and that is only in her prologue, which sets up the Turing test as an important moment of 
birth for posthuman subjectivity. Although he is never discussed in these feminist 
contexts, I believe that Turing may have been of like mind with Braidotti and Haraway: 
the computer intelligence, a kind of posthuman subject, opens up possibilities and new 
forms of thinking that did not replicate humanist definitions of intelligence, but rather 
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created alternatives. I am not attempting to anachronistically commit Turing to a feminist 
notion of posthuman liberation. However, we can extrapolate from “Computing 
Machinery and Intelligence” that Turing does define and also advocate for an alternative 
definition of human that merges gendered, fallible bodies with the computational thinking 
and machinery. Thus, Turing contributes to the destabilizing posthuman figure that 
connects human and technologies. His chiasmic rhetoric produces destabilizes humanist 
definitions of intelligence so that bodies, machines, and mind all overflow with 
significance beyond their siloed humanist definitions 
The form of computing intelligence that Turing describes in this article challenges 
a humanist notion in which intelligence is defined as the sole property of humans. In 
particular, Turing’s chiasmic rhetoric extends this challenge by adding bodily difference 
to Turing’s intelligent machine. And that challenge was understood immediately, causing 
a sense of fear regarding Turing’s computer. Although Turing would not have called his 
notion of computer intelligence a posthuman subject, he did define this as a form of 
heresy against traditional notions of humanism (“Intelligent Machinery: A Heretical 
Theory”). And in this heretical theory of machine intelligence, Turing blurs the lines 
between human and machine terms that integrate the gendered, sexual, error-prone messy 
lives of humans into the too-often assumed sterile, purely logical work in computers.   
 
Gendering Intelligence 
What we find in this Turing’s chiasmic rhetoric discursively constructs a 
destabilizing relation between humans and machines. In particular, the relation between 
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bodies, humans, intelligence and technology is destabilized from a humanist notion by 
Turing’s addition of feminine gendering. In Turing’s article, not only are bodies and 
intelligence connected, in addition, femininity and intelligence are also dynamically 
related.  In this article, we have a productive example of the blurring line. In particular, 
this unbalanced and ambiguous description is a place in which gender is the key to 
intelligence. Here, Turing femininizes not just a machine (this is not a fembot like what 
we see in Metropolis) but he also feminizes intelligence itself. He first genders this 
machine in feminine ways. He also by then identifies intelligence with the performance 
of tasks that are both masculine as well as feminine. Which is not to say that these tasks 
are gender neutral, rather, Turing genders intelligent machinery with an ambivalent 
tendency towards feminine as well as masculine tasks. The form of thinking that are 
traditionally associated as masculine—mathematics, rule-based tasks, logical proofs—
these were tasks that Turing already knew that the machine could do. In order to prove its 
‘intelligence’ Turing would need to also prove that the machine could perform modes of 
thinking that have traditionally been gendered feminine. The machine’s access to 
intelligence hangs on its ability to be gendered feminine.  
  Chiasmic rhetoric produced at the intersection of these bodies (both machine and 
human) and Turing’s text here certainly unstable. And that instability is a chiasmic 
rhetoric that lets us see the negotiating relation between gender and intelligence. Where 
as gender and intelligence are typically cleanly partitioned so as to seem naturally 
separate, Turing’s article connects and relates the two in a way that is unique and also 
challenging to traditional notions of intelligence that excluded embodiment, emotion, and 
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even women. In addition Turing’s chiasmic rhetoric in “Computer Machinery and Human 
Intelligence” makes no pretense of naturalness or stability. Rather, the dynamic and 
unusual relation between gender and intelligence calls attention to the relationing 
performed in this text. In this off-balanced chiasmic rhetoric, we see feminizing 
intelligence as a crucial move for defining intelligence in machinery.  
 Throughout this chapter, I have wanted to find places in which Turing is not a 
passive victim. However, here as elsewhere, I cannot say that Turing decided or wanted 
to feminize intelligence as a subversive choice that disrupts humanist notions of 
intelligence. I don’t think it was that simple or that deliberate. However, this result of his 
material-discursive performance in this text has produced rhetorical force that does 
disturb definitions of human and computer. In their reified articulations, our relations to 
bodies are barely perceptible. Bodies are ossified so that they are perceived as passive, 
natural, and permanent. Turing’s writing disturbs this ossified because he articulates a 
strange and even disturbing relation between machines and bodies. In particular, he does 
this by gendering the machines. The effect is that machines move closer toward 
intelligence by also moving them closer towards the embodied, gendered, sexualized 
experience of humans. 
At the same time, like Hayles, Braidotti, and Haraway, I also recognize that with 
this posthuman subject comes the possibility of being co-opted and controlled by the 
status quo. With time, that has been what has happened: gender was removed from the 
test and the computer was evaluated under more and more masculinized notions of 
intelligence like problem-solving, mathematics, and rule-based game play. Nevertheless, 
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in this article, we see a brief moment in which the relations between bodies and 
intelligence are disrupted by the chiasmic rhetoric of a man who took delight in 
composing this heretical argument. His composition process for “Computing Machinery 
and Intelligence” was apparently delightful. He wrote this quickly and read it back to his 
friend Robin Gandy. Gandy relates that Turing giggled in parts, smiling as he performed 
this text that was intended to solicit a strong reaction. Although this text has sense then 
been interpreted in more sterile ways, and although Turing may not have fully realized 
the impact of gendering machinery in this way, the text continues to exist as a place of 
negotiation and also as a place where Turing’s unique mind, body, and experience 
produce a chiasmic rhetoric that exposes a dynamic and re-forming relation between 
bodies and intelligence.   
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CHIASMUS 6: 
COMPOSING THROUGH CHIASMUS 
“We can only see a short distance ahead, 
but we can see plenty there that needs to be done.” 
~Turing 
“We do not even know what a body can do.” 
~Spinoza 
Chiasmic rhetoric has been my heuristic and theoretical framework for analyzing 
relations between bodies and discourses. I have developed this notion of chiasmic 
rhetoric from theoretical work on feminism, gender theory, literary theory, and rhetorical 
figures. In the life and text of Turing, I have used chiasmic rhetoric in order to 
demonstrate that these relations are productive: they produce Turing as a subject and they 
produce Turing’s original knowledge and inventions. But this dissertation also began 
broadly with the always already connected relations between bodies and rhetoric. 
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My development of chiasmic rhetoric touches on notions of figuration—figures of 
flesh and figures of text—more broadly than Turing’s particular body and his particular 
texts. By broadly, I mean that the implications of this research engage with a larger set of 
discourses beyond Alan Turing’s body and text. My first introduction to theories of 
bodies and writing came through the embodied, lyric performance of Luce Irigaray. 
When we write, Irigaray claims, we are also composing our bodies within a system of 
sexual difference. However, the figure of writing is not passive or neutral towards all 
bodily differences and all embodiments. In An Ethics of Sexual Difference Luce Irigaray 
composes a performative critique of the phallocentric forms of philosophical discourse. 
At once, she exposes the male embodiment and sexuality defining the norms and forms 
of writing and also uncovers the definitional exclusion of femininity on which these texts 
are composed. Irigaray was perhaps where I began, but my research has been informed 
by rich conversations on bodies and writing. For instance, Jean-Luc Nancy defines bodies 
as a corpus, which is composed anew with each touch between writing and flesh. Cixous 
urges women: “Write yourself. Your body must be heard” through poetics (880). And 
Cixous’ intersection between bodies and writing is also a politically subversive act that 
challenges patriarchal values and modes of composing knowledge. Donna Haraway also 
finds feminist leverage in the embodied point-of-views that allow for forms of ‘objective’ 
knowledge. She theorizes the bodies that ground objectivity in order to “insist on the 
embodied nature of all vision and so reclaim the sensory system that has been used to 
signify a leap out of the marked body and into a conquering gaze from 
nowhere…Feminist objectivity means quite simply situated knowledges” (“Situated 
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Knowledges” 581). In all of these texts and so many more that I could list, bodies and 
discourse intersect. In addition, those intersections between bodies and discourses 
produce knowledge. In addition, especially for feminists, these intersections are 
potentially disruptive. At the same time, these same interactions between discourse and 
bodies can punish, discipline, control and exclude bodily differences.  
My dissertation research does not necessarily extend these discourses. Instead, 
this dissertation is built on the same epistemological commitments to the relations 
between bodies and texts. This dissertation is committed to the epistemological 
grounding that all knowledge is situated in particular embodied experiences and 
differences. Feminist scholars of science and technology, especially Haraway, Hayes, 
Fausto-Sterling, Keller, Hekman and others, have shown the many ways that bodies 
inform our knowledge production within scientific communities. This dissertation brings 
together these discourses in order to demonstrate how Turing’s particular embodied 
experiences and his particular texts intersect to produce his subjectivity and his 
knowledge. What is more, this dissertation extends these epistemological commitments 
into the rhetoric of science and technology. Chiasmic rhetoric forms our scientific and 
technical knowledge.  
 Chiasmic rhetoric is just one way to understand these relations. Chiasmus has 
productively aided me to theorize increasingly complex relations between bodies and 
discourse. In addition, chiasmus has created such a strong bond between bodies and 
discourse that this project has been able to demonstrate the ways that embodiment 
informs the writing and thinking of Alan Turing, who is often considered a disembodying 
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figure. However, chiasmus has its limitations. To begin, chiasmus only intersects two 
things. This reproduces a binary relation where a heterogeneous form may best suit the 
experience of embodiment. I have run up against this limitation multiple times in this 
dissertation research. For the most part, I’ve described chiasmus as the relation between 
bodies and discourse. However, I also use chiasmus to figure relations between bodies, 
identities, knowledge, and technologies. In order to fully describe the many relations that 
compose both Turing’s body and his knowledge, perhaps chiasmus is still too simple. A 
more complex figure is still needed. Nevertheless, chiasmus is a starting point that has 
allowed for analysis of intersecting, dynamic, and destabilizing relations between bodies 
and discourse.     
 
Uncovering Bodies 
Chiasmic rhetoric allowed for a rich analysis through several moves of increasing 
complexity. I began with contrary antithesis, a relation of mutual exclusivity, in order to 
explain the relation that is typically constructed between bodies and writing. However, I 
used feminist theories and a close reading of Turing’s text in order to demonstrate that 
this relation of antithesis could not be maintained: locations of overlap and connection 
were always present in the text. The first chiasmic move is to connect. As an X, chiasmus 
always connects. So too, bodies and discourse are inseparable, but also not collapsible 
into each other. Then chiasmus moved again to become dynamically productive. Both 
sides of chiasmus—the rhetorical figure as well as the figuring between bodies and 
discourse—enact force on each other. The result is that, by connecting, each side changes 
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the other. This is a process of co-constructing both bodies and discourses. Together, these 
bodies and discourses produce new knowledge and invention for Alan Turing. However, 
these are not simply productive co-constructions. This chiasmic interaction also 
disciplines and controls bodies. Finally, I turn the most active chiasmic movement: 
destabilizing. At this point the interactions between the two sides of chiasmus seem to 
overflow and exceed each other. In the case of Turing, we found that his gendering 
discourse exceeded beyond gendering of human bodies into the gendering of computers 
as well as feminizing intelligence itself. This moment is significant because, when bodies 
overflow to frame computer and intelligence, normative relations between bodies and 
technologies are destabilized.  This destabilized relation was quickly sterilized by erasing 
the feminizing gendered discourse from the Turing test. Nevertheless, this chiasmic 
analysis brings gendering discourse to the forefront in order to argue that gendering and 
embodiment were central to Turing’s thinking and writing.  
From these movements of chiasmic rhetoric, we find bodies interesting with 
discourse in places where we may not expect to find bodies. This project finds the bodies 
that have always already been present in Alan Turing’s texts. This chiasmic relations 
between bodies and discourse in of Alan Turing’s writing revealed the rhetorically, 
epistemic, and inventive ways that Turing’s body, the bodies in his text, and the bodies 
around his text all give shape to the his inventions and rhetoric. For instance, his 
experiences losing his friend motivated his initial thinking about cognition outside of 
human body. His physical experience solving mathematical problems informs his design 
of digital computation. And his experience as a disciplined subject of sexuality and 
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governmentality also inform his plan for training a computer and also his definition on 
what that intelligence could include.  
 
Uncovering Bodies in the Rhetorics of Science and Technology 
One of the primary contributions of this research is to the fields of rhetoric of science and 
technology. Within these fields, science is understood as a rhetorical activity out of which 
facts are constructed. The work of Bruno Latour is surely notable for its contributions 
towards how fact are constructed by people, in spaces, in relation to objects and 
institutions, disciplinary practices and values, as well as discursive practices (Laboratory 
Life). Facts are constructed within an entire network, which he calls the circulatory 
system of the larger body of knowledge production (Pandora’s Hope). Scholars of 
rhetoric of science have long come to understand the significance of discourse for 
knowledge production (Bazerman; Myers; Campbell; Fahnestock). For instance, Boyd 
argues some theory constitutive metaphors are essential for science to translate between 
causal relations in the world to conceptual relations in language. For these metaphors, the 
rhetorical trope itself forms the knowledge of the theory or fact not-yet known. Gross 
makes a stronger claim that rhetoric is constitutive of scientific knowledge (Rhetoric of 
Science) although he hedges that claim significantly in his more recent publication 
Starring the Text. The rhetoric of science and also science studies more broadly have 
continually shown how our scientific knowledges are inseparable from the words, 
figures, forms, and strategies of composing science in discourse (Taylor). My research 
extends these discussions by demonstrating that the rhetoric of science is also as an 
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embodied rhetoric. This is especially significant because I am drawing from a definition 
of bodies developed by material feminism, in which our embodiment is always volatile, 
singular, and also co-constructed within power relations.  
 Because I argue that bodies are singular, we find that there are particularities and 
even peculiarities in Alan Turing’s scientific rhetoric. For instance, Gross has 
demonstrated that the IMRAD (Introduction, Methods, Results and Discussion) presents 
an inductive process of scientific discovery (Rhetoric of Science; also see Penrose and 
Katz, Writing in the Sciences). This form sets the standard from presenting and 
developing scientific knowledge. However, Turing never once utilizes the IMRaD form 
in his scientific writing nor does he present his thinking as an inductive process. Rather, 
his style his unusual and even unprofessional by general standards. His articles most 
frequently begin with a proposition that he is seeking to develop or defend. For instance, 
he begins “Nature of Spirit” by asking about the relation between spirit and the body. In 
his report to the National Physics Lab, “Mechanical Intelligence,” Turing opens by 
writing “I propose to investigate the question as to whether it is possible for machinery to 
show intelligent behavior” (410). Then he immediately addresses several common 
objections. He never presents data. Much of what he proposes is hypothetical, 
imaginative, and even personally significant. Likewise, in his most famous article 
“Computing Machines and Intelligence,” Turing opens with the question “can machines 
think,” then continues to propose the “imitation game” to define what it means to think. 
This is also highly imaginative and creative. Turing never conforms to the form of 
scientific writing. In addition, it is clear that his thinking is also peculiar. His inventions 
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and scientific theories are not inductive. Rather, they are deductive and often that 
deductive process starts from a personal knowledge.  
 Technical rhetoric is also notable for its characteristic style of expediency, which 
Katz identified in his analysis of Nazi technical documents (“Ethics of Expediency”). 
Katz not only identifies expediency as a key quality of Nazi ethics of technical writing; in 
addition, he finds that expediency is the defining ethic of technology itself. A third 
quality of technical and scientific writing is to maintain an objective, disinterested point 
of view. Certainly, since at least Francis Bacon, the distance between the scientist and the 
object of study must remain impassionate, objective, and disinterested. Turing, however, 
as I have described his work, is an exception to that rule.  When we consider the relation 
between his embodied experiences and his technical writing, we can also begin to notice 
all of the ways that Turing is both inexpedient and also subjective: he writes imaginative 
tangents, he muses about hypothetical situations, he writes in first person, his theories are 
clearly informed by his personal experiences, especially his experiences being disciplined 
and trained through education.  
By studying Alan Turing’s writing as embodied writing, I have explained his 
writing and thinking, which do not conform to the most significant expectations within 
his discourse communities, within the context of his unique life and singular embodied 
experiences. He lived and wrote in a way that resisted the expected forms. Most notably 
this is seen in relation to his sexuality. He was a homosexual man in the ultra 
conservative society of mid-20th century England, one that employed chemical castration 
as punishment and also a ‘cure’ for those found guilty. He was open about his sexuality. 
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What is more, even when he was arrested and tried, Turing refused to defend himself as 
he held a conviction that there was nothing indecent or criminal about his sexual 
behavior. More generally, he was also a peculiar man in his day-to-day life. Although 
elite British society maintained rigorous standards of etiquette and polite society, Turing 
seemed unaware or merely disinterested in many of these expected social graces. He was 
peculiar: he rode on a broken down bike, he tied his pants up with a rope, he never 
participated in social clubs, and was often sweaty or dirty while working in the 
laboratory, he said strange things, and never ceased to think of mathematics and 
computing machines. But he seemed committed to living his life in the way that suited 
his body, mind, and personality.   
 Also, given that bodies are always already composed within power structures and 
political networks, bodies also create an intersection between those power structures and 
the scientific texts. In this way, Turing’s body forms a nexus between the scientific 
knowledge he composes and the power structures that co-construct his body. In 
particular, those power structures define and discipline bodies in terms of sexuality and 
gender. These gendered and sexual power dynamics shape Turing’s body and they also 
shape the knowledge that Turing composes. In particular, power dynamics that define and 
regulate gendered norms also inform Turing’s definition of artificial intelligence. 
However, Turing, in a typically-for-him queer move, uses these gendered norms to 
compose a disruptive notion of embodied intelligence that is both feminine as well as 
surprisingly humane.  
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Hence, my with this theory of chiasmic rhetoric, I have been able to contribute to 
the rhetoric of science by adding the complexity inherent in the interactions between 
bodies and discourse that together produce new knowledge. Although my dissertation 
focuses on the embodied composition of technical writing, the chiasmic interactions 
between bodies and discourse inform all writing. Therefore, the value of chiasmic 
rhetoric extends well beyond technical writing and into every composition, including the 
composition classroom.  
 
Bodies in Composition  
While we have studied bodies in composition theory for a very long time, I will point out 
some significant contributions that chiasmic rhetoric brings to the teaching of writing. In 
particular, scholars who want to leverage ‘the body’ in composition tend to privilege 
affect and embodiment as positive and productive. As we’ve seen from Turing’s writing, 
disciplinary practices that regulate and punish bodies also focus on bodily experiences 
and affect. Consider, for example, Sondra Perl as one writer who argued that composition 
must focus on bodies but who does not account for the ways that this attention to bodies 
can be both painful, disciplining, and controlling. Perl’s methods of writing with the body 
is built first and foremost on a need to create a protected space, a safe space, for a writer 
to explore her own interests, perspectives, and writing processes. Perl begins by 
addressing those scary moments of first starting a project. And her project is to design 
methods of moving beyond those scary moments toward comfortable composition. And 
for Perl, comfortable writing is the felt sense of embodied writing Once in a comfortable 
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space, writing with the body can start to flow. If we listen to her CD we hear “Breathe 
deeply, repeat the topic to yourself, sense into your body.” Moments later we hear “wait 
patiently for a word, a phrase”… then more peaceful silence. Through Perl’s process, a 
writer can access the knowledge of felt sense in our bodies that may have otherwise been 
repressed.   
Peter Elbow, like Perl, begins by discussing the dissonance experienced in much 
writing: the frustration of getting stuck on the wrong word, the feeling of “nausea” when 
you’ve worked and worked on something until you can’t look at it any more. When free 
writing, our vernacular language can be used to free ourselves from the pain, discomfort, 
or blocks of more critical, self-conscious writing. As Elbow describes, can use our 
embodied sense to feel our way past this discomfort of writing. And that embodied sense, 
Elbow finds most of the time, is a sense that leads to good writing. While thought in 
Elbow’s work is trained and disciplined, eloquent language is described as a mother 
tongue, which is “kinesthetic, as though it is in the body” (Vernacular Eloquence 6). For 
Elbow we should use the naturalness and comfort of our speaking voices to ease the 
writing process towards comfort. In this notion of embodied writing, both the nausea of 
over working on a project and the pleasure of speaking naturally and comfortably are 
embodied writing. However, for Elbow, ideal writing the body is comfortable, natural, 
and fully engaging one’s body through speaking. This embodied writing is similar to the 
flow and freedom that Elbow associates with creative mode of writing in Words of 
Power. In this text, Elbow pairs the creative function of writing with the critical function 
as the two modes that allow for good writing. He separates these modes into the creative 
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intuitive mode of what “feels right,” which is associated with bodily, affective, and 
unconscious experience and knowledge (11). The other mode, the critical mode, he 
describes as “conscious awareness” or “conscious control” (11-12). These two modes 
reinforce and inform each other. Together, for Elbow, these modes compose good 
writing. The problem with this model is that it reinforces a binary between unconscious 
flowing body and conscious critical mind. The first feels good and natural. The second 
does the hard discerning work of judgment and critique. This overlooks the ways that our 
embodied knowledge is also conscious knowledge. In addition, our embodied intuition is 
always already controlled and disciplined.  
In many ways Elbow’s theories have been both useful for improving my writing 
process and product. As a teacher, I have used Elbow and Perl’s theories to describe and 
develop writing processes when teaching composition. Both of these writers offer rich, 
useful methods of writing our bodies and writing eloquently. However, they are also 
leaving much of the complexity and ethical dimensions of embodied writing out of their 
description of the embodied, intuitive mode our writing process. In other words they 
preserve a portion of the writing process for us, as writers and teachers, that feels too 
positive, too easy, comfortable in writing.  
Both Perl and Elbow are commonly associated, even though many challenge these 
associations, with what James Berlin identified as the expressionist theory composition 
pedagogy (“Contemporary Composition”). Berlin and others have critiqued this approach 
to composition pedagogy because it focuses so exclusively on the individual expression 
and lacks critical attention to the ways that what makes “good writing” good is always 
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already composed through political and social disciplinary practices. Given that bodies 
are composed and disciplined through power dynamics and political structures, our 
embodied mode of the writing process is just as culturally, politically, and socially 
informed as any other form of composition.  
 
Bodies in Every Composition 
Chiasmic rhetoric pushes us beyond these expressionist relations between bodies and 
texts. This approach to rhetoric assumes that bodies are always already intersecting with 
text. In addition, these bodies are not naturalistic. These bodies are heavy with the 
complexity of history, politics, culture, and discourse. To move towards this more 
complex relation between bodies and texts, I suggest we ask, “when are we not writing 
our bodies?” Perl and Elbow assume that we are really writing our bodies when we are in 
safe spaces, when we get out of our minds, and when we focus on our bodies, and when 
we more physically enact speech acts orally than through writing. Perl and Elbow both 
describe a process of writing bodies that requires accessing embodied writing through 
processes of clearing our minds, creating safe spaces, and speaking out loud in order to 
allow our bodies to drive writing instead of our analytic minds. Writing our bodies should 
be unencumbered by too much analytic thought so that our embodied experiences and 
embodied knowledge flow onto texts. This assumes that thinking is somehow separate or 
distinct from writing our bodies. It also assumes that writing our bodies is in some way 
the most natural practice of writing. Why should our bodies only play a significant role 
when we’ve cleared our minds and created safe spaces? If we reject a binary between 
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thought and emotion, mind and body, then we can begin to think about how to include 
bodies in composition pedagogy in a wide range of situation, or every situation.  
We must presume that we are always writing our bodies. The chiasmus between 
bodies and discourse is always already intersecting. And this presupposition opens up 
embodied writing into all forms and processes of composition. After all, we can’t write 
without our bodies. We can’t think without our bodies. Given what I have reviewed from 
feminist philosophers, especially Lloyd, Gatens, Grosz, and many others, we know that 
embodiment is necessary aspect of our ontology. Our bodies are a precondition for 
writing. At the same time, our bodies do not exist before or beyond writing, waiting in 
some pure form to be conveyed through language. No, bodies are also constructed, 
disciplined, defined, and come into shape through language. This is the chiasmic 
interaction between bodies and discourse, which is an intersecting, interacting, dynamic 
and at times unstable relationship. 
I want to suggest that writing our bodies is inherently rhetorical mode of writing. I 
do not write my full unique experience in every text I write. No one can communicate his 
or her full self on each page or writing or in each speech act. In addition, writing our 
bodies is in many ways pre-constructed as we only know our bodies in and through 
discourse and performance. Instead of writing our embodiment in its fullness, we 
rhetorically shape the bodies we write into text. We make choices about what we allow 
bodies to do in texts. And we make choices about what we write when we write our 
bodies and others’ bodies. 
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This is not to say that we have full control or choice over our bodies or our 
writing. Our chiasmic rhetoric that intersects writing and bodies, like any rhetoric, is 
incomplete, partial, and not fully in our control. Concepts, experiences, epistemological 
frameworks, material affordances and limitations, and technologies of discourse and 
material: these all slip into our writing in unexpected and not-totally-controlled ways. All 
of these complex factors are inseparable from the chiasmus that integrates bodies and 
discourse. The anomalous ways that bodies slip into writing are as interesting and 
important as the planned, deliberate ways. Within technical writing, these bodies are 
almost always slipping in unintentionally. But those unintentionally embodied, subjective 
rhetoric in technical writing also help us to understand how the text functions rhetorically 
as well as what bodies the text may presuppose, exclude, or marginalize.  
 
Chiasmic Pedagogy: Composing Bodies through Disorienting Composing 
In classes, I aid students towards an awareness of their own embodied practices of 
composition by designing disorienting pedagogy. The word disorienting is specific here. I 
presume that students come into my classrooms already oriented towards language, 
composition, education, and rhetoric. They have learned their orientations through their 
previous experiences in classrooms as well as out of classrooms.  Many times this 
orientation is that language is a transparent, neutral tool to communicate ideas. Other 
times, their orientation towards writing and rhetoric is that they hate writing or are bad at 
writing. Whatever the orientation may be, students are not aware that they have been 
oriented or disciplined through practices of composition. By disorienting, my 
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pedagogical practices call attention to their naturalized notions of writing and 
composition. By teaching disorienting practices, I also teach many alternative patterns, 
behaviors, relations, actions, and technologies for orienting ourselves and our bodies in 
composition. 
In this disorienting pedagogy, I am looking for the opposite of what Elbow and 
Perl describe. They look for an almost natural, easy relation between bodies and 
composition. But chiasmic rhetoric at its best is always in tense negotiations. Elizabeth 
Grosz describes the relation between discourse and bodies as volatile. I use a pedagogical 
method that addresses how negative, stressful, dissonant, and even uncomfortable affect 
be an important method of engaging bodies in composition. Lynn Worsham wants 
writing to be not a form of learning, but unlearning. The goal of this unlearning “does not 
mean that writing produces ignorance; rather, it produces a sense of defamiliarization vis-
à-vis unquestioned forms of knowledge” (101). Worsham calls for a defamiliarization in 
composing that allows us to see how we have been learned. I would call this form of 
learning a kind of disorientation. Additionally, I am informed by Kristie Fleckenstein’s 
notion of writing our bodies. Fleckenstein describes how somatic writing must negotiate 
between senses of immersion and emergence. This writing process “depends on the 
immersion of being-in-a-material-place and the emergence weaving throughout; it 
depends on the continuous hybridization of who and what and where we are. I do not find 
it easy" (298). The examples that she offers for somatic writing that emerges to disrupt 
corporal codes include the biographies of holocaust victims and describes this as the 
“ragged edge of necessity - the experience of hurt and betrayal, the insanity of cultural 
  214 
stories contradicting physical experience” (293). I am not suggesting that all moments of 
discomfort in writing are necessarily political resistance. However, I am suggesting that 
these moments make us see our own performance or constructedness in relation to 
writing and rhetoric. While on the other hand, easy, comforting moments of composition 
may offer a false sense of naturalness.  
How then, do I structure chiasmic rhetoric into my pedagogical practice? Because 
chiasmus is dynamic and even destabilizing, I use disorientation to call attention to the 
relations between our bodies and our compositions. In my classes, we work on 2 
assignments at the same time. I define what qualifies as ‘good work’ for each assignment 
as opposite and even opposed to the other’s definition of ‘good work.’  Each project has 
its foil that requires the opposite set of skills. For instance, for the largest project, the 
research assignment, students write an article in Wikipedia at the same time as they write 
an opinion for the school newspaper.  
These assignments are defined with drastically different audiences, genre, media, 
styles, and purposes. However, both are research projects on the same topic. In class, we 
alternate back and forth, often in class working for 30 minutes on one assignment and 
then 30 minutes on the other assignment. For instance, we may work to define and revise 
for ‘good style’ in Wikipedia then when we switch to do the same activity for the student 
newspaper students must re-orient their approach to style and revision.  
This practice of switching discourse practices creates a change in the students’ 
orientation to language. They must stop the ‘natural’ flow of their writing and become 
more aware of how to create deliberate differences in sentences structure, word choice, 
  215 
voice, and organization. Through this they experience how rhetorical choices ‘feel’ 
different. And students do comment on the disorienting feeling of switching between two 
different definitions of good writing. They write that this is uncomfortable, challenging, 
and requires a level of focus to switch styles. And that challenge is exactly the goal. This 
is a form of rhetorical flexibility that requires keen attention to the details of rhetorically 
effective composition.  
However, this obviously does not by itself make the students more aware of their 
bodies in the composition process. In fact, it could be really confusing. They may 
struggle, but they may not realize why. In order to reflect on these changing practices of 
composition, I structure in a comfortable, reflective space for composition. Each week, in 
class, we spend time writing and sharing personal reflections on their own writing 
process, experiences, practices, and struggles. In this reflective writing assignment, 
students write about their writing. It is here that they begin to see their own discomfort 
and their own physical struggle to write. We talk about how we feel ‘at home’ in some 
kinds of writing, and distant or awkward in other kinds of writing. In this way, my 
disorienting pedagogy is not opposed to comfort and ease in writing. In fact, this 
reflection on the disorientation is essential to help students see when and how they feel 
comfort in language and when and how they feel uncomfortable in language.  
 
Continued Destabilization 
The point is not simply making our students uncomfortable. Instead, I want to help them 
to see that their bodies perform, feel, and experience differently to different practices of 
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composition. This suggests that our bodies are active in our composition processes. From 
this grounding, we can begin to discuss the ways in which their bodies have been trained 
to feel more at home in some writing conventions than in others. Ultimately, the goal is 
not to valorize discomfort over pleasure. Rather, the goal is to expand the ways that we 
think of bodies engaging in writing. More specifically, my approach to pedagogy seeks to 
recognize our bodies as they actively perform in all rhetorical situation and all 
composition processes.  
Again, chiasmic rhetoric is just one place to begin understanding the relations 
between bodies and discourse. Likewise, disorienting pedagogy is just one method that I 
have begun to try. With this approach, I aid students to feel and reflect upon the ways that 
their bodies are active in the composition process, even with technical writing. Through 
disorienting pedagogy, I attempt to facilitate the final move of chiasmus towards 
destabilizing relations between bodies and discourse. By disorienting students and 
producing destabilizing relations between bodies and discourse, I work as a teacher and a 
scholar to make the bodies in our texts ever more visible and palpable. However, much 
more work needs to be done. I also need more time to think, act, and respond as a teacher. 
With each class I learn more from my students. With each new research project, I learn 
more about bodies and writing. As I continue to teach and continue to research, I know 
my thinking on chiasmic rhetoric and composing with chiasmus will change. At the same 
time, I also know that my embodiment and embodied knowledge will change. Only after 
more experience will I be able to fully integrate the insightful, persuasive, inventive, 
uncomfortable, and disciplining embodied knowledge into my pedagogical processes.   
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